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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims to revise the current understanding of the behaviour of different groups 
of traders in financial markets. Research involves statistical analysis of historic 
‗Commitment of Traders‘ reports, a U.S government dataset providing the long and 
short positions of core groups of traders, reported at weekly intervals over 17 years. 
Empirical work identifies a surprising level of consistency amongst different groups 
across 31 markets. A specific pattern is identified: speculators are found to increase their 
buying interest when prices are rising whilst commercial traders (or ‗hedgers‘) increase 
their selling; the opposite pattern of behaviour occurs when prices are falling. The thesis 
explores the implications of this behaviour for existing models of financial markets by 
referencing a number of peer-reviewed studies. The agent-based computational model 
of Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005) is implemented and analysed. A lack of validity is 
demonstrated in the interactions between the different types of traders in this model. 
These theoretical components are further shown to be typical of much of the literature 
in this area. An objective for the thesis is to correct this oversight by incorporating 
genuine patterns of trading behaviour into an existing computational model. The 
approach of Mike and Farmer (2008) is used for this purpose, being currently unique in 
that core components are calibrated from real-world data and no group-level 
representations are assumed. This model is extended to observe groups of traders with 
different levels of order-aggression: speculators are found to rely on market orders 
whereas commercial traders rely on limit orders. These preferences, in the absence of 
deeper theoretical considerations, are sufficient to account for the identified behaviour. 
A discussion is offered on the relevance of this finding for financial market regulators, 
who have typically focused on regulating types of traders, specifically speculators, 
rather than on types of trades. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Contents:    
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Abstract: 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis subject, its chapters, and the motivations 
for research. This encompasses an introduction to financial markets, derivative markets, 
and the basic categorisations of different participants, as well as an overview of some 
ubiquitous statistical properties associated with financial market prices. Computational 
models capable of simulating these statistical idiosyncrasies often propose important 
group-level dynamics involving interactions amongst different types of traders. 
However, these components often lack any genuine empirical foundations. A central 
objective for this thesis is to correct this oversight by documenting genuine patterns of 
trading behaviour amongst participants and incorporating this knowledge into an 
existing computational model. As discussed in this chapter, more realistic 
representations of financial market participants could impose new constraints on 
existing theories and increase the behavioural realism of future computational models 
for more successful practical applications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The system of world financial markets can be viewed as a huge social science 
experiment.” 
Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009, p. 63) 
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1.1 Aim and Objectives 
 
This thesis aims to review and revise the current understanding of the behaviour of 
different groups of traders in financial markets and to offer new empirical research.  For 
the first time, previously unexplored patterns of trading behaviour, that are apparently 
stable and durable across significant periods of time and a wide range of markets, are 
documented in detail. The thesis will consider the preferences and motivations 
underlying behaviour patterns, first by reviewing a significant number of peer-review 
papers on related subjects, and then by implementing recent agent-based computational 
models of financial markets. Extensions to an existing computational model are put 
forward for the first time to test a hypothesis for the patterns of behaviour uncovered 
from empirical sources. The result of these efforts is threefold: to highlight the relative 
stability of certain group-behaviours in financial markets, to present a computational 
model that incorporates this knowledge and can be readily extended in new directions in 
the future, and to move academic focus towards using this empirical information in 
more practical settings, such as for financial market regulation. 
 
This thesis can be considered timely, being written in the aftermath of one of the most 
significant financial crises of the last 100 years, the so-called 'credit crunch' with 
dramatic stock market and housing crashes leading to the largest contraction in Western 
world economic output since the 1930s. A new perspective on market regulation in the 
twenty-first century is a clear objective for social science research. Increasing our 
understanding of how traders behave, interact and aggregate to create market 
behaviours, and exploring new approaches to the modulation of the volatility often 
associated with financial market prices are important, albeit lofty, goals. This thesis 
aims to present  a set of findings and proposals relevant to these research aspirations, 
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whilst acknowledging there are many different approaches to this broad and important 
subject area. 
 
Economics, known for too long as 'the dismal science', is undergoing a paradigm shift, 
bringing in researchers from different domains to reflect more accurately the multi-
disciplinary nature of the subject matter. Economics embraces psychology, sociology, 
statistics, physics and biology – to name a subset of disciplines – in a closely-grouped 
cluster of related interests. However, as Ormerod (1998) highlights, it was not until 
relatively recently that economics as a discipline actually began testing and developing 
theories with empirical data. Prior to this, economics was largely theoretical, relying on 
idealistic assumptions about human behaviour to permit a myriad of analytical solutions 
to different economic problems. More recently, a trend in academic literature has begun 
to correct this oversight, approaching traditional economic subjects from alternative and 
non-traditional perspectives. Research presented in this thesis can be considered part of 
this new behavioural and empirical economics, readily embracing the viewpoint of the 
subject as fundamentally a social science: concerned with people, their reactions, their 
preferences, their decision-making, striving to understand, and perhaps even predict, 
aggregate social behaviour within particular economic contexts. 
 
The focus of this thesis is the psychologist's, on the behaviour, preferences and 
motivations of actual people operating in the context of financial markets, an area of 
interest to the social sciences that might be considered dissimilar to any other. Financial 
markets generate a phenomenal amount of empirical data, recording transactions 
between buyers and sellers, market prices, trade volumes and frequencies, across the 
globe 24 hours a day. There are detailed audit trails of the perspectives and behaviour of 
a huge array of different individuals, groups, nationalities, businesses and governments, 
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all with differing viewpoints and objectives. This information is of inherent interest to 
psychologists concerned with decision-making, collective behaviour, or perception. The 
amount of data being recorded is ripe for a more empirically-orientated investigation 
into economic behaviour. Financial markets are influential, directly or more often 
indirectly, in the lives of millions of people every day; they influence economic trends 
that impact on the creation of jobs and levels of prosperity; they influence prices for 
core commodities that create food, housing and other central aspects of our lives. 
Despite this profound relevance, the behaviour of participants in financial markets 
remains ill-understood, and, as with much of traditional economics, has been 
investigated with assumption-laden theories about human behaviour. The goals of the 
research presented here are to provide insight into how some participants actually 
behave in financial markets, and to present a market model that incorporates this 
knowledge as a foundation for practical, future research. It is to be hoped that this will 
encourage more empirical research in this direction in and for the future. 
 
This introductory chapter offers a broad overview of financial markets, derivative 
markets, and the basic categorisations of different participants that inhabit them. I 
briefly summarise what financial markets and derivative markets are, what they provide, 
and to whom. Following this, the chapter then briefly reviews research on the statistical 
characteristics of financial markets – these findings point to remarkable consistencies in 
market behaviour across time-periods, asset classes and national boundaries. This prior 
literature provides an important context for understanding the motivations and 
aspirations for the research presented in this thesis. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of the contents of each chapter and overall thesis objectives. 
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1.2 Introduction to Financial Markets and Derivative Markets 
 
Like all markets, the basic function of financial markets is to match buyers and sellers. 
The term 'financial' refers to the numerous freely traded and highly active markets 
where the exchange of capital and credit occurs in the economy (Downes and 
Goodman, 1998). These include stock markets, currency markets, bond markets and 
commodity markets. Within the broad capacity of matching buyers and sellers, financial 
markets provide different economic services to different participants. These can be 
considered as primary and secondary services. An outline of these different services and 
the relevant groups who participate and benefit will now follow. 
 
As a primary service, financial markets provide issuers of a product a means to raise 
capital by selling a right, obligation, or a primary good to a wider market-place. As 
examples, stock and bond markets provide funding to corporate and government 
entities; commodity markets provide producers of tangible goods or consumables a 
means to auction their products to a wider market of wholesalers and distributors. 
Primary markets allow newly created products to be bought and sold. As a secondary 
service, financial markets provide the opportunity to trade in a given product once it has 
been issued or produced. As examples, investors trade the right to participate in profit 
and wealth creation schemes arising from corporate or government activities via 
secondary stock and bond markets; primary goods can be augmented with value-adding 
features and traded to across a wider-economy of consumers. Secondary markets 
provide a crucial economic service by setting accurate prices based on interactions 
between product supply and demand. 
 
Derivative markets are different from the markets for stocks, bonds or other financial 
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products. A derivative is a financial instrument derived from and priced in relation to an 
underlying product that already exists. The vast majority of new derivative products 
therefore provide no direct source of funding to the issuer. As such, derivative markets 
offer in essence a secondary market service to participants; wealth is not increased or 
decreased directly with the use of derivatives, but rather, it is transferred. Derivatives 
provide a crucial risk-shifting and insurance function to a wide-range of industries and 
commercial activities and can be either OTC (over-the-counter) or exchange-traded. 
OTC refers to customised derivatives traded between pre-arranged counter-parties. In 
contrast, exchange-traded derivatives are standardised in location, grade and legal 
terms, with the exchange acting as an impersonal counter-party to guarantee 
transactions for all eligible participants. 
 
Options and futures are common derivatives. An option gives the bearer the right, but 
not obligation, to buy or sell a product at a given price over a period of time; whereas, a 
futures contract provides the bearer with the obligation to buy or sell a product at a set 
date in the future (typically once a quarter). Futures contracts have no restrictions on 
closing out a position before the set date, and, indeed, doing so is standard procedure for 
the vast majority of open positions. Another class of derivatives is referred to as Exotic. 
These are typically OTC products structured in creative ways towards particular 
business objectives (Taylor, 2007). 
 
The appetite for derivatives is growing at an astounding rate. For example, for G10 
countries (and Switzerland) the notional amount of outstanding OTC derivatives in the 
month of December 2008 was valued at $591,962.9 billion. This figure represents a 7-
fold increase in the last 10 years (BIS Quarterly Review, June 2009). The outstanding 
notional value of exchange-traded derivatives in December 2008 was $57,859.9 billion, 
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a greater than 4-fold increase over the last 10 years. The total value of the turnover in 
both futures and options, on organised exchanges in 2008, was $2,213,345 billion (BIS 
Statistical Annex, June 2009). Although the two cannot be compared directly, as an 
indication of the size of this number, U.S. GDP in 2008 was $14,263 billion (U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis). These markets are clearly very large and becoming 
increasingly significant to economies over time.  
 
It is the unique dataset available for derivative markets that makes them the basis for 
empirical research presented in this thesis. The following chapter analyses group trading 
behaviour associated with 31 different derivative markets over the last decades. This 
research is conducted with the use of  ‗Commitment of Traders‘ data provided by the 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Association. These data report the long positions (held 
in anticipation of higher prices) and short positions (held in anticipation of lower prices) 
of different groups of participants in U.S. derivative markets. In order to understand the 
groupings of different traders as applied in this dataset, the following section considers 
what types of market participants can be considered a priori, as they relate to the 
different economic services provided by financial markets.   
 
1.3 Introductory Classification of Different Groups of Participants 
 
There are a number of ways of classifying different participants and this is a theme 
explored further in chapter 3. Based on their motivations for participating in financial 
markets, however, three separate groups of traders can be considered. These are as 
follows: 1) participants who rely on the primary service provided by financial markets, 
and raise capital from, or sell products to, a wider marketplace, 2) participants who rely 
on the secondary market service, and are active in markets in order to directly generate 
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revenue via speculation, and 3) participants active in markets in order to guarantee their 
business revenues by transferring risks. 
 
This latter group is typically associated with derivative markets, which help companies 
to lower their production or supply costs by offering a venue for ‗hedging‘ –  a strategy 
used to offset investment risk, thereby guaranteeing revenue in situations where there is 
either supply or demand uncertainty, or the path to market has time or situational 
constraints (Downes and Goodman, 1998). For example, Cadburys, the chocolate 
company, might hedge its supplies of cocoa in the futures market to limit the risk of a 
rise in the cocoa price. These hedging activities allow companies to concentrate on 
maximising rational production and increase productivity. 
 
For derivative markets to provide this risk-shifting functionality, a sufficient number of 
participants must be willing to receive price risk. These include speculators such as 
market makers, hedge funds and managed futures funds. Derivatives provide an 
important venue for speculation and a low-cost way for participants to act on their 
beliefs about the suitability of prices. This influences prices for underlying products and 
maintains suitable prices for the wider economy. There is therefore a natural symbiotic 
relationship between these 2 groups of participants: participants who are active in 
markets in order to hedge risks from underlying businesses, and participants willing to 
receive those risks in return for possible profits.  
 
The classification of different participants by their business objectives relates closely to 
the groups reported in Commitment of Traders data, which include large speculators and 
hedgers (hedgers are known as ‗commercial traders‘ – discussed in detail in the 
following chapter). The above classification scheme therefore extends logically from 
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the economic functioning of financial markets and offers a powerful means to segregate 
large numbers of participants. It can be no coincidence that the Commodity Futures 
Trading Association, the U.S. regulatory body charged with monitoring derivative 
markets and maintaining their economic functioning, segregates participants in this way. 
 
Of interest to this current research, however, is how clear demarcations between trading 
objectives translate into differences and similarities in trading behaviour. If large 
numbers of market participants share similar objectives, such as to speculate or to 
hedge, does this manifest as particular forms of behaviour? A key related question is 
how much consistency in trading behaviour can be expected, given the dynamism and 
adaptation normally associated with financial markets. The below section provides an 
overview of research identifying surprising consistency in financial market behavior. 
This research suggests that other consistencies, such as in the behavior different groups 
of traders, may be equally possible.  
 
1.4 Some Statistical Characteristics of Financial Markets 
 
One of the earliest applications of the scientific approach to the study of economics was 
by the late Polish mathematician, Benoit Mandlebrot. Mandelbrot (1963) analysed 
empirical data on cotton and other commodity prices and found price changes (or 
‗returns‘, in financial parlance) did not form a normal distribution, as previously 
proposed (Bachelier, 1990); but rather, the distribution of returns had extremely 
pronounced tails. The probability of extreme price changes was much higher than under 
a normal, or Gaussian, distribution and subsequent research has shown this property of 
returns to be universally true of almost all financial markets (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay, 1997; Adler, Feldman, and Taqqu, 1998). 
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Furthermore, as Mandelbrot was the first to highlight, the functional form of the return 
distribution is consistent when measured across various time-scales, for example, from 
1 minute up to 1 month. This 'time scaling' is also found to be universal across markets. 
The exponents characterising the power-law scaling of the tails of the return 
distributions are remarkably similar across markets, as the figures presented below will 
demonstrate. Whilst Mandelbrot carried out his research in the 1960s on a limit dataset 
consisting of just 2000 data points, subsequent research has confirmed these results 
based on a much more extensive analysis that include a wide cross section of markets. 
 
Gopikrishnan, Plerou, Nunes Anarakm, Meyer, and Stanley (1999) utilise three different 
databases of financial market prices to substantiate Mandelbrot‘s findings: intraday data 
(high frequency measures of prices taken every 15 seconds, on average); daily data 
(spanning multiple decades); and monthly data (covering most of the history of the 
markets). Figure 1.1 is taken from this publication and demonstrates the clear non-
Gaussian probability distribution of returns for the S&P500, a popular measure of the 
U.S. stock market. Figure 1.2 plots the cumulative return distributions for daily data 
from 3 of the world's largest stock market indexes, the Nikkei in Japan, the Hang-Sang 
of Hong Kong, and the S&P500 of North America. The similar form of the cumulative 
distributions is striking. The exponents for these tails, highlighted in Figure 1.1 with  
are obtained by power-law regressions to be 3.05, 3.03 and 3.34, respectively 
(Gopikrishnan et al., 1999, p. 5311). Such remarkable similarities in  also characterise 
other markets. For example, Figure 1.3 presents the exponents for daily data from 1000 
different stocks; by far the majority has exponents of approximately 3. 
 
It is important to note that the fitting of power-laws is a relatively controversial area of 
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statistics. Perline (2005) argues many findings of inverse power-laws are more 
accurately categorised as either weak-form inverse power-laws, where only some upper 
portion of the distribution follows an approximate inverse power-law, or false inverse 
power-laws, where only the most extreme values of the sample mimic an inverse power-
law. Perline demonstrates how well-published examples of inverse power-laws in social 
and economic systems, such as those found in the early work by Pareto (1897) and Zipf 
(1947), involve important truncations to the data, and are therefore not representative of 
what Perline terms strong-inverse power-laws – where a power law forms for all ranges 
of the variable of interest. The work of Pareto and Zipf is referred to in more detail in 
chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
Perline‘s argument certainly applies to the research by Gopikrishnan et al., who 
acknowledgement that the tails of the market price distributions are characterized by an 
inverse power-law, rather than the entire distribution. Indeed, the classification of 
inverse-power law distributions has moved forward significantly in recent years 
(Clauset, Sahlizi, and Newman, 2009) and more formal categorizations in this area are 
possible. However, for the purposes of this chapter, the precise specification of the 
distributional form is of secondary relevance to the more general point: the findings of 
Gopikrishnan et al. demonstrate important similarities across numerous markets.  
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Figure 1.1 Linear-log Plot of the Probability Density Function for Normalised S&P500 
Returns (Gopikrishnan et al., 1999, p. 5308) 
 
 
Note the non-Gaussian nature of the distribution. The solid lines are power-law fits, the 
exponent for the positive (right-side) tail is 3.01 and 3.02 for the negative tail (left-side). 
Returns are normalised in the standard way, by subtracting each return the mean and 
dividing by the standard deviation of the total sample (see Gopikrishnan et al., 1999, p. 
5308, Equation 3). 
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Figure 1.2 Comparison of Cumulative Distributions for the Positive Tails of the 
Normalised Returns for Daily Records of NIKKEI index (1984-1997) Hang-Seng index 
(1980-1997) and S&P500 index (1962-1996), (Gopikrishnan et al., 1999, p. 5311) 
 
Figure 1.3 Histogram for the Power-law Exponents Fit to the Individual Cumulative 
Distribution Functions, for all x larger than two standard deviations, across 1000 U.S. 
Stocks (Plerou, Gopikrishnan, Nunes Amaral, Meyer, and Stanley, 1999, p. 6521) 
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There are other statistical properties that also appear ubiquitous across markets. As 
discussed at later stages in this thesis, these include significant autocorrelation in 
absolute returns (or market volatility, as it is commonly referred) that persist for up to 
several months, and insignificant autocorrelation in actual returns beyond appropriately 
20 minutes (Ding, Granger, and Engle, 1983; Lundin, Dacorogna, and Muller, 1999). 
Other observable distributions also characterised by asymptotic power-law tails include 
the relative price of bids and offers (Bouchaud, Mezard, and Potters, 2002; Zovko and 
Farmer, 2002), trading volumes and trade frequencies (Gopikrishnan, Plerou, Gabaix, 
and Stanley, 2000). 
 
1.5 Thesis Overview   
 
Research reviewed above highlights ubiquitous characteristics across markets and 
points tantalisingly towards universal mechanisms underlying market behaviour 
(Gopikrishnan et al., 1999). My interest is to move beyond the purely statistical 
treatment of this subject and to explore the underlying human behaviour. If 
consistencies are apparent at the level of price characteristics, consistencies may also 
exist at other levels of market activity, such as in the trading behaviour of different 
participants. This can be reinforced by the observation, commonly accepted in the 
finance industry and increasingly so within academia, that financial markets are not 
exclusively driven by news or economic announcements. Rather, prices often reflect 
endogenous dynamics – such as the buying and selling behaviour of groups of 
participants. Indeed, this observation is, in part, the motivation for a large number of 
agent-based computational models of financial markets that aim to simulate market 
behaviour based on interactions between different types of traders. In some way, these 
internal elements in financial markets must result in the robust consistencies at the price 
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level – this insight has lead to a large body of work, much of which is reviewed in this 
thesis. 
 
In trying to understand the etiology of relatively subtle statistical properties, many 
physics-orientated economists have proposed quite precise interactions between 
different groups of traders in their computational models. Despite the end goal of this 
modelling – to replicate and understand empirical properties – the inputs and 
mechanisms involved in many models typically do not have the same level of empirical 
attention. There has been a tendency to make unrealistic assumptions at the group-level 
regarding the nature and behavioural characteristics of different participants. As 
Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009, p. 145) highlight, ―it would be extremely valuable 
to have a comprehensive empirical study that connects the heterogeneity of market 
participants with their strategy and with the properties of price dynamics‖. This could 
offer a strong foundation for exploring statistical properties and imposing more realistic 
constraints on the many theories claiming to account for the nature of market prices. 
 
Research presented in this thesis supports the process of moving towards more 
empirically-orientated group representations for use in agent-based models. The 
research documents recurring patterns of group trading behaviour, and thus, raises the 
explanatory requirements on market theories. This research is motivated by the 
conviction that theories in the future must also strive to account for empirical 
regularities identified in trading behaviour, rather than focus exclusively on the 
empirical properties of market prices, A model is proposed towards the end of this thesis 
that accomplishes this goal, with explanatory power at two levels of analysis, accurately 
replicating many statistical characteristics of market prices alongside realistic group 
trading behaviour. In addition to the academic relevance of this work, agent-based 
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market models with higher levels of behavioural realism can offer cost-effective tools 
for exploring market dynamics. These tools may be used in the future for investment 
management (Farmer, 2001) or for market regulation (Darley and Outkin, 2007). 
 
The structure of this thesis is therefore as follows. The next chapter analyses the buying 
and selling history of core groups of traders across a 17 year period, revealing important 
regularities in trading behaviour. These results are attained via a standard econometric 
methodology and a more bespoke, non-parametric methodology. Research focuses on 
the relationship between changes in positions and concurrent changes in markets prices. 
It finds strong evidence that speculators increase their buying during positive price 
changes and increase selling during negative price changes, whereas hedgers (or 
commercial traders) are seen to do the opposite. This pattern of trading behaviour is 
identified across a wide range of different markets, time-horizons and sizes of price 
change. 
 
Chapter 3 moves focus onto agent-based models of collective and social behaviour, 
providing an overview of different approaches to using computational models in the 
social sciences. This includes a review of the objectives and necessary conditions for the 
successful application of this relatively new approach. A recent computational model of 
a financial market is described in detail and implemented. This model is capable of 
simulating many properties associated with realistic market prices. However, the group-
level dynamics that form the basis of the approach are shown to lack validity. A number 
of suggestions are provided to help improve the behavioural realism of future models of 
financial markets. 
 
Chapter 4 applies the suggestions made in the previous chapter by extending a very 
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recent computational model of a financial market to include realistic measures of 
trading behaviour, such as the long and short positions of different groups of traders. 
With this new, extended model, a hypothesis is formally tested for the patterns of 
trading behaviour documented in chapter 2. Specifically, different groups of participants 
are proposed to have particular order-type preferences. Commercial traders are 
considered less aggressive and therefore tend towards using limit orders, buying as 
prices decline and selling as prices increase; speculators are considered more 
aggressive, utilise relatively more market orders and aggressive limit orders, and 
typically trade in the direction of prices changes. These behavioural preferences are 
sufficient to account for the empirical regularities documented in chapter 2. Traditional 
economic theories that rely on deeper strategic considerations or distinctions between 
'informed' or 'uninformed' decision-making are not required. 
 
Chapter 5 applies these insights to the topic of market regulation by exploring the 
impact of speculators on market prices from both a model-based and an empirical 
perspective. The analysis generates mixed results, highlighting the need to extend the 
model developed in the previous chapter still further, to include new groups to order-
flow level relationships. The findings also suggest that regulatory debate needs to focus 
on the role of liquidity in causing market volatility. A discussion is provided on the 
possibilities for new regulation focused on participant orders preferences, and therefore 
market liquidity. Chapter 6 summarises the research presented in this thesis and offers 
potential criticisms and areas for future research. 
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Abstract: 
 
This chapter presents evidence of systematic trading behaviour amongst different 
groups of financial market participants. Commitment of Traders reports provide the 
historic long and short positions of different groups of traders. A standard econometric 
methodology and a more bespoke, non-parametric methodology focus on the 
relationship between changes in positions and concurrent changes in market prices, as 
applied to 17-years of trading records collected from 31 different futures markets. Both 
methodologies find strong evidence that speculators increase their buying during 
positive price changes and increase selling during negative price changes, whereas 
commercial traders increase selling during positive price changes and increase buying 
during negative price changes. This trading behaviour is identified across a wide range 
of markets at different time-horizons and sizes of price change. Further evidence of 
proportionality in the trading behaviour of different groups of traders at different sized 
price changes is also presented. 
 
 
 
“Striking regularity can emerge when human beings are confronted with a complicated 
decision problem.”  
Zovko and Farmer (2002, p. 392) 
 
 
“If we are struck having to study every creature individually, it will be difficult to make 
much progress, so our underlying hope is that we can find some way to distil this 
marvellous collection of behaviour down to just a few prototypical ones.”  
Miller and Page (2007, p. 28) 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Research into the behaviour of different groups of traders is important for enhancing 
understanding of financial markets. The aggregate buying and selling of traders cause 
prices to change over time, often in dramatic and volatile ways. Despite this truism, 
academic research has tended to make assumptions at the group-level, relying on 
theoretically tractable notions of behaviour that lack empirical foundations. This chapter 
approaches the subject of group behaviour in financial markets empirically, with an 
extensive U.S. government dataset. As part of a long-running market surveillance 
programme, it documents changes in long positions (those that profit from higher 
prices) and short positions (those that profit from lower prices) of core groups of traders 
in U.S. futures markets. Changes in the positions of these different groups were aligned 
with changes in price, revealing regularities in group behaviour across many different 
markets. 
 
This research is at a juncture between psychology and economics and therefore applies 
different styles of methodology. The first methodology is a customary econometric, 
parametric approach. It involves time-series modelling and the additional analysis of 
estimated parameters for the relationship between changes in traders' positions and price 
changes in different financial markets. The second methodology complements the first, 
and is non-parametric in its approach. Behaviours are standardised across markets and 
compared using a range of statistical tests. Both methodologies reach similar 
conclusions and provide important insights into previously undocumented patterns of 
trading behaviour across a range of markets, time-periods and scales of price change. 
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2.2 Theories of Financial Markets and Economic Agents 
 
The following section briefly reviews the emergence of contemporary approaches to 
financial markets and trader behaviour, a subject that is returned to at later stages in this 
thesis. Traditionally in economics, agents are considered as 'homo-economicus', rational 
and self-interested, striving to maximise objectives whilst expounding the minimal 
amount of effort to do so. This behaviour has been termed 'utility maximising' in the 
literature (e.g. Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Becker, 1978). For the most orthodox 
approach to theoretical economics (e.g. Fama, 1965), agents are also considered 
homogeneous; in the sense that they all have access to relevant economic information, 
and act rationally and consistently based on this information (e.g. Arrow, 1989). Agents 
are seen as heterogeneous, but in the relatively limited sense that their tastes and 
preferences are allowed to differ.  
 
Research as early as 1947 argued these assumptions of human economic behaviour are 
unrealistic. People may act based on preferences unrelated to strict utility maximisation, 
for example, people 'satisfice' rather than pursue optimal economic behaviour (Simon, 
1947; 1992). Early observations against neoclassical agent representations became 
formalised and more widely accepted with the seminal publication of psychologists 
Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. These psychologists demonstrated, via a series of 
experiments, systematic deviations of people's decision-making from the utility 
maximising assumed in standard economic models. People display a preference for 
certainty of outcome, leading to asymmetric behaviour in different economic contexts. 
In the context of gains, we tend to prefer a sure gain over a larger, probable gain. In the 
context of losses, people tend to prefer larger, probable losses, rather than certain losses 
(Allingham, 2002). For detailed reviews see Luce (2000), Starmer (2000) and Birnbaum 
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(2008). Research into economic decision-making and how it differs from traditional 
theories marked an important shift in modern economics away from more idealised 
notions of economic agents that have a foundational role in many economic models 
(Halpern and Stern, 1998b). This current research also falls within this new, behavioural 
economic approach, where, rather than make convenient assumptions for the sake of 
theoretically tractable models, a goal is to study how economic agents behave and 
interact from an empirical perspective. 
 
The debate between traditional economics and behavioural economics suggests a divide 
between the rational, 'homo-economicus' and the more irrational, non-optimal decision-
maker. This divide is represented more directly in recent theories on financial markets 
which typically incorporate two different groups of traders. These are fundamentally 
orientated (or informational) traders and chartist (or noise, or liquidity) traders (Frankel 
and Froot, 1986; Hommes, 2005; Samanidou, Zschischang, Stauffer, and Lux, 2007). 
Fundamental traders are seen as rational, smart money traders acting on ‗real‘ 
information such as company dividends, economic statistics or valuations.  They 
correspond to the rational agent described above. In contrast, chartists are considered 
less-rational and reference more 'noisy' information such as recent market trends and 
price patterns to make erroneous trading decisions. They correspond to the non-optimal 
decision-makers. As discussed in chapter 3, it may be inappropriate to consider chartists 
irrational, in many contexts following what others are doing can be an effective strategy.  
 
This second group of non-optimal traders are often considered to trade on the basis of 
positive feedback strategies, buying when prices rise and selling when prices decline 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1990). Examples of positive feedback strategies include trend-
chasing and the use of stop-loss orders (that cut losing trades as prices move against the 
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trade). Other examples include front-running by brokers (for example, placing orders in 
front of a large client order) and portfolio insurance (increasing risk exposure by buying 
as prices rise and reducing risk exposure by selling as prices decline). As discussed 
further in chapter 4, these trading behaviours are not consistent with the standard 
economic approach, where participants only respond rationally to changes in 
fundamentals, but do more plausibly describe the behaviour found in real markets. 
 
Numerous models of financial markets involve interactions between these two groups of 
traders as a central component (Marengo and Tordjman, 1995; Steiglitz, Honig and 
Cohen, 1996; Bak, Paczuskim and Shubik, 1997; Lux and Marchesi, 1999; 2000; 
Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner, 2005) despite a lack of empirical evidence on the actual 
ecology and behaviour of different types of traders. The assumptions on market 
participants as being either fundamental or noise traders is a marked improvement on 
the traditional approach, as participants are considered more heterogeneous and diverse. 
However, this approach to categorising different types of traders can still be considered 
as overly theoretical. If agent-based simulations and theoretical models of financial 
markets are to become more directly useful as tools for investigating market scenarios 
in relatively realistic settings (e.g. Darley and Outkin, 2007), empirical representations 
of different types of traders are needed. This current research joins the general trend in 
economics away from theoretical notions of human behaviour, towards more 
empirically-grounded representations of how people actually behave in real-world 
economic scenarios. 
 
2.3 Empirical Data on Trader Behaviour 
 
Despite abundant high frequency information on trade prices, volumes, and bids/offers, 
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publicly available information on the composition of markets and the behaviour of 
different traders is in fact very limited. This feature of the data associated with financial 
markets is, of course, intentional. Modern exchange traded markets are centralised and 
structured to ensure participants and their dealings are kept anonymous. As a result, 
empirical data on the behaviour of different participants is restricted and typically 
relates to either the local and private information held by brokers and dealers, or 
proprietary data collected by the organised exchanges. As discussed in the following 
chapter, Wiley and Daigler (1998) analyse data from the Chicago Board of Trade; Kein 
and Madhavan (1995), Aitken, Alemedia, Harris, and McInish (2007), and Darley and 
Outkin (2007) analysis data from Australian brokers, the New York Stock Exchange, 
and the NASDAQ stock market, respectively. Whilst the datasets used by these 
researchers may be quite detailed, they are typically limited in availability and cover 
only short periods of time. Fortunately, an alternative source of data on the behaviour of 
different types of market participants is available. This is found in the Commitment of 
Traders reports that include information from local sources and also cover a significant 
multi-decade time-period. 
 
Responding to the lack of transparency in modern financial markets, regulatory bodies 
such as the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have special 
legislative powers to monitor markets (Section 4a(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 
USC 6 a(a)). The CFTC's Market Surveillance Program collates daily market-data and 
position-information from all sources, including exchanges, clearing members, futures 
commission merchants, foreign brokers, and traders, known collectively as reporting 
firms (under regulations set out in Parts 15 to 21 of the CFTC‘s regulations). Reporting 
firms must identify traders with long or short positions at or above reporting levels set 
by the CFTC for a given market, where reporting levels are updated over time to 
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correspond to between 70-90 percent of the total open interest (or number of contracts 
outstanding) in a given derivative market. This position information is aggregated into 
different groups to maintain confidentiality and made publicly available every week via 
Commitments of Traders reports (COT data). Although restricted to U.S. Exchange 
traded derivative markets (not applying to stock markets or currency markets, for 
example), COT data provides objective documentation on market composition and 
traders positions unavailable in any other form. It is also longitudinal, covering many 
years of market activity, becoming reported at regular weekly intervals in 1991.   
 
Currently, COT data is published every Friday by the CFTC and provides a breakdown 
of the previous Tuesday's open interest for markets in which 20 or more traders are 
subject to large-trader reporting. The release schedule has increased in frequency over 
the years since the reports first began in 1924. (The U.S. Grain Futures Administrator 
was founded in 1921.) Other data are provided, including current open interest (that is, 
the total number of contracts outstanding in a given market), spreading positions (for 
example, where a trader is long and short different contract expiries in the same 
market), the number of traders reporting, and various transformations of this 
information (such as concentration ratios representing the percentage of open interest 
held by the largest four reportable traders). An example output of COT data is shown in 
Table 2.1 with long and short positions ('Commitments') for different groups of traders. 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 2.1 Example of CFTC Commitment of Traders Data for Wheat Futures 
 
 
The CFTC Form 40 identifies reporting traders as either commercial or non-
commercial. A commercial trader is engaged in business activities hedged by the use of 
futures or options markets, where transactions are formally defined as representing ―a 
substitute for transactions … to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel, 
and where they are economically appropriate to the reduction of risks‖ (CFTC Form 40 
Statement of Reporting Trader, p. 4). Conversely, a non-commercial trader is not 
engaged in hedging activities, and as such can be considered a speculator in one of the 
many guises such a categorisation can represent (e.g. market maker, arbitrageur, hedge 
fund). A single trading entity cannot be classified as both commercial and non-
commercial. In the event of a multi-faceted organisation being involved in both business 
objectives, separate corporate entities are required to distinguish between trading 
activities. 
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COT data also provide an aggregation of the current long and short positions of non-
reporting traders (those below reporting requirements specified by the CFTC), where 
positions are derived by subtracting total reportable long and short positions from total 
open interest. The business objectives of these traders are not known; they could be 
commercial and / or non-commercial in nature. These participants are, by definition, the 
smaller traders making up only 10% to 30% of the total open interest in the market and 
are often assumed by researchers (as discussed in the following sections of this chapter) 
to represent small speculators and / or the general public. 
 
Researchers investigating COT data have noted potential sources of error with regard to 
group categorisations and position reporting. For example, there are strong incentives to 
classify as a commercial trader due to the lack of imposed limits on position sizes 
(Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo, 2004). Furthermore, commercial positions can be 
speculative on a net basis, as changes in underlying cash positions are not directly 
monitored by the CFTC across all markets. (The CFTC Form 204 / 304 Statement of 
Cash Positions is used to determine if sufficient cash positions justify derivative 
positions for commercial traders in the Grains and Cotton markets, but this doesn‘t 
apply to all markets.) To counteract this issue, commercial traders are required to keep 
detailed records to justify transactions if called upon by the Commission (CFTC 
Regulation, Part 18). 
 
Commercials are entitled to trade on expectations of future supply and demand 
conditions, as stipulated in the CFTC definition of bona-fide hedging (CFTC 
Regulation, 1.3(z)): hedges must reduce risk based on current or anticipated assets or 
liabilities. Whilst an essential function for commercial traders, there is an inherent and 
unavoidable speculation involved in basing transactions on anticipated future 
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production, assets, or liabilities. This process is akin to speculative trading and could be 
extended to generate revenue directly from price changes in derivative markets. 
 
Based on these factors, it is likely that pure hedge-positions are some subset of those 
reported by commercial traders (Sanders et al., 2004; Ederington and Lee, 2001). Whilst 
there is scope for misuse and possibly even abuse of these group categorisations, for the 
purpose of the current study, these limitations do not inhibit the overall value of COT 
data. These data still represent the most objective and long-term sampling of trading 
behaviour available. Other academics acknowledge the value of COT data and have 
employed the resource to study a range of different hypotheses. 
 
2.4 Existing Research on Commitment of Traders Data 
 
Much research interest into COT data inevitably surrounds the forecasting value of 
trader‘s positions (Kahn, 1986; Hartmark, 1991; Buchanan, Hodges, and Theis, 2001; 
Wang, 2001, 2003; Briese, 2008). The effect of trader behaviour on market volatility has 
also been studied using COT data (Chang, Pinegar, and Schachter, 1997; Wang, 2002), 
but is more often researched with relation to volume and open interest (e.g. 
Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993). An area of significant interest is the theory of normal 
backwardation originally put forward by Keynes (1930), but extended and explored by 
numerous economists since (Bessembinder, 1992; Chatrath, Liang, and Song, 1997; 
Chang, Choi, and Nelling, 2000; De Roon, Nijman, and Veld, 2000). Keynes argued that 
commercials require futures markets to transfer risks and effectively pay speculators a 
risk-premium for taking the other side of their trades. Although there is limited 
conclusive evidence to support the theory, partly due to the difficulties in calculating 
profit and losses amongst different participants, it does imply a broad division of 
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activity between groups of traders, for which there is some empirical support in the 
literature. 
 
Using various assumptions regarding COT data (such as positions being held over 
certain time-intervals), Chang (1985) estimates the profitability of the two groups and 
finds speculators tend to be profitable over the time-periods and markets studied whilst 
commercials tend to lose money. An inverse pattern between speculators and 
commercials is also seen in Wang‘s (2001) study on return predictability in the 
agricultural markets. Wang found, over time periods of up to 12 weeks, speculators 
traded as if they forecast price continuations whereas commercials forecast price 
reversals. As discussed in detail in chapter 5, Wang (2002) also studied the relationship 
of group net-positions (long positions minus short positions) to changes in foreign 
exchange market volatility, finding changes in the net-position of commercials 
associated with market volatility decreasing whilst changes in speculative net-positions 
associated with increasing volatility. Wang (2003) investigates monthly time-horizons 
during the 1990s to find changes in speculator net-positions to be positively correlated 
with future and concurrent returns whilst commercial net-positions are negatively 
correlated. Both types of traders are also found to relate differently to external 
information, such as changes in measures of market sentiment. A study by Sanders, 
Boris, and Manfredo (2004) on the energy markets also documents a similar inverse 
activity: during rising markets speculators increased long positions whilst commercials 
decreased long positions. 
 
Sanders et al. (2004) assume the inverse activity between groups of traders results from 
a data constraint: due to the necessity of long open interest to equal short open interest 
and to the fact that commercials and speculators make up the majority of the open 
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interest, these groups must behave inversely to one another. However, this account does 
not adequately explain possible consistencies in the sign and relative magnitude of 
trading behaviour. For example, Sanders et al. and Wang find speculators are buying 
into a rising market whilst commercials are selling, not the other way around. If the 
behaviour is consistent across a large number of markets, across an extended period of 
time, and across different time intervals and scales of price change, it should not be 
regarded as a data constraint, but rather, a recurring important feature of market 
dynamics. Although documented to some degree in the literature, the prevalence and 
significance of this trading behaviour has not been the focus of a comprehensive 
investigation until now. 
 
The research-base of this thesis is the study of the behaviour of different groups of 
traders as related to concurrent price changes across 31 different financial markets. A 
variety of statistical techniques establish whether important patterns of trading 
behaviour exist amongst different types of market participants and whether this 
behaviour can be considered general to a large number of markets. This research 
therefore treats COT data differently to previous studies. To avoid obscuring important 
intra-group activities, long and short positions are referenced separately for each group 
(cf. the use of net-positions typical in other studies). Other COT variables, in addition to 
commercial and speculator positions, are also included for completeness. This study 
also uses the highest frequency, weekly time-intervals of COT data available, covers a 
multi-decade time period from 1991 to 2008, and a selection of markets that includes all 
major asset classes. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The methodology involved in pre-
processing the dataset and aligning market prices and group long and short positions is 
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outlined. The econometric methodology involving time-series modelling and the 
analysis of slope coefficients across markets is reviewed and associated results 
presented. The non-parametric approach then follows, with results from statistical tests 
comparing trading behaviour across markets and across different groups. A summary 
representation of group behaviour is presented. The standardisation procedure involved 
in the second methodology permits further analysis of whether behaviour scales 
proportionally across different sized price changes. The chapter ends with concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.5 Methodology 
 
COT data provides information on market composition including the long and short 
positions and total number of commercial, non-commercial (referred to as speculators 
henceforth) and non-reportable traders (referred to as other traders). In addition, the 
spread positions (where a trader may be long and short different contracts of the same 
market) are also reported, along with total open interest in a given market. From these 
available variables, the information referenced in the following analysis are commercial 
short and long positions (selling and buying behaviour of commercial traders), 
speculative short and long positions (selling and buying behaviour of speculators), other 
short and long positions (selling and buying by smaller traders), and total open interest 
(the total number of contracts outstanding). Total open interest is the sum of long or 
short positions and is included in this study for completeness and as a variable of 
separate interest. By measuring changes in open interest, overall fluctuations in the size 
of the market can be studied independently of the number of short and long contracts 
held by specific groups. The number of large traders in a given market is reported by 
COT data, but not considered directly relevant as it does not relate to behavioural 
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characteristics. Similarly, to keep things as simple as possible, spread positions are also 
omitted from the following analysis. 
 
2.5.1 Data Pre-Processing 
 
COT data is retrieved from the CFTC dating from 1991, when the release scheme 
became weekly, through to the beginning of 2008. Some markets that are currently very 
active had not begun trading in 1991 and therefore are included in the sample, but have 
a later start date. The historic COT information is retrieved in .txt format and processed 
with a java program I developed to separate data into specific markets and variables and 
to order the data chronologically. 
 
COT data for 31 U.S. Futures markets were selected with two constraints: first, each 
market being actively traded and secondly, the total sample of markets covering six 
major asset classes, including interest-rates, stock indexes, agricultural commodities, 
industrial commodities, metals, and currencies. Full details of the markets and time-
periods covered are provided in Table 2.2. 
 
Historic continuous contract price data (from Trade-Station securities, a U.S. brokerage) 
was aligned with the relevant COT data for each market. Futures markets offer a 
multitude of separate contracts with separate expiries, e.g. March, June, September and 
December. The front-month is the most current, and often active, contract. Notably, the 
price data is for the front-month futures contract where the majority of trading activity 
occurs. This contract is assumed to be representative of all contract expiries referenced 
in the COT data. 
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The COT report is published on a Friday evening, providing information valid for the 
preceding week ending on a Tuesday. The price-series was therefore lagged by 3 days, 
so that each data-point in both price and COT-series covers the same period. Figure 2.1 
demonstrates the alignment of price and COT data and provides a view of typical raw 
data. For brevity, non-reportable positions are omitted from the following plots as they 
are derived from the reportable positions and total open interest. 
 
Table 2.2 Sample of U.S. Futures Markets Analysed 
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Figure 2.1 Crude Oil COT Data (top panels) aligned with Continuous Contract Crude 
Oil Futures Prices (bottom panel) 
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5.2.2 Econometric Methodology 
 
To explore the research question within an econometric framework, changes in group 
positions can be considered a dependent variable to be explained in terms of changes in 
market prices as an independent variable. Differences in the sign and significance of 
estimated coefficients for group positions by trader type can therefore be interpreted and 
compared across markets. To begin, COT and price data are transformed into week-on-
week percentage changes. Descriptive statistics across the various markets are reported 
in Table 2.3. 
 
As typical of other financial market data, Table 2.3 shows evidence of non-normal 
distributions in both changes in prices and group positions. This non-normality is 
considered inevitable to financial market data and no-further efforts are taken here to 
further transform the dataset. (Future research could formalise these non-normalities 
with the use of the Anderson-Darling test but such a study is considered irrelevant for 
current purposes.) Preliminary diagnostic tests find all these data to be stationary based 
on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test at p < 0.05 (results not shown).   
 
COT data and market prices can be considered time-series panel data. The time 
dimension is important as weekly observations cannot be considered independent. 
Rather, past events can influence future events and therefore lags in behaviour may be 
significant. It is therefore crucial to maintain chronological ordering of observations and 
test this ordering for potentially relevant information (Wooldridge, 2006). The weekly 
percentage changes in all variables are tested for significant partial autocorrelations (p < 
0.05) across 6 lags and reported in Table 2.4. The majority of markets have significant 
lags. Future research could extend the analysis to explore the time-invariance of results.  
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Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics – Evidence of Non-normal Distributions 
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Table 2.3 Continued. Descriptive Statistics – Evidence of Non-normal Distributions 
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Table 2.4 Significant Partial Autocorrelation (P < 0.05), Lags 1 to 6 
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Table 2.4 Continued. Significant Partial Autocorrelation (P < 0.05), Lags 1 to 6 
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I. Time Series Models and Slope Coefficients 
 
The autocorrelations unique to each market are incorporated into multiple regression 
time-series models in order to estimate the ceteris paribus effect of changes in market 
prices on changes in groups of traders' positions. As represented in Equation 2.1, each 
group's position across each market is treated separately as a dependent variable, with 
market returns and the significant lags of both prices and group position treated as 
independent variables. The estimated slope parameter therefore represents the 
relationship between change in positions and concurrent price changes, holding other 
factors constant. This slope coefficient is of interest in comparing different group 
behaviours across the sampled markets. 
 
Equation 2.1 Group Position's Regressed On Concurrent Returns and Significant Lags 
of Both Position's and Concurrent Returns 
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Table 2.5 reports the slope coefficients and significance for each group inventory across 
all markets and reveals a consistent pattern of trading behaviour. The slope co-efficient 
for speculators and commercials, in particular, are of the same sign across the majority 
of markets: changes in speculators inventory tends to be are positively correlated with 
market prices whereas commercial traders are negatively correlated. The majority of 
coefficients are also found to be significant (p < 0.05). The consistency of this result 
51 
 
across markets is surprising and indicates that groups of commercial traders and 
speculators trade in a consistent way in relation to market prices. Speculators increase 
long positions during rising prices and decrease short positions.  The opposite behaviour 
is observed during declining prices. In contrast, commercials increase short positions 
during rising prices and decrease long positions.  Again the opposite behaviour is 
observed during price declines. Other (smaller, or non-reportable) traders, whose status 
as either commercial or speculators is unknown, have a similar, but less pronounced 
pattern to speculators. Open interest is typically found to be positively correlated with 
prices, particularly for positive price changes.  
 
The residuals of the time-series models are each analysed and the Ljung-Box test finds 
no significant autocorrelations, indicating that the lags included in the models are 
sufficient for the study. The residuals are non-normally distributed however, as an 
inevitable result of the non-normal distributions of the input variables. As stated above, 
financial market data is typically non-normally distributed and such heteroskedasticity 
is expected for the current analysis, although the White correction for heteroskedasticity 
could be employed for future research.  
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Table 2.5 Slope Coefficients for Weekly Change in Group Positions and Concurrent 
Change in Prices 
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II. Different Time-horizons 
 
The following procedure investigates consistencies in slope coefficients across different 
time-horizons. Log weekly changes are aggregated to represent cumulative returns over 
time, from these series, the log change over different time-windows is calculated again 
for both prices and group inventories. The time-windows of interest include 2 weeks, 4 
weeks and 8 weeks. 
 
The above analysis is then repeated on these new time-windows. Significant lags are 
calculated over 2, 4, and 8 week returns (results not-shown) and incorporated into time-
series models to compare estimated slope coefficients. Tables 2.6 to 2.9 document these 
results. Notably, a very similar pattern of group behaviour, particularly amongst 
commercials and speculators, is identified. However, the significance of the coefficients 
degrades as sample sizes decrease with the larger price windows. 
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Table 2.6 Slope Coefficients for Change in Group Positions and Concurrent Change in 
Prices, 2 Weeks Time-horizon 
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Table 2.7 Slope Coefficients for Change in Group Positions and Concurrent Change in 
Prices, 4 Weeks Time-horizon 
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Table 2.8 Slope Coefficients for Change in Group Positions and Concurrent Change in 
Prices, 8 Weeks Time-horizon 
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III. Statistical Comparison of Commercials and Speculators 
 
The above results find the sign of coefficients associated with commercial and 
speculators to be broadly consistent across markets and over different time scales. 
Change in speculators' long and short positions are positively correlated with market 
prices, whereas changes in commercial positions are negatively correlated with prices. 
The statistical significance associated with the different trading behaviour displayed by 
commercials and speculators can be tested more formally in the following way. 
 
A multiple regression is fitted with a categorical variable for trader group, as being 
either commercial or speculator (note other COT variables are excluded here), and an 
additional categorical variable for position (either long or short). Change in group 
inventory is regressed on to these categorical variables and 6 lags of market prices and 
group inventory. The three-way interaction between market prices and the qualitative 
variables of group and position sign represent the relationship between change in prices 
and inventory, moderated by group and position sign. That is, the joint effect of 3 
independent variables on change in inventories is tested. 
 
As documented in Table 2.9, the three-way interaction is significant across all time-
horizons for the majority of markets. This result indicates trading behaviour can be 
considered significantly different across market participants. Change in positions for 
commercial traders, when changing from long to short positions, is significantly 
different to the change in positions for speculators when changing from long to short 
positions. This conclusion is supported by a within subjects repeated measures 
ANNOVA, comparing the estimated slope coefficients for each market across each 
group (see Tables 2.5 to 2.8). The results are significant for every time-horizon and 
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shown in Table 2.9. This analysis supports the conclusion that commercials and 
speculators display very different patterns of trading behaviour. 
 
Table 2.9 Three-Way Interactions Between Position-Sign, Group and Prices; ANNOVA 
of Coefficients for All Markets; Per Time-horizon, Significance at P < 0.05 
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IV. Summary Coefficients for Commercials and Speculators 
 
To provide a summary of this behaviour across all the markets in the sample, the 
following analysis treats each market 1 to as a categorical variable in a multiple 
regression of each group's positions on market returns . This has the effect of 
relaxing assumptions of consistent mean price and inventory change across markets, 
which is inevitably unrealistic. In Equation 2.2, is an adjustment to the intercept for 
each market. The data for all the markets is therefore grouped together, and as with the 
above regression, all 6 lags are also included for positions and returns as dependent 
variables. The summary slope coefficients for commercials and speculators are 
significant in every case and documented in Table 2.10. 
 
Equation 2.2 Group Position's Regressed On Concurrent Returns and Significant Lags 
of Both Position's and Concurrent Returns, with a Categorical Variable for Each Market 
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Table 2.10 Summary Slope Coefficients for Change in Group Positions and Concurrent 
Change in Prices Across Different Time-horizons, Significance at p < 0.05 
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Note the size of the coefficients do not move uniformly with the increasing time-
horizons, this is a result of changes in sample size; smaller sample sizes are associated 
with larger time-horizons. 
 
2.5.3 Alternative Methodology 
 
The above econometric analysis treats behaviour as a time-series variable, where 
behaviour is considered continuous and related to past behaviour in a persistent way. An 
alternative viewpoint is to consider behaviour as more discrete, and uniquely related to 
particular scenarios or conditions. The following bespoke methodology follows this 
second viewpoint and applies a standardisation procedure, as outlined in the following 
section, to categorise different market scenarios and isolate underlying group 
behaviours. Examples of trading behaviour are then grouped together to form 
meaningful sample sizes and compared statistically across markets. A benefit of this 
methodology is that it permits direct comparisons of behaviour across different scales of 
price change. In the following analysis, the buying and selling patterns of different 
groups of traders during smaller price changes is also compared to the buying and 
selling patterns during larger price changes. 
 
I. Standardisation Procedure 
 
Price changes across all markets are categorised into particular sizes and particular signs 
to represent specific market conditions. To categorise price changes and compare group 
behaviour in this way, a normalised measure of change is required. The technique 
developed here is similar to calculating a coefficient of variation, but avoids using a 
constant mean as a measure of scale. Due to variation in the volatility of financial time-
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series, each variable in a series (price and COT data) is divided by a rolling standard 
deviation derived from the previous 10 weeks. Change in a time-series from one week 
to the next is therefore represented as a unit of its recent volatility, allowing underlying 
characteristics of the different markets to be compared across a dimensionless scale. 
Figure 2 depicts a standardised time-series for the crude Oil market. Note the y-axis 
now represents change in units of standard deviation. 
 
Figure 2.2 Standardised Time-series for Crude Oil 
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To categorise price movements of a specific size, price changes of a target size are 
identified together with corresponding changes in contracts across the various groups. 
For example, Figure 2.3 marks changes in position associated with positive price 
changes of between 2 and 4 standard deviations. This data series is inhomogeneous with 
respect to time (that is, the period of time between each data point varies) but broadly 
homogeneous with respect to market movement (a data point occurs each time prices 
move a given magnitude). This categorization was carried out for positive and negative 
price changes of >=1 and <2 standard deviations, >=2 and <4 standard deviations, >=4 
and <8 standard deviations, and >=8 and <16 standard deviations. Each observation in 
this new series is therefore independent of time period; that is, a discrete observation 
occurs every time prices move a specific increment rather than over a specific period of 
time. 
 
To summarise then, an original aligned time-series (as in Figure 2.1) is standardised 
(Figure 2.2), and categorised into price changes of a specific size and sign with 
associated changes in contracts (Figure 2.3) across commercial traders, speculators, 
other traders, and open interest. In this way, conditions are held constant for meaningful 
comparisons of trading behaviour to be conducted. 
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Figure 2.3 Observations of Positive Price Changes of 2-4 Standard Deviations in the 
Crude Oil Market and Associated Changes in Group Positions 
 
 
In the following analysis, the distributions of changes in short and long positions 
associated with different sized price changes for the different market groups are 
presented. These changes are shown to be significant. The changes in short and long 
positions are also shown to be similar across markets, and, as with the above 
econometric analysis, the behaviour of commercials and speculators found to differ 
significantly. 
64 
 
II. Example Distributions of Group Behaviour Under Specific Conditions 
 
The distribution of changes in contracts across group behaviours in the Crude Oil 
market during similar sized price changes are presented in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. These 
are derived from a Gaussian Kernel Density estimate and are plotted with the median 
values of the distribution. Note that the sample size for positive price changes of 2-4 
standard deviations (N=68) is different to that of negative 2-4 standard deviation price 
changes (N=39) as Crude Oil has been in a broad up-trend over the sample period and 
therefore more positive price changes have occurred. 
 
Note in Figure 2.4 that the sign of the median change in contracts, in particular for 
commercial and large speculators, has a pattern that is broadly reversed for negative 
price changes (Figure 2.5). During positive price changes, commercials increase their 
short contracts (top-left plot of Figure 2.5) and reduce long contracts (top-right plot of 
Figure 2.5). Speculators tend to do the opposite, increasing their long exposure during 
positive price changes and decreasing short positions (upper-middle plots in Figure 2.5). 
These findings confirm the results from the econometric analysis (Tables 2.5 through to 
2.10). In accordance with the econometric findings, the following results also 
demonstrate this pattern of trading behaviour as entirely standard and occurring with 
apparent regularity across a wide range of markets. 
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Figure 2.4 Crude Oil, Density Plots (with Medians Highlighted) for Changes in 
Positions During Positive Price Changes of 2-4 Standard Deviations (N=68) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Figure 2.5 Crude Oil, Density Plots (with Medians Highlighted) for Changes in 
Positions During Negative Price Changes of 2-4 Standard Deviations (N=39) 
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III. Positions Change Significantly as Price Changes    
 
To test the hypothesis that changes in group behaviour are non-randomly related to 
market prices, a non-parametric, bootstrap methodology is employed. A random 
permutation of a standardised dataset (as depicted in Figure 2.2, for Crude Oil) is 
generated. Specifically, the COT variable time-sequence is reshuffled whilst week-on-
week price changes are held constant. Shuffled data are categorised as the real data 
were. By repeating this procedure 10,000 times, the distribution of change in COT 
variable medians under the null hypothesis of no relation to price is constructed. 
 
I find a large number of markets have non-random changes in COT variables with a 
clear pattern in the direction of significance. Table 2.11 presents changes in COT 
variables associated with positive price changes of 1-2, 2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 standard 
deviations. Significant positive changes are denoted '+' and significant negative changes 
are denoted '-'. Significance is at the 5% level. Note the 1-2 standard deviation category 
in the first column for each COT variable in the table. For the majority of markets, 
change in commercial short positions and speculator long positions are positive, whilst 
changes in commercial long and speculator short positions are negative. As Table 2.12 
demonstrates, this pattern of results is reversed for negative price changes. As with the 
findings from the econometric study across different time-horizons (Tables 2.6 to 2.8), 
the significance of the results declines with the larger sized price changes (or time-
horizons). This effect may relate to the much smaller sample sizes associated with larger 
sized price changes. These finding can be investigated further by comparing group 
behaviours across markets. 
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Table 2.11 Changes in COT variables Associated with Positive Price Changes of 1-2, 2-
4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviations (Significant Differences to Randomised Samples) 
 
Significant positive changes are denoted '+' and significant negative changes are 
denoted '-'. 
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Table 2.12 Changes in COT variables Associated with Negative Price Changes of 1-2, 
2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviations (Significant Differences to Randomised 
Samples) 
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IV. Positions Change with Price in a Similar Way Across Markets 
 
To test whether group behaviour differs across markets, each market is compared with 
average behaviour across the remaining markets. Specifically, for a given target market, 
observations are pooled across all non-target markets. By re-sampling averages from 
this pool of observations, a market-average distribution can be created against which the 
target average is compared. 
 
For example, to compare the average change in COT variables for the Crude Oil market 
during 2-4 standard deviation positive price changes, a distribution is constructed by re-
sampling 10,000 averages (where N = 68, as per Figure 4) from all observations of 2-4 
standard deviation positive price changes seen in other markets (that is, all markets 
excluding Crude Oil). The second column for each COT variable in Table 2.13 
documents markets with significant differences (at a 5% significance level) for this 
category of price change. For Crude Oil, change in trader positions cannot be 
considered significantly different from other markets. That is, the trading behaviour is 
similar across markets. 
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Table 2.13 Positive Price Changes of 1-2, 2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviations 
(Significant Differences to the Average Market's Behaviour) 
 
This procedure is repeated for each market and all price change categories. For many 
price change categories, less than 20% of the markets can be considered to have 
significantly different group behaviour. Whilst findings of non-significant differences 
does not necessitate no differences between group behaviours, the results are indicative 
of similarity in the relative magnitude and sign of changes in positions amongst traders 
in the same groups, across a majority of markets. 
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Table  2.14 Negative Price Changes of 1-2, 2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviations 
(Significant Differences to the Average Market's Behaviour) 
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To further demonstrate the similarity in group behaviour across markets, the median 
change in positions for each market is examined. The distribution of these medians is 
presented for positive (Figure 2.6) and negative price changes (Figure 2.7). These plots 
clearly demonstrate the general pattern identified in the econometric analysis. During 
positive price changes, commercial traders tend to increase their short positions and 
decrease long positions, whilst speculators decrease short and increase long positions. 
During negative price changes, the pattern is reversed. The smaller, non-reportable 
traders display a pattern of behaviour broadly similar to speculators. The inverse of 
these behaviour patterns is seen during negative price changes. Open interest measures 
the total size of the market and is seen to mostly increase during positive price changes 
along with increasing demand for a product. During negative price changes, open 
interest may increase or decrease. The pattern of change in contracts is similar across 
the four price change categories. Further, changes in contracts are approximately, 
proportional to the size of the price change. 
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Figure 2.6 Median Change in Contracts for All Markets Sampled During Positive Price 
Changes of 1-2, 2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviation. For Groups: Com=Commercial, 
Spec=Speculators, Other=Non-reportable, and O.I=Open Interest 
 
 
The range denoted on the y-axis for each plot in Figure 2.6 and 2.7 increases as the 
price change size increases (from 1-2 to 8-16 standard deviations); the broad pattern of 
behaviour across the different groups of traders remains consistent. 
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Figure 2.7 Median Change in Contracts for All Markets Sampled During Negative Price 
Changes of 1-2, 2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviation. For Groups: Com=Commercial, 
Spec=Speculators, Other=Non-reportable, and O.I=Open Interest 
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    V.  Commercials and Speculators Trade in Significantly Different Ways 
 
In the above econometric study, Table 2.9 demonstrates that speculators and 
commercials trade in significantly different ways. This results can be verified and the 
same research question addressed within the alternative methodology. The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that two related samples come from an identical 
population (Wilcoxon, 1945), compares the difference in buying behaviour (change in 
long positions) and separately, the difference in selling behaviour (change in short 
positions) for commercial and speculative traders in the same market. Table 2.6 and 2.7 
demonstrate for the majority of markets studied that the behaviour of commercials and 
speculators is significantly different under the same price change categories. This 
finding is most apparent for the 1-2 standard deviation price change category with the 
largest number of observations. The behaviour of commercials and speculators differs 
significantly for more than 80% of markets (in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7, significance at a 
5% level is denoted as previously).  
 
As noted above, because it takes more time, on average, for a large price change to 
occur, there are fewer observations and reduced statistical power for larger price change 
categories. Markets denoted with NA in Table‘s 2.6 and 2.7 have sample sizes less than 
8 observations and are therefore inappropriate for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
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Table 2.15 Positive Price Changes of 1-2, 2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviations, 
Significant Differences Between Commercial and Speculator Buying (Change in Long 
Positions) and Selling Behaviour (Change in Short Positions) 
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Table 2.16 Negative Price Changes of 1-2, 2-4, 4-8 and 8-16 Standard Deviations, 
Significant Differences Between Commercial and Speculator Buying (Change in Long 
Positions) and Selling Behaviour (Change in Short Positions) 
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VI. Proportionality in Group Behaviour Across Different Sized Price Changes 
 
As noted in section 1.4, there is evidence of striking similarities in the statistical 
properties of market prices across financial markets. One finding relates to the scaling 
of the return distributions (Figure 1.1) across different time-horizons and different 
markets (Figure 1.2). The exponents characterising the power-law scaling of the tails of 
the return distributions is typically around 3 (Figure 1.3). Asymptotic power-law tails 
also describe the relative price of bids and offers in the limit order book (e.g. Zovko and 
Farmer, 2002). Given this evidence, it is reasonable to investigate the possibility of 
scaling, or ‗self-similarity‘, in trading behaviour at different relative scales of price 
change, a research direction that is also supported by findings presented here of 
consistency in trading behaviour when compared across different markets. This current 
section begins research in this new direction by exploring how group behaviour during 
smaller price changes compares to group behaviours during larger price trends. This is 
made uniquely possible with the alternative methodology introduced here that separates 
price changes into different standardised categories. There are methodological 
difficulties associated with this investigation however, most notably due to the non-
independence of samples taken from a single market. 
 
The standardisation procedure outlined above involves sampling observations of 
different size price changes from the same market. However, when observations of 
different standard deviation multiples are taken from a single market they may overlap 
in time. For example, an 8 standard deviation price change may take many months to 
occur, and during this period many smaller 1 or 2 standard deviation price changes have 
also occurred. Therefore, it is not appropriate to compare the group behaviours 
associated with these 1, 2 and 8 standard deviations due to the lack of independence 
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between the data points. An alternative methodology must be constructed. The approach 
taken here involves randomly determining which price change size to sample from a 
given market, and doing this in a sequential order so as independent samples are 
maintained. 
 
The methodology is applied to each market as follows. A price change size is randomly 
selected between 1 and 5 standard deviations (higher thresholds are not directly targeted 
due to their relatively low-frequency of observation). The process then reads from the 
starting point through the weeks until a target price change is captured, for example, a 2 
standard deviation price change as presented in Figure 2.3. The changes in COT 
variables over the same time period are also documented in line with the above studies. 
This time period is then excluded to maintain independent samples, and the next 
interaction of the methodology begins at the subsequent week. This process continues 
until all weeks in the dataset have been exhausted, and repeats separately for both 
positive and negative price changes – as price changes of different signs are compared 
separately.  
 
As an example, the methodology generated 42 independent observations of positive 
price changes in the Oil market ranging from 1 to 7 standard deviations in size. In order 
to create more meaningful sample sizes, observations from each of the markets are 
grouped together for the following statistical comparison. This is considered reasonable 
given evidence of broad consistencies in group behaviour across different markets, as 
outlined in detail above. The grouping of observations from all markets creates a sample 
size of 891 for positive price changes and 765 for negative price changes for each of the 
7 COT variables investigated. 
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To test how COT variables scale across different sized price changes, a quadratic 
regression model is fitted to the sampled data for each COT variable. Change in group 
position at scale  is regressed against price returns  at scale . Note  indexes the 
period of time over which a price change of a given size and sign took place. The 
variable tests the curvature in order to classify the data into one of the following 
categories: (a) evidence of curvature across price change sizes where there is no 
significant intercept; or (b) evidence of curvature across price change sizes with 
significant intercept. The category with significance intercept implies an underlying 
drift in COT variable continuing separately from the size of price changes. Actively 
traded markets will often transact large amounts of volume without prices moving 
significantly, where traders change their long and short positions whilst prices remain in 
relative balance. This process is reflected in significant intercepts in the modelling 
described here. Equation 2.3 represents the regression model. 
 
Equation 2.3 Quadratic Regression Model for Scaling Categorisation 
 
ssRsRsP ε+γ+β+α=
2
 
 
If the coefficient for the quadratic term is equal to zero (at 5% significance) there is no 
evidence of proportionality and a linear model is fit to the data to categorises further 
into (c) no evidence of curvature with a non-significantly intercept (note this category 
provides evidence most consistent with self-similarity across price change sizes); or (d), 
no evidence of curvature with significantly intercept. Results from this categorisation 
procedure are presented in Tables 2.17 and 2.18. 
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Table 2.17 Results from Scaling Categorisation, Positive Price Changes 
 
 
For positive price changes, there is no evidence that changes in commercial shorts, 
speculator short positions, speculator long positions, and other short positions do not 
scale proportionately at different sizes of price change. The categorisation results for 
commercial short and speculator long positions, in particular, show no significant 
intercept implying direct proportionately across different price change sizes. This 
reflects a surprising level of self-similarity in certain trading behaviours at different 
scales of price change; large price changes, that may take many months to occur, can be 
considered similar to smaller price changes in terms of typical group-level behaviour.  
 
The results for negative price changes presented in Table 2.18 also show evidence 
suggestive of proportionality in the behaviour of commercial short and other long 
positions. 
 
Table 2.18 Results from Scaling Categorisation, Negative Price Changes 
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These results indicate certain COT variables may be considered self-similar at different 
scales. However, additional dynamics associated with changes in traders‘ positions are 
unrelated to the size of corresponding price changes. These effects may relate to 
autocorrelation in position changes, as shown in the Table 2.4 above, and active trading 
that occurs in the absence of large price changes. 
 
For those group behaviours where evidence is consistent with proportionality at 
different scales, such as the behaviour of speculators during positive price changes, 
these results suggest larger price changes cannot be considered as outliers or anomalies, 
a view taken by some researchers (e.g. Sornette, 2003), but rather, extensions of typical 
market behaviour (Mandlebrot and Hudson, 2004). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
An investigation of the trading behaviour of different groups of market participants 
reveals important consistencies across 31 financial markets over a 17-year period. An 
econometric analysis demonstrates the ceteris paribus effect of changes in market prices 
on changes in traders inventories as significant and varying systematically with different 
groups of traders. This evidence finds that commercial traders and speculators trade in 
significantly different, yet consistent, ways. During positive price changes, speculators 
increase their buying whilst commercials increase their selling. During negative price 
changes the opposite pattern occurs. A more bespoke methodology supports these 
conclusions, also demonstrating that trading behaviour cannot be considered 
significantly different across a wide-range o markets. A further study into the behaviour 
of traders at different scales of price change finds evidence consistent with self-
similarity in the behaviour of speculators, commercial and smaller, non-reportable 
84 
 
traders under specific market conditions.  
 
Similar findings of the systematic behaviour of traders in relation to market prices have 
been alluded to in previous studies involving COT data (e.g. Wang 2001; 2002; 2003, 
Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo, 2004) but have not been the focus of a comprehensive 
investigation until now. Sanders et al. (2004) explain the inverse behaviour between the 
net positions of commercial and speculative traders in terms of a data constraint, arising 
from the fact that long open-interest must equal short-open interest. However, this fails 
to account adequately for the consistency of this finding across different markets and 
additional findings of similarities across time-horizons and different scales of price 
change. These group trading behaviours may relate more fundamentally to market 
dynamics and require a deeper explanation. 
 
The current findings support a notion of asymmetric objectives and hence trading 
behaviours that are consistent with Keynes' theory of normal backwardation in which 
commercials pay speculators a premium. To account for evidence of systematic biases 
in the behaviour of different groups however, a broader socio-economic account may be 
required, one that relates observable behaviour to goals, objectives and constraints 
amongst different populations of traders. Researchers have moved towards such an 
account with comparisons of markets to eco-systems, where different groups of traders 
are seen as analogous to species, and interact to determine complex system-wide 
behaviour patterns (Lo 2004; 2005; Farmer 2002). 
 
The level of explanation required to account for these surprising consistencies in trading 
behaviour is an interesting subject discussed in later chapters of this thesis. The theory 
developed here is that these patterns of trading activity can be explained most 
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parsimoniously via a behavioural  explanation related to group order-type preferences. 
This is in contrast to more economically-orientated accounts in terms of differences in 
information or rationality, positive feedback, noise, or fundamental trading (e.g. Wang 
2003); such theories are developed further in many agent-based computational models 
of financial markets (e.g. Bak, Paczuski and Shubik, 1997; Lux and Marchesi, 1999; 
2000). 
 
Empirical evidence of group-level behaviour patterns suggests that agent-based 
computational models of markets should strive to be consistent with regularities in the 
behaviour of different market participants. Although documented here in certain futures 
markets, these regularities may equally apply to other financial markets such as stock 
markets (Darley and Outkin, 2007). Modelling practices of this kind may enable agent-
based models to be used more effectively as regulatory tools as they would achieve 
higher levels of realism. This subject is explored in further detail in the following 
chapter.   
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Abstract: 
 
Agent-based models simulate collective behaviour as an emergent feature of complex 
interactions amongst 'agents' and their associated behaviour and decision-making rules. 
This chapter reviews a cross-section of agent-based models developed in the social 
sciences, noting objectives, necessary conditions, and requirements that can be applied 
to the agent-based modelling of financial markets. Models of financial markets have 
tended to make assumptions at the agent level, proposing important interactions 
between different groups of traders, yet relying on theoretical and often implausible 
representations of different traders. An example model reviewed in this chapter 
(Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner, 2005) generates realistic price behaviour for specific 
markets, but lacks behavioural validity when simulated group behaviour is compared to 
actual group behaviour, as documented in Commitment of Traders reports. From this 
analysis, a number of suggestions are provided to improve the behaviour realism of 
future models for more practical applications. 
 
 
"Computational models allow us to consider rich environments with greater fidelity 
than existing techniques permit, ultimately enlarging the set of questions that we can 
productively explore.” 
Miller and Page (2007, p. 26) 
 
“We have to take onboard the factor that represents probably the most egregious 
omission of conventional neoclassical economic theory, and that brings us most firmly 
into the realm of statistical physics. That factor is interaction.”  
Ball (2004, p. 214) 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
An overall objective of the scientific approach is to assess a theory empirically, and then 
based on results, refine or reject a theory before further testing takes place. Agent-based 
modelling with computer simulations provides a unique tool when analytical or 
experimental approaches to theory-testing fail to be appropriate (Bankes, 2002). Various 
academic disciplines involve subjects engaged in large-scale interaction. From 
economics and finance, sociology, social psychology, to anthropology and history, the 
study of large collections of interacting people and the subsequent outcomes that 
emerges from these interactions is standard practice. The study of large-scale interaction 
amongst components is also common in non-social-science domains, for example, 
atomic physics and molecular chemistry. Systems of large-scale interaction, whether of 
social origin or otherwise, result in collective behaviour that may be difficult to derive 
analytically or test experimentally. In these situations, agent-based computational 
models offer researchers a rigorous means to test theories. Component characteristics 
and interaction rules can be conjectured, collective behaviour simulated, and results 
validated against empirical sources (Weidlich, 2000). 
 
Programming a computer to carry out a task, such as simulate interactions between 
theoretical agents, by its very nature, involves abstraction, engaging with a concept 
whilst ignoring different details at different levels (McConnel, 2004). More precisely, 
‗object-orientated‘ programming involves focusing on common attributes and ignoring 
details of specific cases, in order to develop useful and reusable classes in a computer 
language. The software development process therefore has parallels with the building of 
scientific theories; both strive for simplicity of process and a parsimonious view of a 
complex object. Object-orientated programming, in particular, is well-suited to 
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simulating large numbers of agents. An agent can be represented via a particular object 
of a class in a programming language, with associated gains in program efficiency. This 
combination of software development and scientific theorising is becoming increasingly 
utilised in psychology (Sun, 2006) and the social sciences (Silverman and Bryden, 
2007), alongside a more established user-group in the physical and computer sciences 
(Wolfram, 2002). 
 
Research into different systems involving large-scale interactions has identified that 
emergent collective behaviour has many features in common. One of the most 
prominent is the finding of right-skewed distributions and possible power-laws to 
describe relationships between the size of an event and its frequency. For example, the 
size of an earthquake and how often it occurs follows a power-law (Bak, 1997). The 
mathematical relationship described by a power-law is not at all inevitable, yet it may 
exist to represent a variety of disparate phenomena, including, for example, the 
relationship between the size and frequency of populations in cities or causalities in 
human conflicts (Zipf, 1965; Buchanan, 2000; see also the discussion on Perline, 2005, 
in chapter 1). Although many systems of interaction have overwhelming differences in 
terms of subject matter and content, the level of interaction involved in many systems 
results in their having other important features in common. Often, underlying causes of 
collective behaviour cannot be easily attributed to a single or simple set of precursors, 
instead, causality is distributed. Additionally, causality is often found to be non-linear: 
the size of a particular event may not be proportional to its cause (Watts, 2001). 
 
Per Bak (1997) provides an account of distinct characteristics common to systems of 
complex interactions, describing systems as self-organising into a critical state with 
associated scale-free, or fractal, behaviour patterns. Research into self-organised 
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criticality is seen by some researchers as one of the most important scientific 
developments of the 20
th
 century and has been extended to account for social 
phenomena, such as the behaviour of economies and financial markets (Bak, Chen, 
Scheinkman, and Woodford, 1993; Krugman, 1996; Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane, 1997). 
The approach provides theoretical underpinnings for a philosophy of 'catastrophism', the 
view that extreme events can happen relatively often. This is opposite to the more 
conventional view, where change is incremental and always proportionate to the size of 
the cause. (Bak, 1997). With the recent financial 'credit crunch' crisis still lingering, a 
view of economics and markets as being stable and in-equilibrium seems more and 
more unrealistic. It may be argued that the use of agent-based computer simulations is 
well-suited to the study of economic phenomena, capable of reproducing the large-scale 
interactions and complex emergent behaviours involved. 
 
Financial markets are a particularly relevant example of a complex, evolving system 
involving large-scale interactions. Every time a trade takes place in a market, a direct 
interaction between a buyer and seller has occurred. The largest financial markets 
regularly trade millions of times a day. Estimating the global and financial scale of all 
the transactions taking place in financial markets is difficult, but it is likely to be 
trillions of dollars per day. The behaviour of market prices is a result of all the 
individual interactions between traders buying and selling to one another. Research into 
this collective behaviour documents characteristics common to other systems of 
interaction. For example, as described in chapter 1, price fluctuations of financial 
markets are well described with power-laws that relate the frequency of a price change 
of a particular size to its magnitude (Gopikrishnan, Plerou, Nunes Anarakm, Meyer, and 
Stanley, 1999; Plerou, Gopikrishnan, Nunes Anarakm, Meyer, and Stanley, 1999). The 
causality underlying price changes in markets is also apparently non-linear and 
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distributed. For example, the 1987 stock market crash had no apparent news releases of 
proportional significance to the size of the 23% drop in stock prices (Cutler, Poterba, 
and Summers, 1989). Building on the modelling of complex interactions in other 
domains, agent-based models offer researchers a unique tool to develop theories of 
market behaviour. 
 
This chapter is primarily focused on agent-based approaches to understanding how and 
why financial markets behave the way they do. To different extents, researchers 
employing agent-based models have been successful at reproducing statistical 
characteristics of market prices.  A number of example approaches are reviewed in this 
chapter (see chapter 1 for a more detailed outline of the statistical characteristics of 
market prices). However, concerns remain over the validity and realism of many of 
these models. Most notably, simplifying assumptions are often made at the group-level, 
where different groups of traders are presumed to co-exist in financial markets. Models 
often propose important interactions between these groups and their associated trading 
characteristics to determine price behaviour. It is clear from a review of the literature on 
theories of market behaviour that the group categorisations employed in many agent-
based models result from convenient theoretical assumptions and have avoided due 
empirical scrutiny. Whilst the previous chapter documented evidence of systematic 
trading behaviour in real-world groups of traders, this chapter will demonstrate that 
trader group dynamics and agent-level representations typically employed in agent-
based models fail with regard to their behavioural validity. More verifiable and useful 
descriptions of different types of traders, such as those provided in the previous chapter 
of this thesis, offer a route towards more empirically grounded models of financial 
markets. 
 
92 
 
The goal of moving towards higher level of behavioural realism is shared with other 
researchers into agent-based market simulations (LeBaron, 2000; Alfarano, Lux, and 
Wagner, 2006). Alfarano et al. propose that a natural next step for researchers in the 
field is to move towards models capable of calibration to represent particular financial 
markets. This can enable models to be more useful for investment management (Farmer, 
2001) or market regulation (Darley and Outkin, 2007). A renewed focus on validation 
must bring a renewed focus on how traders in financial markets actually operate and in 
what useful ways this behaviour can be represented. The results presented in the 
previous chapter inform on this process. The trading behaviour of commercial traders 
and speculators is characterised by consistent biases towards buying or selling 
depending on the direction of market prices. This empirical insight and the group 
categorisation provided by Commitment of Traders (COT) data could prove useful in 
modelling the strategic behaviour of agents and market behaviours that emerges from 
these interactions. By incorporating empirically derived group-level representations, 
theories of financial markets can be constrained further towards a higher level of 
validity. 
 
The chapter continues with a broad introduction to agent-based modelling in the social-
sciences:  the origins of the approach, strengths, practical applications, and potential 
weaknesses. This introduction provides a context for reviewing the necessary conditions 
and objectives that can also be applied to the agent-based modelling of financial 
markets. A number of financial market models and agent-orientated approaches are 
reviewed here, with a focus on the approach of Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005). This 
particular model is selected for more detailed review as it is a relatively recent addition 
to the literature, relies on only a few parameters and is therefore considered 
parsimonious, and is also unique in that the authors claim it can be calibrated to 
93 
 
represent the statistical characteristics of specific markets. This claim is tested in this 
chapter using a study of the Oil market during the period 1991 to 2008. This study finds 
that, despite successes, the model relies on traditional group categorisations and, 
depending on the interpretation of these categorisations, either lacks behavioural realism 
when compared to the real-world, or, alternatively, the model rests on assumptions that 
cannot be tested objectively. The chapter concludes with detailed suggestions for 
improving the realism of future agent-orientated models of financial markets. 
 
3.2 Origins of Agent-based Modelling 
 
The origin of agent-based models can be seen in the early computation experiments 
known as cellular automata, the most famous of which is 'The Game Of Life'. The game 
involves a grid of cells, like a chess board, where each cell can shift between a finite 
number of states determined by the local interactions between different cells. This is the 
basic computational template for many other agent-based models. The Game Of Life 
was initially devised by the mathematician John Conway (Gardner, 1970) and has since 
taken on a wider following on the internet (e.g. www.ibiblio.org/lifepatterns/). The 
game involves setting initial conditions for a computational experiment, and then 
simulating system-wide patterns of behaviour over various time steps. The behaviour 
that emerges from simple interaction rules and changes of states within cells on a grid is 
surprisingly unpredictable. This study of cellular automata has become important for a 
range of academic disciplines, including physics, biology (Wolfram, 2002), and 
philosophy (Dennet, 1995). 
 
The Game Of Life starts with a simple configuration of 'live' cells on a grid. Conway's 
rules for the birth, death and survival of individual cells are then applied as follows: 
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every cell with two or three live neighbours survives for the next generation; cells with 
four neighbours are removed from the population, as are cells with just one neighbour; 
empty cells next to exactly three live neighbours are 'born', that is, they become live. 
Each application of these rules simultaneously across grid is considered one move of the 
game. The initial starting pattern of the cells and subsequent interactions result in cells 
changing location, often in unusual and unexpected ways. Some examples taken from 
the original publication of how the system can evolve based on starting configurations 
are presented in Figure 3.1. Different time-steps are representing horizontally from left 
to right; different initial starting conditions are represented vertically. 
 
Figure 3.1 Simple Examples from The Game Of Life (Gardner, 1970, p. 121) 
 
 
Note the initial configuration of cells can result in a series of changes and then a static 
pattern (a to d in Figure 3.1).  In other cases, the initial configuration is self-
perpetuating leading to continuous alternation between patterns (e). The Game of Life 
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can simulate an important and basic feature common to many real-world systems of 
interaction: continuous change. Simple interaction rules can result in continuous 
fluctuations in the global behaviour of a system. Agent-based models often operate in a 
similar way to Conway's original formalisation. Agents (or cells) occupying a landscape 
(or grid) change states as a function of their interactions. Agent states and rules of 
interaction can be programmed to be analogous to real-world situations, and, from these 
dynamics, to simulate realistic collective behaviour. 
 
One technical consideration is how to handle cells on the edges of the grid that have 
fewer neighbouring cells than those not on the out-skirts. In a simple 2-D topology 
involving interactions across a grid, this is most often achieved with a torodial 
arrangement. Cells on the bottom edge of the grid are considered neighbours to those at 
the top, whilst those on the right edge of the grid loop over to be considered neighbours 
to those on the far left, and vice-versa (this is typically programmed via modular 
arithmetic). With this basic formulation, the only intervention in the model by 
researchers occurs at the onset, with the setting of initial conditions. The system then 
evolves over various iterations, or time steps. Successful examples of this broad 
approach applied to specific social-settings are now reviewed. 
 
3.3 Examples Models in Social Science 
 
Thomas Schelling (1972; 1978) applied principles of cellular automata to study 
segregation on the basis of individual preferences. Although commonly discussed in 
terms of geographical segregation based on racial preferences, Schelling's model is 
sufficiently abstract to apply to any form of segregation not directly organised, for 
example based on income, religion or language. Segregation of the geographical kind is 
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often visible on trips to almost any metropolitan area; residents tend to segregate quite 
clearly into different racial groups. For example, many European cities have a 'China-
town'. In America, according to Schelling, it is easy to find localities where people of 
'white' Caucasian or 'black' skin colour are more than three-quarters of the total. That is, 
racial segregation is naturally common place. Schelling modelled segregation by 
proposing a cellular automaton style grid to be analogous to the map of a city where 
constituent cells can be compared to people living in a property. Similar to The Game 
Of Life, the location of 'black' or 'white' cells in Schelling's grid evolve over time, based 
on the following interaction rule: if greater than a third of the directly neighbouring 
cells on a grid are of a different colour, the cell moves to another, randomly selected 
available location. Through this simple mechanism, quite dramatic and notably realistic 
levels of racial segregation can occur. For Schelling, this result demonstrated how 
―underlying motivation can be far less extreme than the observable pattern of 
separation‖ (1978, p, 154), and, more generally, that collective behaviour is not 
necessarily representative, or follows on directly, from the behaviour or preferences of 
individual agents within a system. 
 
This general theme was taken further by Craig Reynolds (1987) in his agent-based 
simulations of flocking behaviour in birds, fish and other animals. Flocks of birds move 
in distinct patterns of apparent synchronisation and structure. Reynolds used a computer 
simulation to demonstrate that this coordination is not planned, or the result of a 
deliberate collective intelligence, but rather emerges from local interactions within a 
flock. Reynolds's virtual birds, or 'boids', are programmed to react to others within a 
certain distance. Just three simple rules, separation, alignment, and cohesion, describe 
behaviour at the level of the individual boid: 1) separation: steer to avoid crowding local 
flock-mates; 2) alignment: move towards the average heading of local flock-mates; and 
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3) cohesion: an individual moves towards the average position of local flock-mates. 
From these rules of interaction remarkably accurate simulations of flocking behaviour 
emerge. The 1992 Tim Burton film, ‗Batman Returns‘, was the first to apply this 
methodology in the now standard practice for computer-based animation. Reynolds 
noted, with reference to the potentially vast size of collective animal behaviour (for 
example, herring migrations can occur in schools up to 17 miles long, containing 
millions of fish) that it is unrealistic to give simulated boids complete information of the 
flock; it leads to obvious failures in the simulated behaviour (1987, p. 30). Reynolds 
demonstrates how global knowledge of the flock location is not involved in boids' 
decision-making. This is an example of a possible theory for a  phenomenon being 
falsified with the use of an agent-based simulation. Reynold demonstrated, quite 
conclusively, that local interactions, based on the simple rules outlined above, are the 
most plausible explanation for coordinated flocking behaviour. 
 
More recently, results from an agent-based simulation have been applied to economic 
social situations. One example is the study of crime. Traditionally, economists viewed 
crime as a type of market, with decisions to participate made in a rational and utilitarian 
manner (e.g. Becker, 1991). However, as Ormerod (1998) highlights, these economic 
explanations fail to account for typical characteristics of real-life crime statistics. For 
example, low correlations are often found between crime levels and unemployment; 
equally, situations can persist where high levels of unemployment accompany low 
levels of crime. Ormerod notes crime statistics typically have a higher variance than 
corresponding socio-economic variables and none of these real-life features of crime 
statistics are consistent with a theory where individuals rationally turn to crime to avoid 
impoverished circumstances. In place of more standard economic models, Ormerod 
proposes that economic agents are involved in direct social interactions and the 
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resulting positive feedback effects, where an effect may amplify over time within a 
population, accounts for characteristics common to real-life crime statistics. Ormerod 
simulates the evolution of crime levels over time in the following way. 
 
A population is divided into three discrete groups of people that can be defined as: 1) 
those not susceptible to crime; 2) those that have not committed a crime, but may do so 
in the future; and 3) those who are active criminals. Individuals within a population 
move between these groups, not due to a rational response to economic conditions, but 
based on social influence effects within the population. The probability of individuals 
changing groups is directly related to the proportion of the population in each group. 
Whilst socio-economic variables are also included in the model, interaction effects 
mean the impact of economic variables can be significantly different depending on the 
current state of the system. This system becomes non-linear, and causality becomes 
more distributed, paralleling the observation made in the introduction. Overall, Ormerod 
finds that the behaviour exhibited by the model can successfully replicate real-world 
crime statistics, including, more specifically, the possibility of abrupt changes in the 
level of crime. This behaviour was seen in New York City in the late 1990s, when a 
'zero tolerance' policy was cited as the primary contributing factor to a dramatic 
reduction in crime. It may be that crime-levels, as is the case with other measures of 
collective behaviour, are inherently volatile and that dramatic shifts occur with more 
regularity than was assumed by New York City regulators.   
 
Ormerod extended the agent-based modelling approach to a separate economic 
problem: accounting for company extinction-rates within an economy. As with other 
systems of complex interactions, there is evidence of power-law distributions in 
industrialised economies in the form of company extinction rates and how they vary 
99 
 
over time. Based on the work by Sole and Manrubia (1996) and Newman and Palmer 
(2003), Ormerod (2005) investigated the power-law distribution relating the number of 
company extinctions to their frequency of occurrence (see also Ormerod, 2002) using 
agent-based simulations. A model is proposed with the by-now familiar cellular 
automata grid. But rather than the grid representing physical locations, as with 
Schelling's example, each row and column is analogous to a separate company with a 
number in each cell (being at the intersection of two companies) representing the impact 
a company has on another. If the number is positive, the relationship is considered 
beneficial and cooperative; if negative, companies compete and are damaged by their 
relationship to one another; if zero, there is no important relationship between firms. In 
Ormerod's simulation, the starting numbers are determined randomly. For each time 
step, a single cell in each row changes randomly and the impact of all other companies 
on each individual company is summed to determine company extinction. If the sum is 
greater than zero, the company survives, if less than zero, it is considered extinct and 
immediately replaced by a new company (derived from a randomly chosen 'parent' 
company). Different variations of this model allow for shock events to impact the 
system, but, even from these simple collections of rules, a precise power-law 
relationship emerges between the levels of company extinction and their frequency, 
similar to that found in real economic statistics. 
 
Ormerod's account of extinction patterns by way of interaction effects in the economy is 
capable of simulating real-world behaviour that emerges from complex interactions. 
However, the model applies to patterns of data and does not offer any immediate 
application to real-world problems. Sugarscape is a large-scale agent-based model of an 
evolving economy with more pragmatic aims (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Designed to 
investigate all manner of political, social and environment hypotheses, Sugarscape, 
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named after the agents' objective to acquire sugar, is both sophisticated and complex. 
Agents are provided with rules enabling them to fight, collaborate, exchange cultural 
traits and material goods; agents can even reproduce. From extensive interaction rules, 
many real-world collective behaviour patterns emerge in the model's simulations. These 
include the Pareto distribution, relating individual wealth to its frequency with a power-
law (e.g. Lorenz, 1905). This particular agent-based model continues to be developed. A 
collaboration between various U.S. Institutions aims to extend the Sugarscape model 
into more pragmatic settings of policy recommendations and resource allocations (Ball, 
2004). The application of this technology towards a more realistic and socially-aware 
regulatory approach is an exciting agenda for the future of agent-based models, and 
discussed further in chapter 5. 
 
The application of agent-orientated simulations to real-world problems has already 
begun in more domain-specific areas, such as the simulations of pedestrian behaviour to 
improve event planning and regulation. Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek (2000) respond to 
an observation that a growing population and improved transportation links are leading 
to more panic events at large crowd gatherings (www.angel.elte.hu/~panic/disasters/) to 
develop an agent-based model capable of simulating this crowd behaviour. For Helbing 
et al., a significant oversight often made by safety engineers is to assume exits are used 
uniformly during panics. Agent-based models can demonstrate how clogging at certain 
exits will often emerge if individuals are subject to social interaction effects, a preferred 
velocity, and physical friction caused by close proximity to others. Helbing et al. 
propose simulations can even be tailored to specific locations to prepare event 
management teams and test event locations for suitable evacuation procedures. 
 
This approach to pedestrian modelling has also been applied in other areas. Helbing, 
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Molnar, Farkas, and Bolay (2001) simulate pedestrian motion to provide specific  
recommendations for more efficient pedestrian facilities. By varying the arrangement of 
walkways, entrances and exits, and room shapes, and simulating different population 
sizes and agent-characteristics, more efficient geometric boundaries can be developed 
which optimise pedestrian flow-rates. Figure 3.2 demonstrates results from the 
optimisation procedure applied by Helbing et al. (2001). The conventional facility (on 
the left in Figure 3.2) is compared to the improved pedestrian facility (on the right). 
Their results demonstrate (a) two-way flow of pedestrians can be stabilised with the use 
of a series of columns or trees, making it less attractive for individuals to use breaks in 
the opposite stream to overtake and potentially obstruct those walking in the opposite 
direction; (b) bottlenecks can be improved by the use of a funnel-shaped construction; 
and (c) the use of a tree in the centre of a roundabout and attractive features such as 
posters on the outskirts (denoted with exclamation marks in Figure 3.2) improves flow 
efficiency. The application of simulations of this kind to real-world problems is practical 
and cost-effective. As Ball (2004, p. 138) highlights, ―planning can be fitted to human 
nature‖, rather than the other way around. 
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Figure 3.2 Practical Recommendations From Agent-based Simulations of Pedestrian 
Flows (Helbing et al., 2001, p. 373) 
 
 
 
 
A further example is the modelling of traffic flows. Patterns of traffic activity have been 
measured in countries including the U.S.A (Daganzo, 1996) and Germany (Kerner and 
Rehborn, 1996; 1997; Helbing and Treiber, 1999) to reveal important consistencies in 
behaviour. These findings have encouraged a large amount of research into how 
characteristics of traffic flow can be effectively modelled with agent-based simulations 
(Helbing and Schreckenberg, 1999; Wolf, 1999). Research demonstrates that the 
properties of traffic flows can be grouped into three distinct categories: 1) free flow, 
when traffic moves readily; 2) synchronised flow involving consistently moving traffic 
with occasional oscillations in speed; and 3) traffic-jams, when a traffic grid-lock occurs 
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(e.g. Kerner and Rehborn, 1997). This has led researchers to establish statistical 
parallels between different traffic states and the behaviour of particles in changing states 
of matter, when moving from gas, to liquid, to solid (Treiberm, Hennecke, and Helbing, 
1999; Ball, 2004). Drivers in agent-based models of traffic behaviour are considered to 
have: 1) preference for a given speed; 2) brake to maintain a constant distance from 
other vehicles; 3) imperfect reactions that can lead to errors (Helbing, Hennecke and 
Treiber, 1999); and in some cases, 4) preference for a smooth changing of speed 
(Schreckenberg, Barlovic, Knospe, and Klupfel, 2001). From these simple behavioural 
rules and characteristics, agent-based models can simulate traffic behaviour that is 
statistically consistent with the empirical observations on traffic flows.   
 
This research has also been made directly useful to other real-world problems. Dynamic 
traffic simulations, based on real-time measurements of traffic density, speed, and 
vehicle composition, are now capable of predicting traffic levels very accurately 
(Treiber, Hennecke and Helbing, 2000; Schreckenberg, Chrobok, Hafstein, and 
Pottmeier, 2003). Treiber and Helbing (2001) extend research to demonstrate how 
traffic flows could be improved substantially with the use of variable speed limits that 
respond dynamically to traffic density. Treiber and Helbing show optimal traffic flow 
could be achieved most effectively with the use of automated systems to control the 
speed of vehicles, arguing that the existence of even a small number of cars with 
automated response systems could almost eliminate traffic jams. Research by Brockeld, 
Barlovic, Schadschneider, and Schreckenberg (2001) also document how the 
optimisation of traffic lights can improve traffic conditions in major cities. This research 
on traffic flows is a particularly powerful demonstration of the potential for agent-based 
simulations to successfully model, categorise, and even predict, complex collective 
behaviour. 
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3.4 Conditions and Objectives for Agent-Based Modelling 
 
The above examples can help formalise necessary conditions and objectives for 
developing agent-based models in the social sciences, and in particular, for their use in 
studying financial markets. A clear objective of using the approach is to support theory 
development when other more analytical or experimental approaches are not 
appropriate. This tends to be in situations that involve interactions on a particularly 
large-scale. In such situations, the collective behaviour of a system may not relate to the 
behaviour or preferences of individuals within the system, at least not directly, and can 
therefore be explored most effectively via computational simulations. Agent-based 
models also permit a change of focus in theory-building, away from studying the 
characteristics of individual units, towards studying potentially complex relationships 
between individual units and the particular form of the interactions that occur. 
Interactions and other features inherent to a system may be more directly pertinent to 
theoretical accounts than knowledge of the individual agents. This premise can be tested 
effectively with agent-based models. 
 
Effective agent representations are still important in successful agent-based modelling, 
especially if an additional objective is to make useful predictions where other 
approaches may be unable to do so. As Farmer, Patelli, and Zovko (2005) discuss in 
relation to developing theories for financial market behaviour, the problem must be 
divided into two separate parts. The first and, according to Farmer et al., easier part of 
the problem is understanding of how situational factors and constraints inherent to a 
system invoke particular behaviour patterns. With regard to financial markets, Farmer et 
al. use the example of how different types of orders to buy and sell are submitted and 
demonstrate how even relatively subtle patterns of market behaviour can relate to 
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associated restrictions. These observations are explored more fully in the following 
chapter. The second and more challenging part of the problem, according to Farmer et 
al., relates to how individual agents and their characteristics interact to determine 
collective behaviour. In the study of markets, this relates to particular agent 
representations, strategies, expectations, and interaction channels. Research that shares 
this objective is reviewed further in this current chapter. When both strands of research 
naturally join, a strong explanation can be represented within an agent-based modelling 
framework and offer useful predictions for complex behaviour. 
 
Agent-based models, then, are tools that allow researchers to test the validity of 
different theories and develop means to make useful predictions for systems involving 
complex collective behaviour. However, as Ormerod and Rosewell (2006) highlight, 
agent-based models face a variety of issues in verification and validation which are new, 
precisely because they offer an opportunity to model a wider class of phenomena. Due 
to the simulation involved, verification, whether the model does what we think it is 
supposed to do, blends into validation, the extent to which a computer model is an 
accurate representation of a phenomena, as there is typically no single result that the 
model must match. Testing a range of model outcomes therefore provides a test only in 
respect to a prior judgment on the plausibility of the potential range of outcomes.  
 
Ormerod and Rosewell suggest that validation of agent-based models therefore requires 
a particularly clear description of what is and what is not being explained. A model 
should be judged by the extent to which it accounts for a phenomenon more 
parsimoniously than previous models have done so. Ormerod and Rosewell also stress 
that the micro-macro link involved in agent-based modeling requires a new perspective 
on validation: empirical data on the macro level must be combined with empirical data 
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on the micro level. This approach is applied later in this chapter to test the assumptions 
involved in a particular agent-orientated model of a financial market. I assess simulated 
group behaviour (the micro-level) in additional to simulated price behavior (the macro-
level). This testing of multi-leveled assumptions in agent-based models is fundamental; 
agent representations and interactions should be realistic and, where possible, relate 
closely to empirical evidence. When used this multi-level approach is used effectively, 
agent-based models can provide powerful accounts of previously ill-understood 
phenomena, for example, racial segregation based on preferences, the flocking of birds, 
and the patterns of activity in economies and other social phenomena, such as 
pedestrian and traffic flows. Each of these examples reviewed above have further 
conditions in common that make the use of agent simulations appropriate and effective. 
 
Firstly, a large amount of empirical data on the collective behaviour of a phenomenon is 
available. Whether this is crime-statistics or traffic flows on a German motorway, 
models can use real-world data to benchmark and falsify different approaches; and if 
successful, to calibrate models to specific conditions. The real-time tests of traffic 
predictions by Treiber and Helbing (200l) are one such example of real-data interacting 
with agent-based models. (Notably, large amounts of data may not always be required if 
the model attempts to explain a relatively small number of specific emergent 
phenomenon at the system level.) As a second condition, agent-based models require 
the data collected on empirical behaviour to be sufficiently non-arbitrary and unique, so 
as underlying processes can be meaningfully modelled and the success of different 
theories adequately discriminated. For example, Ormerod (2002) identifies the distinct 
power-law in company extinction rates as a target for judging the effectiveness of a 
model of company interactions. The distinct statistical characteristics of traffic flows 
also make it more amenable to computational modelling.  
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A final, essential condition for agent-based modeling relates to the realistic 
representation of agents. The behaviour and preferences of component agents in a 
model must be sufficiently constrained so that a set of states and interaction rules may 
adequately represent behaviour within a system. These operational definitions of 
behaviour may relate closely to inherent situational constraints. For example, agents in 
vehicles are restricted to decisions associated with driving their cars; the effective 
modelling of these decision-constraints and characteristics gives rise to powerful 
explanations for traffic behaviour.  
 
Representing the agents and their behavior in financial markets is a difficult problem. 
Traders and their decision-making are not well-understood; strategies are inevitably 
extremely diverse and potentially complex. The behaviour of different types of traders 
may also adapt and evolve significantly over time. Although not true of all agent-based 
approaches, many have approached this problem by representing just two types of 
traders. The following sections review the emergence of the typical agent 
representations applied in financial models and a number of specific approaches. 
 
3.5 Modelling Markets: Representing Agents as Fundamental or Noise Traders 
 
The fission between two separate groups of traders, one rational and the other irrational, 
is considered a reasonable simplifying assumption for agent representations in a number 
of agent-based models of financial markets. However, there is no clear analogy between 
these theoretical groups and those found in the real-world – there is no explicit divide 
between rational and irrational market participants in real markets. Whilst advocates of 
this approach may claim this is of course just a simplifying representation of the real 
world, the question explored in this chapter is whether these group representations are 
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the most sensible, effective or parsimonious ones available. This section briefly reviews 
the theoretical developments that led to the wide-ranging adoption of two separate 
groups of fundamental and noise traders in many market models. 
The emergence of the current status-quo for representing groups of traders relates 
closely to the standard economic account of financial markets and its subsequent 
revisions. Briefly, the standard economic approach is known as 'the efficient market 
theory' and proposes market prices accurately or 'efficiently' reflect underlying 
valuations. In its most extreme form, this is considered a result of the access to complete 
information and homogeneous rational decisions on behalf of agents. The efficient 
market theory began with Samuelson's (1965) proof that stock prices follow a random 
walk if rational market participants require a fixed rate of return. It gained prominence 
with Fama's (1965) demonstration of random walks in stock prices (see, for example, 
Malkiel, 2007). This approach to financial markets is encapsulated in the fundamental 
traders typical of many modern agent-based models. These traders are considered to act 
rationally on the basis of information on fundamental information, such as information 
on earnings or valuations, and act to arbitrage away any available opportunities 
immediately to keep prices efficient. 
 
Given this description of market behaviour, many commentators highlighted the 
inherent paradox in the original version of the efficient market theory (e.g. Black, 1986; 
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985): if all traders respond homogeneously to new 
information, how can anyone trade, or profit for that matter, as there is no-one to trade 
with? This observation led to subsequent revisions to the approach with the inclusion of 
a new group of market participants: noise traders who act irrationally on the basis of 
noise or erroneous information and provide profits for the fundamental traders. This 
new group thereby maintains the plausibility of a theory of efficient markets, albeit in a 
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much changed form, and has provided clear group representations for researchers to 
employ in their agent-based models. The next section reviews a subset of these models 
in more detail, with focus on the approach by Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005). 
 
3.6 Examples of Agent-Based Models of Financial Markets     
 
Agent-based modelling of financial markets has generated significant research interest 
(see reviews by LeBaron, 2000; Levy, Levy and Solomon, 2000; Samanidou, 
Zschischang, Stauffer and Lux, 2007). This section reviews five market models (in 
order: Kirman, 1991; Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik, 1997; Arhur, Holland, LeBaron, 
Palmer, and Tayler, 1997; Darley and Outkin, 2007; and Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner, 
2005) to provide a broad time-line and overview of developments in this area. 
 
To recap, the above section reviewed the necessary conditions for agent-based 
modelling, namely: 1) a large quantity of empirical data to validate and potentially 
calibrate models; 2) sufficiently non-arbitrary characteristics of collective behaviour 
displayed, and 3) realistic and useful agent-level representations and interactions. The 
study of financial-markets, for the first two conditions at least, is relatively well-suited, 
offering a large amount of thoroughly documented empirical data on market prices. As 
reviewed in chapter one, the characteristics of this data are also sufficiently non-
arbitrary to enable meaningful models to be pursued. On the last necessary condition, 
however, typical agent representations have lagged behind a more general trend in 
modern economics towards increased realism and empirical testing. Fortunately, agent 
interactions (in contrast to agent representations) have been well represented within 
many market models, and this has contributed to the success of many approaches in 
replicating important features of price behaviour. 
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Alan Kirman (1991) proposed one of the first agent-based models of a financial market. 
Extending previous work relating to the behaviour of ants and social contagion effects 
within a population (Kirman, 1990), Kirman proposes a mathematical function to 
describe the effect of direct interactions between agents within a market. This marked 
an important break from traditional economic models that permits only indirect 
interaction between agents on the basis of price changes (Ormerod, 1998). In standard 
models, for example, if demand for a particular product increases in relation to the 
supply, the price will rise, and as a result, fewer agents purchase a product. However, 
there is empirical support for more direct forms of interaction, or herding, between 
economic agents. For example, Trueman (1994) and Welch (1996) find herding effects 
in broker forecasts and Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) document similar effects 
in the behaviour of fund managers. Crowd dynamics are also considered important in 
the etiology of speculative bubbles and market crashes (e.g. Kindleberger, Aliber, and 
Solow, 2005). This increasing focus on direct interactions in market situations relates to 
the famous observation made by Keynes (1936). The actions of investors are 
comparable to judging a beauty competition: in markets we devote our intelligences to 
anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. Keynes's 
observation relates to the herding effect Kirman formalises: traders constantly try to 
anticipate the actions of other traders. 
 
In Kirman's agent-based model, then, traders switch between two groups, the 
probability of changing groups is determined by the relative size of each group. In other 
words, market agents herd or follow the majority. This creates positive feedback effects 
whereby the initial impact of an event can magnify over time. In this context, a trader 
joining a different group impacts on the probability of a subsequent trader joining the 
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same group, and so on. Figure 3.3 presents an example of Kirman's herding function, 
relating the number of agents in group 1 (x-axis) to the probability of moving groups (y-
axis); when the number of agents in group 1 is high or low, there is a lower probability 
of an agent switching to the other group. 
 
Figure 3.3 Kirman's (1991) Herding Function  
 
 
Examples of the output of this function, representing the number of agents in a given 
group over 1000 time-steps, are presented in Figure 3.4. The starting number in a group 
is determined randomly between 1 and 100; group size then evolves based on the 
function in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.4 Example Changes in Group Size (from a Population of 100 Agents with Two 
Separate Groups) Applying Kirman's (1991) Herding Function 
 
 
 
As a stochastic Markov chain (for example, Meyn and Tweedie, 2005) probabilistic 
switching between groups in Kirman‘s model is determined randomly, and for any given 
manifestation the outcome is unpredictable. However, the statistical properties of 
multiple manifestations can be predicted accurately. In Kirman's market model, this 
switching between different states based on majority opinion is considered to be 
representative of the non-equilibrium endogenous dynamics found in real markets – and 
as a result, the volatile price changes found in the real world are also simulated 
relatively accurately by the model. 
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In Kirman's approach, the two groups correspond to agents involved in two different 
types of trading strategies. As reviewed above, the fundamental approach, where prices 
are considered to revert back to equilibrium value, involves buying below equilibrium 
value and selling above it. In contrast, the noise trader or chartist approach references 
erroneous information such as price movements, and may extrapolate future prices 
based on the past. For Kirman, following closely Keynes's observation from above, each 
agent therefore observes a noisy measure of the overall majority opinion of the market 
as being either fundamentalist or chartist, and then follows the majority based on his 
observation – namely, the agent acts like a fundamentalist or chartist. This observation 
is separate from the actual proportion in each group (which is determined using the 
herding function from Figure 3.3) and cannot be known perfectly by any agent. The 
market's forecast for the price change over the next period is a combination of the 
fundamentalist view (fundamental value minus current price) and the chartist view 
(current price minus previous price) weighted by the proportion of agents acting like 
fundamentalists and chartists. The actual price series is determined by the market 
forecast each period, plus an index of fundamental variables (determining the actual 
value of the market). Simulated prices from Kirman's model are qualitatively similar to 
real markets, generating intermittent periods of stability and occasional market 
'bubbles'. Although unable to generate more specific quantitative characteristics, 
subsequent researchers have extended this framework to achieve much closer alignment 
to the real-world. 
 
A model capable of generating more realistic market prices is put forward by Bak, 
Paczuski, and Shubik (1997). A market is characterised by two types of agents, noise 
traders who trade randomly and fundamental traders who maximise utility based on: 1) 
randomly determined dividend return; 2) level of risk aversion; and 3) a personal level 
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of 'stickiness', that is, how quickly a trader reacts to changes in dividends. Fundamental 
traders buy if the stock's dividend is high enough above a constant interest rate and sell 
if the dividend is relatively low, but can vary further in their characteristics due to 
differences in risk aversion and reaction speeds. The price updating process involves 
agents placing orders into a virtual order book, and, when buyers and sellers overlap, a 
trade takes place. With N traders and N/2 shares available, each agent is only able to 
own 1 share, meaning half the agents are potential buyers and half potential sellers. 
Note there are no short positions in this model. At each time-step, an agent is chosen at 
random to either update a bid (a price to buy) or offer (a price to sell) or do nothing. If a 
buyer is willing to buy at or above the price at which someone is willing to sell, a trade 
takes place, and vice-versa for traders who are already owners of a share and wishes to 
sell. This incremental updating of prices on the basis of buy and sell orders is in line 
with the actual functioning of real markets, which typically trade on the basis of a 
continuous double auction (to be described in detail in the following chapters). 
 
Using this framework, Bak et al. simulates a number of different agent and interaction 
scenarios to assess the conditions required for realistic prices to emerge. In keeping with 
the original efficient market hypothesis, one such configuration that Bak et al. 
experiment with is a market characterised by only fundamental agents. Interestingly, 
after an initial period of trading activity, a market characterised by only fundamental 
traders simply stops transacting. All fundamental traders who have already bought will 
only sell at a price above a certain price p, and all those agents who are willing to buy 
will only do so at a price below p. Therefore, no agents take any further action. This 
finding resonates with Black et al.'s critique of the efficient market hypothesis, as 
described in section 3.5. Even a relatively diverse population of fundamental traders 
cannot adequately explain the price variation found in real-world financial markets. 
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A second scenario tested by Bak et al. involves direct interaction between traders. In 
this variant of the model, after each trade takes place, an agent's subsequent bid or offer 
is randomly chosen from an existing bid or offer. This results in a new price being 
chosen with a probability related to the number of agents with the same price. This is a 
process similar to Kirman's herding function described above, the probability of joining 
a group relates to the number of agents in the same group. A further modification in Bak 
et al.'s model has noise traders being affected by the overall volatility of the market 
price, whilst including a stochastic drift in orders back towards the current price. The 
increment by which bids and offers update, instead of being constant over time, 
dynamically reflects recent price changes. For example, agents update their orders plus 
or minus the price change over the last 50 time steps. The inclusion of these two factors, 
1) new prices chosen based on a probability related to the number of agents already with 
a given price (a form of direct interaction between agents), and 2) positive feedback 
effects based on recent price volatility, result in emergent behaviour in the model that is 
consistent with real markets. As described in chapter 1, distinct characteristics of market 
prices include fat-tailed distributions, scaling behaviour, and autocorrelation in absolute 
returns (or market volatility). These features are successfully replicated within the Bak 
et al. framework. The authors conclude these characteristics originate in collective, 
crowd behaviour, and use their model to propose specific underlying mechanisms. 
 
The Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market is a more complex and sophisticated agent-based 
financial market introduced by Palmer, Arthur, Holland, LeBaron and Taylor (1994) and 
extended over a number of papers (Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer and Tayler, 1997; 
LeBaron, Arthur, Palmer, 1999). The model, now publicly available, allows researchers 
to study how learning agents which adapt over time can help to explain the empirical 
observations made of financial market data. Unlike other agent-based markets, traders 
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in this model all begin identically and then use machine-learning techniques to evolve 
their decision-making rules to maximise a utility function. The object of all agents in the 
model is the same, to maximise a formal measure of expected utility – an approach that 
is therefore consistent with neoclassical economic representations of human decision-
making. 
 
The information each agent has access to is divided into the usual categories: 
fundamental and chartist information. Chartists in the Santa Fe model, although 
typically associated with noise traders, do not make decisions randomly or on the basis 
of noise, as is the case in the Bak et al. model, but rather, decisions are made as a result 
of specific technical trading rules and indicators, such as the location of the current 
price in relation to a moving average of the recent prices. Agents in the Santa Fe model, 
with different updating speeds, reference the historic performance of different 
combinations of chartist and fundamental information to change trading rules via an 
optimisation algorithm. Therefore, based on an agent's experience, it learns to weigh 
specific chartist and fundamental rules as relevant in order to maximise its utility. The 
particular combination of rules and parameters adjust over time as the agent gains more 
experience. At an aggregate level, this results in a marketplace that involves dynamic 
and evolving agents, similar, in principle, to real market environments. 
 
The results from this agent-based experiment show the importance of the speed by 
which agents update and re-learn their decision-making rules. In a slow-learning 
regime, in which agents learn and adapt their behaviour every 1000 time periods on 
average, overly stable and unrealistic prices emerge. However, when agents update and 
re-learn every 250 time periods on average, complex outcomes emerge with no stable 
price equilibrium and other characteristics more in common with real markets. Arthur et 
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al. find, in this second learning regime, agents are also more likely to use and profit 
from technical analysis trading rules, that is, making trading decisions based on chartist 
information rather than fundamental information. This suggests a very different origin 
to the existence of noise traders / chartists than originally proposed by Black and others 
in the 1980s. Rather than providing profits to more rational traders, these traders are 
seen to emerge naturally in the Santa Fe model as a consequence of the complexity of 
the market environment. 
 
The Santa Fe agent-based model is unique in that no agents are behaving irrationally or 
randomly, nor are agents involved in any form of direct social influence or explicit 
herding (in the sense of Kirman's or Bak et al.'s model). Agents simply strive to 
maximise utility at all times and are therefore consistent with more traditional agent 
representations. However, agents differ from those associated with standard economic 
accounts in that they rely on inductive logic: they are learning by trial and error rather 
than a priori optimal decision-making strategies. Therefore, agents adapt and evolve in 
pursuit of their economic goals and, from these evolving dynamics, realistic market 
price characteristics can emerge.  
 
The authors make the important observation, made separately by the financier George 
Soros (1987; 1994), that market environments are generated by people's expectations, 
and as a result, perfect rationality cannot be well-defined. In markets, economically 
optimum behaviour relates to what other traders are expecting and how they are acting. 
Inductive learning and adaptation are therefore central to agents' survival and 
profitability. In the terminology of Soros (1987), markets have a 'reflexive' quality; they 
are self-referential, and thus, ―the market becomes driven by expectations that adapt 
endogenously to the ecology that these expectations co-create‖ (Arthur et al., 1997, p. 
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38). These results demonstrate how realistic market characteristics can emerge quite 
naturally as a result of inductive learning and adaptive agents. 
 
The inclusion of technical analysis rules in the Santa Fe model introduces positive 
feedback dynamics that can be seen as analogous to more explicit herding formulations 
seen in the Kirman and Bak et al. models. An underlying premise of technical analysis 
is that price changes in a market must result from the expectations and actions of other 
traders, and therefore price movements are relevant to future market behaviour. In the 
Santa Fe model, trading rules such as ―if the price is greater than a 5 period moving 
average of past prices‖ (Arthur et al., 1997, p. 28) allow traders to infer and be 
influenced by the expectations and actions of other traders. This is not in a direct sense, 
as Kirman originally envisioned, as there are no direct interactions between agents, but 
equally, it is not in the indirect sense assumed in standard economic models – where, for 
example, higher prices are assumed to reduce demand and increase supply. Instead, 
traders may observe price changes to identify trends that are likely to continue, and as a 
result, higher prices may actually increase demand and reduce supply. To paraphrase 
Keynes, agents devote their intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects 
the average opinion to be; this principle is encapsulated with technical trading rules, and 
offers a profitable source of information to agents in the Santa Fe model. Rather than 
associating the use of technical analysis with irrationality and noise trading, as is more 
typical in the literature, technical analysis is very possibly a logical methodology for 
anticipating and responding to the behaviour of others in a constantly evolving, self-
referential market environment. 
 
A similar direction to interaction between agents is pursued by Darley and Outkin 
(2007) in their model of the NASDAQ stock market. No explicit herding effects, 
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deliberate randomness, or irrationality, is introduced into market agents. In contrast, 
heterogeneous agents are modelled with a suite of advanced machine-learning 
methodologies to learn and co-evolve over time. In research funded by NASDAQ Inc., 
the U.S stock exchange, the objective of Darley et al.'s model was to provide 
recommendations on precise questions relating to the decimalisation of NASDAQ 
stocks and the impact it could have on market participants, price volatility and trading 
volumes. Markets on NASDAQ were quoted in fractions of a point and typically moved 
in increments of 1/8 or 1/16 up until 2001. From 1998 onwards, plans were in place to 
move towards decimalised prices, and before implementing this change, NASDAQ used 
agent-based modelling to investigate different pricing schemes and how best to 
introduce the new regime. Towards these goals, researchers interacted with and 
interviewed many actual market participants, including market makers, brokers, traders 
and large investors. With additional access to unique proprietary data sources provided 
by NASDAQ, Darley et al. calibrated their simulation by explicitly modelling the 
strategies of individual participants. Strategies then evolved over time, based on 
performance measured with utility functions relating profitability to variance of returns. 
Many of the predictions made by the agent-based model as a result of decimalisation, 
such as a surge in trading volume and a regime shift in market maker strategies, proved 
to be accurate. 
 
The Darley et al. model, in keeping with other agent-based markets, stipulate two broad 
groups within a finite population of traders. These groups are classified as market 
makers and investors. Investors are analogous to fundamental traders, who operate with 
a fuzzy definition of fundamental value, where the fundamental value changes 
randomly and is updated exogenously. Each investor has a different degree of 
'informedness' based on their knowledge of the fundamental value weighed by a 
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randomly determined error-rate. Market makers, in the Darley et al. model, are similar 
to chartists from other agent-based simulations: they rely on price-based information 
and must provide continuous bids and offers to the market. They have no knowledge of 
fundamental value, and post quotes based on information derived from prices, volumes, 
and also their own interactions with the market (for example, how many times they deal 
at bids or offers). Markets makers were a focus in the Darley et al. model, due to their 
sensitivity to market pricing. The model involves sophisticated techniques to be as 
analogous as possible to real-world strategies and evolve performances over time. These 
include neural networks, reinforcement learning, genetic algorithms, and other machine-
learning techniques. In this way, a complex heterogeneous market place was constructed 
within a precise replication of NASDAQ exchange rules and trading processes (such as 
obligatory posting of bids and offers on a public board). This model is unique in 
reflecting a real-world market so accurately; considerable efforts were made to calibrate 
the model with regard to its agent representations and realistic distributions of prices 
and trading volumes. From this highly complex and sophisticated agent-based 
simulation, statistical characteristics of real markets readily emerge, and, as with the 
Santa Fe model, without direct herding or noise trading components to the model.  
 
The success in providing NASDAQ with precise policy recommendations encourages 
Darley et al. to envision broader uses for agent-based financial market models in the 
future. One clear application is towards studying different regulatory approaches for 
managing financial markets. Darley et al. suggest the relationships between market 
rules, trading volume, price volatility, market liquidity and agent strategies can be 
studied and understood more clearly with agent-based technology. Indeed, this claim 
parallels the application of simulations to other regulatory arenas. This chapter has 
already reviewed the development of optimal structures for maximising pedestrian 
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flows (Helbing et al, 2001), recommendations for reducing traffic jams (e.g. Treiber et 
al, 2001) and models for economic regulation (Ball, 2004), all of which gain from the 
use of agent-based modelling. Simulations have even been applied to the safety of 
boating trips on the Colorado river (Daniel and Gimblett, 2000) and other outdoor 
recreational activities (Manning, Itami, Cole, and Gimblett, 2005). With these 
precedents, it is logical to suggest models of financial markets can be used to aid market 
regulators by increasing understanding and control over emergent market behaviours. 
Perhaps, as with the Helbing et al. studies, models can even provide means of 
optimising market regulation for the benefit of market participants. NASDAQ is unique 
in its application of agent-based simulations to explore the impact of proposed changes 
to market institutions in a controlled environment. However, it seems plausible that the 
approach will become more wide-spread in the future. The increasing impact of the 
world's financial markets on real economies, and the enhanced awareness we now have 
of the risks associated with extreme market volatility suggests such an aim, although 
ambitious, should be pursued as a clear objective of applied economics. 
 
Darley et al. also advocate the possibility of using agent-based simulations in financial 
trading and research settings. Farmer (2001) agrees, claiming agent-based technologies 
may be used in investment strategies in the near future. Although it should be noted that 
Farmer's paper was written almost 10 years ago, agent-based models have not yet 
become widely used in investment settings (although there are, of course, exceptions: 
www.whodrivesthemarket.com). By calibrating simulation models in real-time using 
live data, models could provide market forecasting techniques similar in principle to the 
traffic forecasting models of Treiber et al. (2001). However, this level of sophistication 
is beyond the majority of most market observers. As Darley et al. themselves 
acknowledge: ―it may well be possible to build simpler models than ours which bring 
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the results down to a more fundamental set of criteria‖ (2007, p. 14). The amount of 
time required to develop a model similar to Darley et al. (taking them over 3 years, for 
example), in addition to the proprietary data and market access necessary to accurately 
calibrate models, makes the approach prohibitive for a broader user group. Ideally, an 
agent-based model would find a satisfactory middle ground between the realism 
required to validate the approach and the practical ease of implementation necessary to 
make a model usable and replicable. A model with this objective in mind is described in 
the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
Various agent-based models, then, have been able to reproduce characteristics in 
common with real markets. As Darley et al. acknowledge (2007, p. 58), ―statistical 
characteristics of market prices are highly robust emergent features‖. Indeed, Darley et 
al. struggled to find a scenario within their modelling framework in which prices did not 
have distinctive and realistic characteristics such as fat-tailed distributions. It may well 
be that these characteristics relate closely to ubiquitous situational constraints in 
financial markets, such as the nature of the order book and the double auction process, 
in addition to interaction effects between agents. Other details, such as whether agents 
are considered rational or irrational, or whether herding is considered explicit or 
implicit, may be less relevant in reproducing realistic collective behaviours.  
 
If success at replicating the statistical features of market prices is readily achievable, 
what is next for agent-based models of markets? Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2006) 
suggest the natural next step for researchers in the area is to move towards parameter 
estimation for relating agent-based models more closely to real-world markets. This 
level of calibration could allow models to represent particular markets rather than just 
broader similarities common to many different markets. Attempting to calibrate a model 
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to specific markets can test the validity of an approach closely, and if successful, offer 
insight into unique differences between markets. 
 
The model developed by Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005) claims to offer insight into 
individual differences between markets, providing a relatively simple and replicable 
model that can be calibrated towards the behaviour of specific financial markets. The 
approach combines principles common to many agent-based simulations, such as 
interactions between agents, changes in group sizes, and fundamental and noise traders. 
The model also has a very limited number of parameters; or in the words of Darley et al. 
(2007, p. 14), it brings ―results down to a fundamental set of criteria‖. This approach is 
demonstrated in detail in the following section. 
 
3.7 Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner's (2005) Model  
 
Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005) extend upon research by Lux and Marchesi (1999) 
and Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2004) to propose a version of Kirman's (1991) original 
formulation of a financial market. In the by now familiar framework, a finite population 
of traders move between two groups of noise traders (group 1) and fundamental traders 
(group 2). Fundamental traders buy and sell on the basis of deviations of price away 
from fundamental value. However, following the different approach of Lux and 
Marchesi (1999), noise traders are further sub-divided into optimists and pessimists. If 
noise traders are optimistic they are buying the market, if pessimistic, they sell the 
market. In this model, market sentiment, in addition to group composition, contributes 
to how market prices evolve. 
 
As with Kirman's original formulation, the number of participants in group 1, 
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corresponding to noise traders, changes over time. The probability of joining or leaving 
the group is similar to Kirman, but described here via two separate herding functions. 
The first function determines the probability of joining the noise trader group whilst the 
second describes the probability of leaving. Therefore, as there are only two groups, the 
probability of a trader joining the noise trader group can be different from the 
probability of a trader joining the fundamental trader group. An example of a time series 
generated by this process, representing the number of fundamental traders over time, is 
shown in the third panel of Figure 3.6. Superficially, this time series resembles that of 
Kirman's in Figure 3.4 above, but, as discussed subsequently, the use of two functions 
offers more flexibility. For Alfarano et al., this asymmetry in herding between the two 
groups introduced with the use of two functions is crucial for modelling unique 
differences between markets. 
 
The parameters and describe the level of herding asymmetry between the groups. 
(Note for Kirman's original model is equal to ). The model is implemented and 
Figure 3.5 demonstrates the distribution of the agents in group 1 as a result of specific 
parameter combinations at the end of a simulation involving 1000 steps. Note, if both 
parameters are less than 1, a bi-modal distribution arises (top-left panel of Figure 3.5); 
whereas if greater than 1, the distribution forms a unique mode (top-right panel of 
Figure 3.5). If is lower than 1 and is greater than 1, the distribution increases 
monotonically; if is greater than 1 and lower, the distribution decreases 
monotonically (remaining panels in Figure 3.5). Alfarano et al. note that the flexibility 
permitted with only two parameters contributes to the power of the model in describing 
idiosyncratic differences between individual markets. 
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Figure 3.5 Distribution of Agents in Group One Resulting From Specific Parameter 
Combinations at the End of Simulations Involving 1000 Steps 
 
 
 
Other parameters in the model are also important for explaining a market's behaviour, 
including parameters for the total population of traders, an overall propensity to herd (as 
separate from an asymmetric herding propensity between groups, represented with 
parameters and ), and a scale factor for the impact fundamental traders have on the 
price formation process. In total, then, only 5 free parameters are employed to explain a 
particular market‘s behaviour. 
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From these components a market price series is generated. Change in noise trader 
sentiment is represented as a random walk over time; the log price series for a market 
is derived from the proportion of fundamental traders , noise trader sentiment and a 
scale factor (the impact fundamental traders have on price formation) in the following 
way: 
 
Equation 3.1 Simulating Market Prices According to Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005) 
 
tttt ξδρδ=Price 1/  
 
 
Figure 3.6 presents, in descending order from top-panel to lowest-panel, simulated 
prices (specifically, the exponent of simulated prices), simulated returns, change in the 
number of fundamental traders, and change in noise trader sentiment. The fundamental 
valuation of the market is held constant at 1. If noise trader sentiment is greater than 0 it 
is optimistic, and noise traders are buying; if less than zero, pessimistic, and noise 
traders as selling. Figure 3.6 presents the model solved over 833 time steps. An account 
of why this number of time steps is selected follows below. 
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Figure 3.6 Example Simulation of a Financial Market, Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner 
(2005) 
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The interrelationship between the model components and the evolution of prices can be 
described in the following way. Noise traders buy and sell on the basis of (a random 
walk in) overall market sentiment. Fundamental traders respond to chartists' supply and 
demand to determine prices. Major trends in prices therefore result from consistent 
directional moves in market sentiment, coinciding with a reducing number of 
fundamental traders. With a lower number of fundamental traders, the impact of noise 
trader sentiment on the price development process increases. This abstraction of market 
dynamics into these theoretical components is simple and, at a broad level, plausible. In 
alignment with Keynes's observation, changes in overall market sentiment is central to 
how prices evolve, and, in keeping with Kirman's observation, the relative 
concentrations of different types of participants contribute to market price behaviour. 
 
The validity of the model is supported by the alignment between the statistical 
characteristics of simulated prices and actual prices. As Figure 3.7 documents, the 
distribution of simulated returns has fat-tails when compared to a normal distribution; 
specifically, the kurtosis of the simulated return distribution is 4.632 (whereas a normal 
distribution has a kurtosis of 3). The simulated market returns in Figure 3.6 also vary in 
size over time. Note also the clustering in the amplitude of the size of returns. This is 
realistic market behaviour. Figure 3.8 demonstrates that for absolute returns, or market 
volatility, the autocorrelation for the first lag in the series is 0.407. For returns 
themselves, no obvious autocorrelation is apparent.  
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of Simulated Returns (top-panel) and a Comparison of 
Simulated Returns with a Normal Distribution (lower-panel) 
 
Figure 3.8 Autocorrelation of Simulated Returns (top-panel) and Simulated Absolute 
Returns (lower-panel) 
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In addition to replicating real-world market price behaviour successfully, the Alfarano et 
al. model can be calibrated to represent the price characteristics of a specific market. 
The above simulation is consistent with the Oil market and its statistical behaviour. I 
optimised the parameters for the model with a search algorithm employing a similar 
method to Gilli and Winker (2003). The fit between actual price characteristics and 
simulated price characteristics was evaluated by relating the absolute value of the mean 
real kurtosis to the mean simulated kurtosis , and the absolute value of mean first lag 
autocorrelation of absolute returns for the real market series to the mean simulated 
first lag autocorrelation of absolute returns , as determined by solving the model 100 
times for each parameter combination (to reduce the stochastic element to the results). 
Future research could incorporate the Anderson-Darley test as a means to formalise 
differences in the non-normality of distributions as a further component. The fitness 
function is represented in Equation 3.2 (note the relative weighting of the two 
components is arbitrary): 
 
Equation 3.2 Fitness Function to Compare Simulated Characteristics to Real 
Characteristics 
 
ψΨ+ηT=ff
 
 
Each simulation has 833 time steps, the number of weeks in the Oil dataset. The upper 
panels of Figure 3.6 (simulated Oil prices) and actual Oil prices over the period 1991-
2008 therefore have similar statistical properties as a result of the fitness function 
minimising the difference between the kurtosis of the return distribution and 
autocorrelation of absolute returns over the same time steps. 
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The parameters in this above simulation, where = 5.148, and = 9.116, therefore 
explain the Oil markets‘ behaviour as a result of an asymmetric herding between groups 
of fundamental and noise traders. This parameter combination (where < ) specifies 
fundamental traders are more likely to switch to being a noise trader than noise traders 
are to switch to being a fundamental trader. Using these parameters, Figure 3.9 
documents the distribution of traders in group 1 (noise traders) after 1000 simulations of 
the process over 833 time-steps. Note the higher frequency of observations around the 
60-70 group size (out of a total population of 100). According to Alfarano et al., the Oil 
market tends towards a larger population of noise traders over time. 
 
Figure 3.9 Distribution of Final Number of Noise Traders in 1000 Oil Market 
Simulations; = 5.148 and = 9.116 
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Alfarano et al. claim to provide a behavioural account of market dynamics, where 
model components are supposedly analogous to those found in real markets. The results 
of the model are indeed validated based on the statistical consistency of simulated prices 
with real-world prices. However, the underlying group dynamics proposed in the theory 
have not yet received similar levels of empirical scrutiny, despite their importance in 
accounting for the price behaviour. Just how realistic is the behaviour of traders and 
changes in group composition postulated by the Alfarano et al. model? The following 
section addresses this question by comparing theoretical group behaviour to actual 
group behaviour in the Oil market, as documented in COT data. 
 
3.8 Assessing Behavioural Realism in a Financial Market Model 
 
In keeping with other approaches reviewed in this chapter, central to the Alfarano et al. 
theory of market behaviour is the movement of a population of traders between two 
groups. The movement between groups modulates the random effect of sentiment (in 
noise traders) on market prices. This gives rise to the intermittent periods of more 
volatile price changes. In the Oil market, more specifically, the Alfarano et al. theory 
proposes group fluctuations via herding that tend to increase the numbers of noise 
traders relative to the number of fundamental traders. This asymmetry is considered 
important for explaining particular characteristics associated with the Oil market. We 
have seen that the Alfarano et al. theory is successful at representing characteristics of 
market prices, however, the purported underlying group behaviour has not yet been 
tested. 
 
COT data, introduced in the previous chapter, and many models of financial markets 
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(including Alfarano et al.'s outlined above), specify broad groups of traders. It has been 
suggested that these groups are comparable. Noise traders, or chartists, have been seen 
as analogous to large speculators documented in COT data, whilst fundamental traders 
are considered analogous to commercial traders (see, for example, Wiley and Daigler, 
1998, p. 95). If this analogy between the groups is valid, the Alfarano et al. model (and 
other market models reviewed above) can be evaluated formally based on their 
behavioural realism; that is, the hypothesised group behaviour can be tested against 
real-world sources. However, if the analogy is not valid, then such models are 
empirically unfalsifiable: it is not realistic to test the rationality of different market 
participants. For the purposes of analysing the Alfarano et al. model, let us assume for 
now that the analogy between commercials and fundamental traders, and between large 
speculators and noise traders, holds true. Both offer, after all, a separation of market 
composition into two broad yet discrete groups. And, as the previous chapter 
documents, in real-markets, as in the Alfarano et al. model, the trading behaviour of 
these two groups is very different. Perhaps there is meaningful overlap between the 
categorisations presumed in theories and those found in real-world financial markets? 
 
This analogy between the groups is strengthened if we assume that, rather than noise 
trader's miraculously changing into rational fundamental traders, or vice-versa – which 
would seem unrealistic – changes in group composition correspond to the replacement 
of an old trader by a new one who does not necessarily share the same strategy (where 
the total number of participants in the market is held constant for convenience). This 
permits a comparison between the information contained in COT data and the changing 
sizes of groups of traders in market models – after all, the number of large speculators 
and commercial traders also varies over time and across markets. COT data can provide 
verification for the claims made by Alfarano et al. on group behaviour. 
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Our analysis of the Alfarano et al. simulation begins with a comparison of the buying 
and selling of simulated noise traders to the actual buying and selling of large 
speculators in the Oil market. The lower-panel of Figure 3.10 presents the simulated 
excess demand of noise traders, as formulated in the Alfarano et al. model. This 
measured at each time step by multiplying the current number of noise traders by the 
current market sentiment (simulated with a random walk) by – a parameter 
representing the scale of impact noise traders have on the price formation process. We 
can see, therefore, the number of noise traders regulates the excess demand noise traders 
exert, which in turn corresponds to the overall impact of a random walk on the price 
formation process. The measure of noise trader excess demand is, based on the above 
analogy, comparable to real-world net-positions (long open interest minus short open 
interest) of large speculators, as presented in the lower-panel of Figure 3.11. 
  
It is interesting to note a qualitative resemblance between noise traders' excess demand 
in Figure 3.10 and the net-position of speculators in Figure 3.11, both series fluctuate 
continuously. A more quantitative comparison, however, shows the kurtosis of 
speculator net-positions to be 0.06 whilst noise trader excess demand has a kurtosis of -
0.61. The autocorrelation is also different. As shown in Figure 3.12, both series have 
significant autocorrelation although the lags for speculator net-positions decay more 
rapidly. The excess demand of noise traders is also proposed to relate to swings in 
market sentiment between optimism and pessimism (middle-panel of Figure 3.11). This 
theoretical component to the model could be tested with reference to real-world market 
sentiment measures such as consumer and investor surveys. However, this may well be 
straining an already unsupported analogy too far, so, for our purposes, the focus remains 
on a comparison of the model to COT data. 
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Figure 3.10 Oil Market Simulation: Prices, Noise Trader Sentiment and Excess Demand 
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Figure 3.11 Real Oil Market: Prices and Net-position of Large Speculators, 1991-2000 
 
Figure 3.12 Autocorrelations of Speculator Net-Positions in the Real Oil Market, and 
Noise Trader Excess Demand in a Simulation of the Oil Market 
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In keeping with the other market models reviewed above, Alfarano et al. stipulate 
important changes in market composition over time. According to the particular 
parametrisation of the model for the Oil market, the variation in market composition 
tends towards larger concentrations of noise traders than fundamental traders over time. 
The lower-panel of Figure 3.13 displays changes in the number of fundamental traders 
based on the simulation of the Oil market. Note the overall number of fundamental 
traders tends to be below 50, a typical outcome in the model. In the real-world Oil 
market, it should be possible to see similar changes in participant composition over 
time: based on our analogy, the Oil market should observe a trend towards increased 
participation of large speculators over the sample period. This is a hypothesis that can 
be tested directly. 
 
Figure 3.13 Simulated Oil Prices and Changes in Number of Fundamental Traders 
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COT data is used to investigate changes in market composition in the following way. A 
metric is constructed of the concentration of commercial to speculator activity by 
representing the open interest (both long and short) held by commercials as a ratio of 
commercial plus large speculator open interest (again, both long and short positions). 
This ratio therefore relates the total participation of commercial traders to that of large 
speculators, incorporating both long and short positions to fully reflect how much of the 
market is taken up by each group (see Equation 3.3). 
 
Equation 3.3 Concentration Ratio, Commercial Activity to Speculator Activity 
 
Short,SpeculatorLong,SpeculatorShort,CommercialLong,Commercial
Short,CommercialLong,Commercial
P+PP+P
P+P
=conc
 
 
 
The lower panel of Figure 3.14 documents the change in market composition between 
commercials and large speculators in the Oil market. A high value for the ratio 
represents a larger amount of commercial activity, and a low value, a larger amount of 
speculator activity (where a value of 0.5 would represent equal proportions between the 
two groups). Note there is a general decline in the amount of commercial participation 
over the sample period, and conversely, an increase in speculation. Presuming the 
analogy between the groups and COT data holds true, this finding is relevant for two 
reasons. Firstly, it provides support for a major theoretical assumption typically made in 
agent-based market models: change in market composition, or the size of groups of 
traders, occurs over time. Secondly, the finding supports the more specific claim made 
by the Alfarano et al. model: in the Oil market, speculators (or noise traders) increase in 
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concentration relative to commercials (or fundamental traders) over time. The Alfarano 
et al. model is therefore apparently valid for generating realistic price characteristics 
with, at least qualitatively, accurate representations of the underlying group dynamics 
involved. 
 
Figure 3.14 Oil Market Prices and Changes in the Ratio of Commercial to Large 
Speculator Composition, 1991 to 2008 
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There is further evidence against the validity of the Alfarano et al. model, however. The 
increase in large speculation in the Oil market is not an isolated phenomenon. COT data 
documents, across almost all futures markets, a broad increase in the relative 
concentration of large speculator activity to commercial activity over recent decades. 
There are many possible ways to quantify this general increase in speculation. The 
simple approach adopted here is to take the median market participation ratio (see 
Equation 3.3) during the first 12 months and compare it to the median taken from the 
last 12 months, for each market in the sample. Table 3.1 documents these results across 
the 31 different futures markets sampled in the previous chapter. The final column in 
Table 1 compares the ratio at the start of the sample period to the ratio at the end. Note 
the majority of markets have seen an increase in large speculation. Presuming the 
analogy between the COT and Alfarano et al. groups holds, this suggests the 
discriminatory power of the Alfarano et al. model is inadequate: if the concentration of 
large speculation increases for almost all futures markets, how can it be a source of 
idiosyncratic differences between markets? 
 
In addition, a related observation of real-world markets is a broad increase in total open 
interest (the number of contracts outstanding in a market) over the sample period. As the 
second from right column in Table 3.1 documents, most of the financial markets 
surveyed have increased in the overall size of participation during the last 17 years, 
often quite dramatically. The Alfarano et al. model, as is the case with all other agent-
based markets reviewed here, fails to account for this behaviour, postulating instead a 
constant number of traders, or tradable float, over time. 
 
Participation levels in all financial markets change, as does the amount of floated 
product being traded. For example, public limited companies regularly buy-back or 
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issue more stocks and shares; new interest-rate products and currencies are often issued 
by governments; and in the futures markets, the number of outstanding contracts (as 
measured by open interest) changes continuously. A model of a market unable to 
account for often dramatic changes in the size of participation and floating product, and 
the more recent trend towards heightened activity in many financial markets, is not 
adequately representing one of the most prominent observations of real-world markets. 
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Table 3.1 Comparison of Commercial to Large Speculator Activity and Open Interest  
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This particular criticism of the Alfarano et al. model, and other models reviewed here, 
relates to the argument of Gallegati, Keen, Lux, and Ormerod (2006) for whom econo-
physicists (researchers with a background in physics involved in economics) are often 
pre-occupied with modelling systems where exchange is conserved. In certain physical 
systems, a finite quantity of energy or matter exists and moves around a system without 
being increased or decreased in aggregate. In contrast, real economic systems, such as 
financial markets, are typified by dissipation, growth and change. Gallegati et al. note 
the increase in real-world per capita income over the 20
th
 century, and highlight that 
many econo-physicists have conserved wealth in their economic models in place of this 
crucial feature of real-world economic dynamics. The Alfarano et al. model also 
assumes conservation in the form of market participation: a finite number of traders 
change states between two groups. Although this is deliberate, to maintain simplicity in 
the model, and is by no means fatal to the overall approach, more behaviourally realistic 
theories must acknowledge the change and growth common to real-world economic 
systems and include these features in their modelling objectives. 
 
A further criticism of the Alfarano et al. model is its failure to generate realistic 
measures of group trading behaviour. Such measures could enable more direct analogies 
to the real-world and therefore more falsifiable theoretical accounts. COT data 
documents long and short positions of groups, and not just a net-position or 'excess 
demand' as produced by noise traders (Figure 3.10). A related observation is that 
measures of buying and selling by groups of traders in real-markets may produce typical 
patterns of activity. These patterns of group behaviour are the subject of chapter 2 and 
can be targeted in market simulations alongside the more common objectives of 
generating realistic price characteristics. Although there are individual differences 
between markets, a broad pattern of group-specific trading behaviour is documented 
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across a wide range of futures markets in the previous chapter, and may help to further 
constrain theoretical accounts of market behaviour. 
 
Table 3.2 presents the slope coefficients and associated p-values from the time-series 
analysis for the Oil market, also presented in chapter 2, where changes in COT variables 
are regressed on concurrent changes in prices and significant lags of both COT variable 
and price. The analysis is carried out across a range of time-horizons to reveal 
consistent trading behaviour. Large speculators change in long and short positions is 
positively correlated with prices, whereas commercial traders are negatively correlated; 
a pattern of behaviour typical of a wide-range of markets. 
 
Table 3.2 Oil Market, Group Trading Behaviour, Slope Coefficients and Significance at 
p < 0.05 
 
 
Although the Alfarano et al. model is parsimonious and succeeds in generating realistic 
price characteristics, the model fails as underlying dynamics are derived from 
theoretical notions of group behaviour that lack empirical foundations. The model does 
not aim explicitly to replicate the group categorisations provided in COT data, nor focus 
specifically on behavioural realism of groups of traders. However, it does make claims 
on how participants actually behave in financial markets, claims that underlie a theory 
of market behaviour and individual differences between markets. 
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If we assume the group categorisations in the Alfarano et al. model are not analogous to 
those documented in COT data, the model makes apparently unfalsifiable predictions. It 
is not feasible to assess how closely fundamental or noise trader group categorisations 
relate to real participants, or how changes in the relative dominance of these groups 
impact the market at any given moment in time. Alternatively, if the groups are a valid 
analogy to those in COT data, as the above analysis assumes, the model lacks 
discriminatory power and also fails. Alfarano et al.'s groups are simplifications, of 
course, permitting a parsimonious theory of how markets behave. But are these group 
categorisations the most valid and useful simplifying assumptions available? The 
answer to this question depends on the research being undertaken. But if the future 
agenda for agent-based models of financial markets is to be calibrated accurately for 
specific markets, and to be used in answering specific questions about specific scenarios 
that might be useful for practical objectives, behavioural realism must be achieved at a 
level higher. 
 
3.9 Improving Behavioural Realism in Market Models 
 
The underlying problem in fundamental and noise trader categorisations is a lack of 
empirical foundations. As discussed in section 3.5, typical groups relate to theoretical 
precedents rather than empirical evidence on how traders actually behave. This problem 
can be addressed directly with alternative group categorisation presented in COT data, 
which documents the historical trading record of three groups of financial traders, each 
with different business objectives: commercial, large speculator, and smaller (non-
reportable) traders. 
 
These groups are empirically grounded and relate to fundamental principles of financial 
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markets, as discussed in chapter 1. This is presumably why the U.S. Government 
considers it pertinent to go to the considerable expense and effort to assemble daily 
trading positions of the three groups. It makes sense to align group categorisations used 
in market models with those that have direct real-world analogues. This would offer 
new and meaningful constraints on those developing theories on market behaviour, and 
additionally, making theories more directly applicable to the real-world. 
 
However, the use of COT data for group categorisations in models of financial markets 
is not without its difficulties. Derivative markets are unique in that no underlying 
product is being vended. Stocks or bonds are not issued, nor currencies floated, rather, a 
derivative product explicitly relates to an underlying product – but it is derived. 
Derivatives are used in industrial settings by commercial traders, who produce and 
distribute products and therefore require derivatives to managing their cash-flow and 
risk. This activity by commercial traders does not necessarily extend to non-derivative 
markets, such as stock-markets, and would suggest that the group categorisations in 
COT data are limited in their application. 
 
Whilst the group categorisations used in COT data do not apply ubiquitously, 
participants with different business objectives do operate in all markets. In stock 
markets, for example, it is possible to segregate participants in terms of their business 
goals; for example, there are companies issuing stocks to raise capital, market makers 
pursuing profits from small intra-day price changes, and pension funds investing large 
positions for dividend yields and returns that span many years. Each participant has 
unique objectives for being active in the marketplace and, in many cases, these 
objectives apply across a larger group.  Although the specific COT data group 
categorisations do not apply universally, the broader dimension is universal: business 
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objectives are important measures of trading behaviour that impact on groups of 
participants. COT data therefore offers a starting point for providing broad, yet 
empirical, categorisations that apply across a large number of participants. 
 
To summarise, behavioural realism can be improved in agent-based models by ensuring 
simulated agents correspond more accurately to empirical evidence on actual market 
participants.  Additionally, by ensuring detailed measures of trading activity for 
participant groups are generated, and reflect realistic patterns of trading behaviour (such 
as those documented in chapter 2), new and important constraints on theories of 
financial markets are provided. Furthermore, although of lesser relevance, models can 
increase their behavioural realism by allowing the overall size of a simulated market to 
fluctuate over time, to correspond to this characteristic of real-world markets. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed a number of agent-based models developed in the social 
sciences, noting necessary conditions and requirements that can apply to the modelling 
of financial markets. These include the existence of a large amount of non-arbitrary 
empirical data on a phenomenon, to assist in the development and evaluation of 
simulation results, and separately, adequately specified representations of the situational 
constraints and agent characteristics involved in a system. 
 
On the first of these points, a substantial amount of historical price data is available for 
financial markets, although information on trader behaviour and market composition is 
much more limited. On the second point, whilst more recent modelling approaches 
incorporate realistic situational constraints associated with trading in financial markets 
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(as reviewed in the following chapter), agent representations typically stem from 
theoretical rather than empirical precedents. This is a serious weakness associated with 
many approaches, such as the model developed by Alfarano et al. (2005) analysed in 
detail in this chapter. The inclusion of non-empirical trader representations as central 
theoretical components for many models can be associated with low levels of validity 
(LeBaron, 2000). 
 
By utilising empirical sources on the behaviour of different groups of traders, however 
limited, and ensuring theories accurately represent the characteristics of different 
participants, new constraints on theoretical accounts and higher levels of realism can be 
achieved. An agent-based model with these objectives is proposed in the following 
chapter. 
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4. BEHAVIOURAL MODEL OF A FINANCIAL MARKET 
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Abstract: 
 
The agent-based model developed here proposes order-type preferences amongst groups 
of market participants with different business objectives. Commercial traders are 
considered less aggressive and therefore tend towards limit orders, buying as prices 
decline and selling as prices increase; speculators are considered more aggressive, 
utilise relatively more market orders and aggressive limit orders, trading in the direction 
of prices changes. These behavioural preferences, in the absence of deeper strategic 
considerations or a distinction between 'informed' or 'uninformed' decision-making, are 
sufficient to account for empirical regularities in trading behaviour identified in chapter 
2. The market model presented here captures essential elements of the dynamics 
involved at two separate levels, the order-flow level and the level of group behaviour. In 
combination, the model offers a high level of behavioural realism and a powerful tool 
for exploring market dynamics. 
 
 
 
“Market participants make decisions in an extremely complex environment, but in the 
end these decisions are reduced to the simple actions of placing and cancelling trading 
orders.” 
       Mike and Farmer (2008, p. 201) 
 
 
"Models need to be judged by what they eliminate as much as by what they include -- 
like stone carving, the art is in removing what you do not need.” 
Miller and Page (2007, p. 43)  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The late American economist, Robert Heilbroner (1999), believed that the study of 
economics has lost its way, and offered two objections to the current state of the 
discipline. Firstly, economics should be more socially aware, concerned with improving 
capitalism and moving towards a more responsible and sustainable society. This was, 
after all, the motivation of the 'worldly philosophers' that preceded modern-day 
academic economists. Secondly, Heilbroner rejects ―the increasing tendency to envision 
economics as a science‖ (1999, p. 317). The concepts of volition, human consciousness, 
and individual free-will all separate human beings in economic systems from the 
unconscious well-behaved particles found in physical systems. The claim is that 
economics cannot be modelled as mechanical and deterministic, as physical systems can 
be, and many academics are in danger of ―confusing economics with mathematics‖ 
(Nelson, 2004, p 211). 
 
Heilbroner's criticism applies to the agent-based modelling of social economic systems 
reviewed in the previous chapter -- that pursue coherent explanations via computational 
simulations of agents and their interaction rules. However, as Nelson (2004) notes, 
recent scientific developments have moved away from the more deterministic, clock-
work image that Heilbroner considered, towards a wider appreciation for randomness, 
interrelationships, and the fundamental role of unpredictability and adaptation in social 
systems (Miller and Page, 2007). This shift in thinking is well represented in agent-
based modelling techniques that focus on interaction processes and collective emergent 
behaviour patterns. In keeping with Heilbroner's objective of moving towards more 
socially-aware economic research, agent-based models can also offer useful applications 
to real-world problems. Examples reviewed in the previous chapter include the 
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Sugarscape model of economic growth (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). 
 
According to Ball (2004), Heilbroner overlooks a crucial aspect of social systems that 
permits meaningful scientific models to be constructed. In certain contexts, choices 
available to people are inherently constrained. That is: situations, economic or 
otherwise, may limit possible expressions of free-will, and the behaviour of a large 
number of people may inevitably converge. This does not neglect Heilbroner's original 
observation of the importance of human volition, but rather, places it within context. 
Free-will can, at times, be sufficiently bounded for useful modelling and theory building 
to take place. With this in mind, a plausible scientific study of social phenomena 
requires an associated appreciation for the impact of situational constraints on human 
behaviour. As reviewed in detail in the previous chapter, the particular form and 
consequences of situational constraints can often be effectively represented within 
agent-based models. 
 
Research into traffic flows discussed in the previous chapter offers a useful example. 
Individuals driving cars on roads inevitably have very limited expressions of free-will; 
essentially they can change speed or change direction, and as a result, behaviour is 
similar across a large number of people. The behaviour of drivers also relate to similar 
objectives. Drivers typically occupy vehicles in order to arrive somewhere else; they 
wish to do so as quickly, safely and as comfortably as possible. Situational factors 
therefore give rise to meaningful agent-level representations, resulting in effective 
modelling of the collective behaviour involved (see literature review in previous 
chapter). A parallel exists in the study of human behaviour in many economic systems, 
where expressions of free-will may be constrained and objectives shared across a 
population. 
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This chapter continues with a review of research into the role of situational factors and 
its impact on economic behaviour. This is followed by a more detailed overview of the 
role of institutional constraints in financial markets and on traders' behaviour. Related 
models are discussed, and the Mike and Farmer (2008) simulation of a financial market 
is implemented. My own agent-based model presented in this chapter extends Mike and 
Farmer's and adheres to many of the suggestions put forward at the end of the previous 
chapter on how to achieve higher levels of behavioural realism. As discussed 
subsequently, I use this model to test a hypothesis developed in this chapter to account 
for the systematic group trading behaviour documented in chapter 2. 
 
4.2 Situational Constraints on Economic Behaviour   
 
Negatively inclined demand curves are an important theoretical component of many 
theories of economic behaviour. Household spending, for example, is considered to 
respond to changes in the relative prices of different products as demand for a given 
product is negatively related to its price. This simply states, as products get relatively 
cheaper we buy more, as they get more expensive we tend to buy less. Traditional 
economic theories assume economic agents respond to such changes in supply and 
demand as a result of rational, utility maximising behaviour. However, researchers have 
proposed that assumptions on rationality may not be required for such economic 
theories to retain their explanatory power. In contrast, literature reviewed in this current 
section argues that situational factors alone can play an important role in observed 
economic behaviour, due to changes in the opportunity set or the options available for 
an economic agent. 
 
Becker (1962) shows negatively-inclined demand curves can persist even if agents 
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behave irrationally. If household spending is limited to products costing no more than 
available income, a change in relative prices will impact on the distribution of products 
available. For Becker, across a large number of households, the average product chosen 
must tend towards the centre of the distribution of products-by-cost available. Even if 
the sampling of products were done randomly, or 'irrationally', this overall aggregate 
outcome would still be similar to that predicted by the existence of rational agents: it 
would tend towards the centre of the distribution of available options, resulting in a 
systematic aggregate response in household spending. Becker demonstrated 
theoretically how a change in the opportunity set associated with the situation can have 
an important impact on  behaviour regardless of the decision-making rule being 
employed. 
Gode and Sunder (1993) empirically demonstrate similar findings. A traditional view 
held by economists is that competitive markets lead to allocative efficiency, where 
available gains from trade are fully exhausted (Hayek, 1945; 1968). This competition is 
associated with individuals using information in an intelligent way, and the aggregation 
of all this rational behaviour leading to effective market responses. However, as Gode 
and Sunder (1993) demonstrate, a market can sustain high levels of allocative efficiency 
even if agents do not seek profits or deliberately maximise their utility. 
 
Gode and Sunder explore continuous double-auction markets – where buyers submit 
bids and sellers submit offers simultaneously – in an experimental setting. A market can 
be composed of different participants: 1) profit-motivated graduate students, 2) zero 
intelligence computer programs, or agents, submitting random bids and offers 
(independent and identically distributed across a range of prices), and 3) zero-
intelligence agents with budget constraints, that is, unable to submit a bid above 
redemption value or an offer below cost. The allocative efficiency of experimental 
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markets is measured as total profits earned by traders divided by the maximum total 
profit that could have been earned (sum of producer and consumer surplus). 
Experiments with these different participants demonstrate that a market composed of 
the third category, zero-intelligence agents restricted to prices that satisfy a no-loss 
constraint, is almost indistinguishable in terms of  efficiency from markets with human 
agents. For Gode and Sunder, access to information and sophisticated decision-making 
is not essential; as Beckers (1962) also observed, the narrowing of an opportunity set 
alone can result in rational market responses. 
 
Gode and Sunder test the convergence of experimental markets to equilibrium prices, as 
defined by the intersection of a market's supply and demand curves. With budget-
constrained zero-intelligence agents, prices converge almost as precisely to equilibrium 
as a market composed of human, profit-maximising traders. Gode and Sunder relate 
these counter-intuitive findings to the structure of a double-auction market, noting the 
powerful constraining force it exerts on individual behaviour. Sunder (2003) describes 
the efficiency of a double auction markets as primarily a function of two rules: 1) 
traders abiding with their proposals (that is, their bids and offers), and 2) priority for 
proposals being disadvantageous to their originators: higher bids and lower asks 
increase the probability of trading but are disadvantageous to the trader initiating the 
order. For Sunder, some features of market outcomes are therefore robust to the 
decision-making rules of agents; sophistication and access to information may not be 
necessary for aggregate outcomes, such as equilibrium prices and allocative efficiency, 
to approach optimal levels. 
 
For Gjerstad and Shachat (2007), however, such claims are too onerous: the behaviour 
of budget-constrained zero-intelligence agents can be considered as very similar to 
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individual rationality. If agents do not place any orders that directly result in a negative 
pay-off, this is a form of deliberate intelligence and reasoning. Othman (2008) agrees 
that budget constraints, for all intents and purposes, are equivalent to rationality, but 
suggests Gode et al.'s research still highlights the value of what should be considered as 
a new approach to economics. Zero-intelligence agents, or rather, 'zero-intelligence-
plus' agents (e.g. Cliff and Bruten, 1997) have restricted attributes of intelligent 
behaviour, and can therefore provide important insights where other approaches are 
unable to do so. If realistic models of economic situations involving such agents differ 
from the real-world, these differences inevitably relate to what is lacking in the agent's 
cognitive or behavioural repertoire, such as human reasoning, learning, and developing 
strategies (Othman, 2008). As Othman notes, human agents can only act in ways that 
are general restrictions of the random behaviour of zero-intelligence agents, and, 
therefore, this provides a benchmark, or null hypothesis, for the role of different features 
in economic behaviour. 
 
For Othman, more heavily descriptive models, for example, where financial traders are 
classified as fundamentalists or chartists, proceed without a clear null-hypothesis. These 
typical groupings of market participants are considered behaviourally realistic from the 
onset, and therefore meaningful a priori, but it is unclear what market behaviour would 
exist without such descriptive features and relatively detailed decision-making rules. 
The alternative, zero-intelligence approach to economics enables researchers to quantify 
the impact of different theoretical components and build more gradually towards 
theories that inevitably have stronger validity. 
 
Farmer, Patelli, and Zovko (2005) also advocate the zero-intelligence, or rather 'low-
intelligence' approach to studying specifically financial markets, proposing that research 
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be divided into two parts. Firstly, the characteristics of markets that result from 
situational constraints, such as the nature of order placement and order flow in financial 
markets, must be understood as a foundational for further research; and separately, 
descriptions of agent behaviour, such as their strategic considerations and interactions, 
can be considered. This is in contrast to the traditional economic approach that involves 
working downwards from canonical assumptions of human behaviour and rational 
decision-making, towards institutional and situational considerations. For Farmer et al., 
these situational factors must come first. The following section of this chapter reviews 
how situational factors can restrict trading behaviour in financial markets, where the 
term 'situational constraints' relates to the environment in which individuals or 
organisations operate, which includes market institutions and exchange rules. 
 
4.3 Situational Constraints in Financial Markets 
 
Chapter 1 and 2 document how different organisations may have different objectives for 
participating in financial markets. For example, in derivative markets, commercial 
traders are involved in order to hedge exposure to underlying markets where they have 
business dealings. Speculators, in contrast, are involved to anticipate and profit directly 
from price changes in the derivative market. These objectives relate to different 
institutional constraints placed upon the dealing behaviour of different agents, and these 
constraints can lead to very different trading behaviour, as demonstrated empirically in 
chapter 2. 
 
Business objectives may impact on trading behaviour more generally, however, when 
applied to other group categorisations apart from commercial and speculative traders. 
Peters (1994) supports this proposition, suggesting market participants typically have 
158 
 
different time-horizons for their trades. These different time-horizons may also 
correspond to institutional constraints placed on trading behaviour. For example, 
pension-funds often hold positions in financial markets for long periods of time. This 
relates to the size of their investment pools and the associated high transaction costs 
involved in changing positions. In contrast, market makers provide liquidity to markets 
and are therefore involved in markets over intra-day time-horizons, profiting from small 
spread between bid and offer prices; they are trading much more frequently and with 
less trading size than pension funds. Peters argues that heterogeneous objectives and 
trading characteristics must be represented in financial markets for liquidity and price 
stability to be present – and are therefore crucial to the healthy functioning of markets. 
This subject is discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
 
In addition to the constraints arising within business organisations, exchange protocols 
also introduce important situational constraints relevant for understanding economic 
behaviour. Modern financial markets mostly operate as a continuous double auction 
where buyers and sellers can submit two basic kinds of orders. Impatient traders submit 
market orders, to buy or sell immediately at the best available price, whereas more 
patient traders submit limit orders, bids to buy or offers to sell at a given stated price. 
Often limit orders do not result in a quick transaction and are therefore stored in a 
queuing system known as the limit order book until transacted or cancelled. Market 
orders to buy are transacted against limit orders to sell, whereas market orders to sell 
transact against limit orders to buy. There are typically other sub-types available, such 
as stop-loss orders, but, for all intents and purposes, all order-types can be considered 
fundamentally similar to either market or limit orders. This distinction between order-
types is directly relevant for the hypothesis developed in this chapter to account for the 
patterns of trading behaviour identified in chapter 2. 
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From a general agent-based modelling perspective, traders in financial markets are 
restricted to either buying, selling, or doing nothing. (This level of situational constraint 
parallels the constraints of individuals driving in cars, for example, as reviewed 
previously: there are a very limited number of available expressions of individual free-
will.) From a more precise perspective, however, the trading behaviour of agents in 
financial markets can be viewed in relation to the institutional constraints associated 
with their business objectives. Participants' behaviour varies in terms of the order 
quantity of a trade, which relates systematically to institutional constraints associated 
with particular trading organisations. For example, pension funds will trade much larger 
positions (and typically hold those positions for longer) than market makers. 
Participants' behaviour also varies in terms of selecting different order-types, that is, 
either market or limit orders – a choice, as the following literature review demonstrates, 
that is also related to their trading organisations. 
 
The theory developed here builds on the relationship between institutional constraints 
and order-type preferences to account for the empirical findings on traders' behaviour 
presented in chapter 2. Before outlining this hypothesis in more detail, the following 
section reviews existing research that considers a wider range of factors that impact the 
traders' choice of market or limit orders. 
 
4.4 Choice Between Market or Limit Order 
 
The choice of order-type inevitably corresponds to a trade-off between immediacy of 
execution (and the use of a market order) and improving execution price (and the use of 
a limit order). Traders can choose to place limit orders and supply liquidity (or 'depth') 
to the market, or place market orders and consume liquidity. Parlour (1998) shows the 
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probabilities involved in this trade-off relates fundamentally to the existing market 
depth (or number of limit orders held) on either side of the limit order book. An increase 
in buy-side market depth reduces the probability of a new buy-side limit order being 
executed, and vice versa for sell-side orders; which, in turn, encourages an incoming 
trader to submit a market order. Therefore, an increase in buy-side market depth also 
makes limit orders to sell more attractive, as a market order in the opposite direction is 
more likely, and vice-versa. A positive relationship between increases in limit order 
book depth and increases in the use of market orders is supported empirically (Griffiths, 
Smith, Turnbull, and White, 2000; Ranaldo, 2004; Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Duong, 
Kalev, and Krishnamurti, 2009). 
 
An area explored further in the following chapter is the relationship between market 
price volatility and the choice between market or limit orders. Foucault (1999) suggests 
higher volatility increases the probability of limit orders becoming executed at an 
unfavourable price. The appropriateness of a particular limit order price may change as 
prices fluctuate, but, due to the costs of monitoring the market, the limit order price is 
not adjusted and gets 'picked-off'  unfavourably during more volatile periods. For 
Foucault, when price volatility is high, traders placing limit orders will therefore 
demand a higher pay-off for the increased risk of being 'picked-off', and will place more 
limit orders relative to market orders (as limit orders provide more competitively 
prices). This theory is also supported empirically (Bae, Jang and Park, 2003; Ranaldo, 
2004; Beber and Caglio, 2005). 
 
The time of day may also affect the choice of limit or market orders. Harris (1998) 
proposes informed traders become more aggressive as the trading day progresses as a 
result of the potential for information to be more publicly available at the end of the 
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trading day. This finding is supported by Bae et al. (2003) and Anand, Sugato, and 
Terrence (2005) who find institutional traders on the New York Stock Exchange are less 
likely to submit limit orders when there is little time left until the market closes. Duong, 
Kalev, and Krishnamurti (2009) document time-of-the-day effects as they relate to 
different groups of market participants. Institutional investors, who are considered better 
informed, use more aggressive orders in the opening hour of the trading day, whereas 
individual, or 'retail' investors are found to use more limit orders at the start of the day 
and increase order aggressiveness during the day. These results are interpreted to 
support Harris's hypothesis, that the wider dissemination of information throughout the 
day encourages an increasing use of aggressive orders amongst retail traders. 
 
Other possible influences reviewed in the literature include the size of the spread 
between the best bid and best offer (known simply as the 'spread' in finance parlance). 
Limit orders are found to increase when spreads are high, reflecting the decreased 
attractiveness of market orders (Biasis, Hillion, Spatt, 1995; Chung, and Van Ness, 
1999; Foucault, 1999; Duong et al. 2009). The size of the order may also be a 
contributing factor. Bae et al. (2003) analyse a proprietary NYSE dataset and find 
traders are more than twice as likely to submit a large order as a limit order rather than a 
market order. As Zovko and Farmer (2002) propose, the choice of order-type may relate 
to the time-horizon of the trading strategy being employed; larger traders are obliged to 
trade longer time-horizons and therefore pursue the use of more patient, limit orders. 
This returns us to the relationship between order-types and the business objectives 
associated with particular types of traders; a number of empirical studies demonstrate 
how institutions with particular trading approaches have different order-type 
preferences. 
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Kein and Madhavan (1995) analyse a large number of equity trades made by different 
institutions during the period from 1991 to 1993, the total market value of which was 
$83billion. There is considerable heterogeneity across the sampled institutions, 
including investment managers, index funds and pension funds. These institutions are 
broadly categorised into three groups according to their trading strategies: 1) value-
based investing (considered as using fundamental information); 2) technical or 
momentum strategies (considered as relying on chartist information and also, possibly,  
fundamental information); and 3) index strategies (who mimic the behaviour of a 
benchmark index). Kein and Madhavan find order-type preference strongly link to 
group categories, proposing more active managers, such as momentum and index 
traders, trade on information that is short-lived and therefore prefer to use market orders 
to assure quick execution. In contrast, value managers trading on the basis of longer-
term information tend to have longer-term trade durations and use more limit orders. 
These managers also trade larger positions, where the negative price impact for using 
market orders would outweigh the opportunity costs associated with non-execution. 
 
Similar findings are identified in a study by Aitken, Almeida, Harris, and McInish 
(2007) on limit orders held by various brokers in Australia. Institutions who trade 
through the brokers are grouped into two categorises: 1) proprietary trading desks and 
hedge funds (PTDH), and 2) mutual funds, index funds and insurance companies (MII). 
The study does not focus on the use of market orders or limit orders by either group, 
but, rather, on the level of aggressiveness in the use of limit orders, where the relative 
distance of the limit order price from the best bid or best offer at time of placement 
provides a measure of order aggressiveness. The dataset compiles the dealings of a 
number of brokers and provides a unique snapshot of limit orders held by each group of 
market participants every 20 minutes during the trading day, over the period from 
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January 2001 to June 2002. As with Kein and Madhavan, Aiken et al. find the level of 
aggressive order placement relates systematically to the type of institution. PTDH are 
more aggressive than MII, typically placing limit orders at, or closer to, the best bid and 
offer. Aitken et al. relate this finding to a model developed by Handa, Schwartz, and 
Tiwari (2003) that considers order-types in relation to the opportunity cost of non-
execution. Active and passive institutional trading differs in the perceived cost of non-
execution, and, therefore, leads to a consistent choice in the use of either market or limit 
orders. 
 
This conclusion is also supported by qualitative evidence cited by Aitken et al. on how 
brokerage commission varies between the two groups examined. PTDH typically only 
pay 0.02-0.1 percent of the notional value of the trades being executed in commission, 
whereas PTDHs typically pay a higher 0.15-0.35 percent. This apparently reflects 
different levels of brokerage service. MIIs require minimal intra-day contact with 
brokers, typically relying on end-of-day benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of 
order entries. In contrast, PTDHs are ―high service intensity clients‖ (2007, p. 154), 
requiring continual updates on the state of the market and access to order flow 
information not available to the wider marketplace; that is, details of the 'flow' of other 
trades going through the same broker. The two groups of institutions clearly have very 
different approaches to participating in the markets: the PTDH group profits by 
continuously monitoring the market and exploiting relatively fleeting real-time 
information based on market liquidity, news flow, and analysts' opinions; MIIs have 
longer time-horizons, and therefore, require less active order entry strategies. 
 
The study by Aitken et al. suggests order-type preferences should not be considered as a 
strict, binary choice between market or limit orders, but rather, participants should be 
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viewed on a continuum of order aggression. Certain participants will tend to be less 
aggressive, relying on limit orders that are not necessarily close to the current market 
prices, other participants will be much more aggressive, placing limit orders at the 
current market price and using market orders more heavily. The findings of Kein and 
Madhavan (1995) and similar findings over 10 years later by Aiken et al. (2007) support 
a proposition that such preferences are relatively stable behavioural traits of different 
groups of traders. These characteristics can be seen as fundamentally related to 
institutions and their associated business objectives. From a modelling perspective, 
whilst market participants can either buy, sell, or do nothing, participant behaviour can 
also be characterised by the choice of order-type, or rather, the level of aggression 
associated with orders. This characteristic can be considered linked to other dimensions 
of participant behaviour, such as the position-size and time-horizon of trades, in a 
relatively stable way. 
 
4.5 Hypothesis of Group Order-Type Preferences 
 
Institutional order-type preferences may relate to the patterns of group behaviour 
identified in COT data and outlined in chapter 2. To recap, COT data documents the 
long and short positions of large speculators, commercial traders, and smaller, non-
reportable traders in U.S. futures markets. A very clear pattern of trading behaviour is 
identified in historic COT data and analysed in a variety of ways in chapter 2: 
speculators tend to increase long positions and reduce short positions during rising 
prices (that is, they increase their buying), whereas commercial traders increase short 
positions and reduce long positions during rising prices (or increase their selling). The 
reverse pattern of activity in both groups is typically found during declining prices. As 
documented in chapter 2, this trading activity is statistically significant across a range of 
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tests, identified in a cross-section of markets and over an extended period of time. These 
findings suggest relatively stable and enduring underlying behavioural dynamics for 
many markets.   
 
A typical economic account for these empirical findings would do so in terms of 
strategic or informational differences between groups of commercial traders and 
speculators. For example, Keynes (1930) proposed that commercial traders require 
futures markets to transfer risks and therefore effectively pay speculators a risk-
premium for taking the other side of their trades. This proposed division of labour 
between the groups of participants could account for findings of asymmetric trading 
behaviour, but crucially, does not provide insight into the particular form or consistency 
of the trading behaviour observed. Theories of noise and positive feedback trading (e.g. 
Black, 1986; Shleifer and Summers, 1990) may offer a stronger account, suggesting that 
certain trading styles involve extrapolating past prices to predict future prices, and can 
therefore explain the tendency of certain groups to trade in the direction of price 
changes (for example, where speculators buy more as prices rise). Theories of noise and 
positive feedback trading also suggest particular groups may be more informed than 
others and therefore different types of traders can behave very differently. As 
demonstrated in chapter 3, however, theories involving a division of participants into 
uniformed and uninformed traders and informed traders may not adequately represent 
group-level dynamics in real-markets; and, whilst these typical economic accounts are 
clearly valid considerations, the degree of consistency in group behaviour argues for a 
more precise, behaviourally-orientated explanation. 
 
Wang (2003) proposes that high levels of coherence in group trading behaviour 
corresponds to herding, where, as a group, certain participants tend to trade in the same 
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direction over a lengthy period of time. Whilst studies support the role of herding in 
financial markets (e.g. Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Irwin and Yoshimaru, 
1999), this explanation neglects the observation that all groups in COT data typically 
have substantial long and short positions; that is, individual participants within each 
group have very different views on market direction. Directly opposing positions within 
a group suggests herding behaviour alone cannot account for the findings reported in 
chapter 2. 
 
A more parsimonious explanation for the empirical results is provided by relating 
patterns of trading behaviour to order-type preferences. Whilst order preferences may 
possibly relate to strategic and informational differences, the related economic theories 
may not be required to account for the empirical results described in chapter 2. As Mike 
and Farmer (2008, p. 231) highlight, ―going all the way from strategic motivations to 
prices is a much bigger step than moving from strategic motivations to regularities in 
order flow‖. That is, rather than trying to immediately derive a model based on strategic 
motivations, one can ―empirically characterise behavioural regularities in the order flow 
and work backwards to understand the strategic motivations that give to the regularities 
in the first place‖. The following section of the chapter follows this recommendation by 
extending an agent-based model developed by Mike and Farmer. This model, described 
further in the following sections, is extended in order to test a hypothesis of order-type 
preferences amongst commercial and speculative traders. I propose that commercial 
traders tend to be less aggressive, using more limit orders, whilst speculators tend to be 
more aggressive, relying on more market orders, and that these simple preferences are 
powerful enough to account for the findings identified in chapter 2. 
 
The following example helps to clarify this hypothesis. During rising prices, a tendency 
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for limit orders to be held by commercial traders would result in more selling activity by 
commercials as prices trades higher; that is, prices rise into limit orders to sell, resulting 
in commercial traders increasing their short positions and decreasing long positions 
(depending on the original position being held). On the other side of the market, buyers 
using market orders or more aggressive limit orders (for example, adding more orders to 
the current bid price) cause prices to move higher; speculators initiating these trades 
would increase long positions and decrease short positions. In other words, speculators 
may trade more aggressively in the direction of price changes, whereas commercials are 
more passive, trading with limit orders against the direction of price changes. These 
order-type preferences may relate to different information sets, trading time-horizons, 
and overall strategic approaches; but, to para-phrase Mike and Farmer, investigating 
these more theoretical considerations of different strategies or information sets amongst 
groups of traders is made more concrete and plausible by first identifying behavioural 
differences between groups. 
 
With this hypothesis of order-type preferences, large speculators reported in COT data 
can be considered analogous to the group of proprietary trading desks and hedge funds 
documented in Aitken et al. (2007), or, alternatively, institutions operating with 
momentum-orientated strategies as identified in Kein and Madhavan (1995). Both these 
group categorisations encompass institutions involved in markets in order to profit 
directly from price changes, including investment managers, hedge funds and 
proprietary trading desks – and both these studies find a preference for relatively 
aggressive order-types amongst these traders. These participants may use shorter-term 
information to make trading decisions associated with a high opportunity cost of non-
execution and therefore make use of market orders or more aggressive limit orders 
(Handa et al., 2003). In contrast, commercial traders may be analogous to more value-
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orientated trading approaches (Kein et al., 1995) typical of mutual funds and insurance 
companies (Aitken et al., 2007), relying on longer-term information to make trading 
decisions where the value of the information decays relatively slowly. This information 
may relate to the production or distribution of commodities that commercial traders are 
typically involved in and relate to the hedging of relatively long-term risk exposures. 
These participants therefore have lower concern for 'picking-off' risk (Foucault, 1999) 
and the active monitoring of orders (Aitken et al., 2007) as they are trading larger, 
longer-term positions. 
 
This hypothesis can be tested more formally via an agent-based simulation. The Mike 
and Farmer model introduced in the following section is well-suited for this experiment. 
The approach distinguishes between different order-types (market and limit) and is 
considered a 'behavioural' model. It is empirically derived from historical data to 
represent accurately the flow of orders in a continuous double auction of a typical 
financial market. By simulating the interaction of market and limit orders, the model 
uniquely reproduces many of the statistical properties of real prices, including the 
distribution of returns, the absolute level of volatility, and characteristics of the spread. 
The approach is also considered a 'zero-intelligence' model; buying and selling is 
simulated as a stochastic process with no underlying strategic or informational 
considerations on behalf of the agents. In the following section I extend on this zero-
intelligence to include different types of traders with systematic order-type preferences 
and record details of their long and short positions over time. Trading is still driven by 
the same stochastic process as Mike and Farmer develop, but group-specific order 
preferences are also introduced. In this controlled environment, it is possible to assess 
whether, with no deeper strategic or informational considerations provided, order 
preferences in isolation are sufficient to account for the identified regularities in trading 
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behaviour. 
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Background research on the 
statistical characteristics of limit orders books is briefly reviewed, and the Mike-Farmer 
model and its implementation are discussed in more detail. My extension of this model 
is described, followed by results from the experiment testing the importance of group-
specific order preferences. The chapter ends by discussing the implications of these 
results and potential applications to practical problems – a subject that is developed 
further in the following chapter of this thesis. 
 
4.6 Mike and Farmer's (2008) Model 
 
Chapter 1 reviewed empirical evidence on the statistical characteristics of market prices, 
where similar features are identified across a range of markets and time-periods. 
Research into the characteristics of the order flow involved in financial markets (that is, 
the placement and cancellation of orders) also reveals important consistencies. A crucial 
finding is that even the most liquid financial markets are, actually, not as liquid as one 
might imagine. The volume of buy or sell limit orders held in an order book at any point 
in time varies considerably, but is consistently small, often in the region of only 1% of 
the daily traded volume. For a stock, this may represent only a very small percentage of 
its total capitalisation. The limited available liquidity has important implications for the 
behaviour of traders – as the following describes in more detail. 
 
It is a well established fact that price returns are essentially uncorrelated over time (a 
finding typically associated with market 'efficiency' in the literature). However, more 
recent research identifies that order signs have a surprisingly high-level of 
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autocorrelation; where the sign of an order corresponds to its status as either a buy or a 
sell order. Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters, and Wyart (2004) and Lillo and Farmer (2004) 
find evidence that the sign of an order has non-random levels of autocorrelation for 
periods as long as weeks into the future. Due to the limited liquidity available in a 
market at any given time, even fairly small orders must be broken up into smaller sub-
orders. Therefore, large orders may take many days to get completed, and buy and sell 
orders have high levels of long-run dependence. For Lillo and Farmer (2005), the fact 
that market prices are not as predictable as order signs highlights the importance of limit 
order book dynamics in determining market prices: markets must continuously adjust 
other properties, such as the placement and cancellation of limit orders, to prevent price 
changes becoming correlated over time. These order book dynamics are a focus in the 
Mike-Farmer model and are modelled empirically to identify some other surprising 
regularity. 
 
Mike and Farmer analyse the stock Astra-Zeneca during the period May 2000 to 
December 2002, where the high-frequency data includes tens of millions of trading 
orders and prices that allow the state of the market at each moment in time to be re-
constructed. Analysis of this dataset identifies the frequency distribution for the 
placement of orders relative to the best corresponding price (the best bid for buy orders 
or best ask for sell orders) is well-described by a power-law. This finding is supported 
by previous research using historic data from the London Stock Exchange (Zovko and 
Farmer, 2002) and the Paris Bourse (Bouchaud, Mezard, and Potters, 2002), 
respectively. Zovko et al. finds a power-law with exponent of -1.5 describes the 
frequency with which orders are placed relative to the corresponding best price for 
stocks traded in London, whereas Bouchaud et al. find an exponent of -0.8 captures for 
placement of limit orders in Paris. As Zovko et al. proclaim, even for the placement of 
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limit orders, ―striking regularity can emerge when human beings are confronted with a 
complicated decision problem‖ (2002, p. 392). 
 
The Mike-Farmer model uses the Student distribution, or t-distribution as it is often 
referred, to represent this finding as this distribution has a power-law tail. More 
specifically, the model involves sampling x from a Student distribution, parametrised to 
fit a particular market, in order to simulate the log price for a new order relative to the 
best corresponding price (best bid for buy orders, best ask for sell orders). For buy 
orders, the new price is the best bid + x, and for sell orders, the relative price is best ask 
– x. This process is easiest to conceptualise via two separate distributions corresponding 
to the buy-side and sell-side. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the centre point of a distribution 
aligned to the best bid and a separate distribution aligned to the best ask. The centre of 
the Student distribution is therefore equal to where the frequency of order-placement is 
highest. 
 
New orders are sampled either side of centre and correspond to either a new limit order 
(if less than the asking price for a buy; or greater than the bidding price for a sell) or a 
new market order (if greater or equal to asking price for a buy; less than or equal to 
bidding price for a sell). Note the power-law tail results in a non-zero probability that 
new limit orders can be placed a substantial distance away from the current market 
prices – this is consistent with the empirical findings. The Mike-Farmer model therefore 
draws both limit and market orders from the same distribution. 
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Figure 4.1 Schematic of Mike-Farmer Method for Determining the Relative Price of 
New Orders 
 
 
This method for simulating order placement captures important empirical features of the 
spread (between best bid price and best ask price) found in real markets. For example, 
when the spread is wide, simulated orders chosen at random are more likely to fall 
within the spread and less market orders are likely to be placed (Foucault, 1999). Also, 
when the spread is smaller, market orders become more likely – a process that helps to 
preserve stability in the number of orders accumulating in the order book (Bouchard, 
Farmer, and Lillo, 2009). Other statistical properties of the spread not directly modelled 
in the Mike-Farmer approach include a fat-tailed distribution and time correlations 
consistent with a long-memory process (Plerou et al., 2005; Gu, Chen and Zhou, 2007). 
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A final component to the Mike-Farmer model is the cancellation of limit orders, which 
is found to relate to a number of internal variables, including the total number of orders 
in the book, the imbalance in the order book between buy and sell orders, and the 
position of the order relative to the current opposite best price. The functional 
relationship between these variables described by Mike and Farmer effectively captures 
the increasing probability of a limit order being cancelled when it is further away from 
the current opposite best price, and the increasing probability of an order being 
cancelled when it is competing with more limit orders on the same side of the book (e.g. 
Duong, Kalev, and Krishnamurti, 2009). 
 
The Mike-Farmer model follows a long lineage of previous research into the statistical 
modelling of financial market order flow. Approaches that precede Mike and Farmer 
(2008) include Bouchaud, Mezard, and Potters (2002); Challet and Stinchcombe, 
(2001); Daniels, Farmer, Gillemot, Iori, and Smith (2003); Chiarella and Iori, (2002); 
and Smith, Doyne, Gillemot and Krishnamurthy, (2003). The Mike-Farmer model is 
most closely related to Daniels et al. (2003), where the placement of limit orders, the 
placement of market orders, and the cancellation of limit orders are modelled as 
independent Poission processes. Farmer, Patelli, and Zovko (2005) test Daniel et al.'s 
model against real historical data and find, despite the zero-intelligence of the approach, 
it accurately predicts 96% of the spread variance and 76% of the variance for the price 
diffusion rate (the impact of market orders on prices) for a range of stocks. In line with 
the conclusions of Gode and Sunder (1993), Farmer et al. suggest that this finding 
highlights the important role of the statistical mechanics involved in the continuous 
double auction, in contrast to intelligent or conditional agent behaviour. 
 
Mike and Farmer's (2008) approach relates closely to Daniel et al., but each component 
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is modified further based on an empirical analysis of a particular stock, Astra Zeneca, 
traded on the London Stock Exchange. Based on this analysis, Mike and Farmer (2008) 
apply their model to a number of other markets (with similar tick sizes) and find the 
captured dynamics to be broadly representative. The degree of correspondence between 
unseen market data and the model provides strong evidence of consistent relationships 
between simple components of the order-flow in financial markets and more complex, 
or emergent features, such as levels of price volatility. (The model remains to be 
extended for other markets with different tick sizes where the functional relationships 
do not hold so accurately.) In terms of its relatively simple yet empirical orientation, and 
the array of different statistical characteristics represented, the model can be considered 
as amongst the most accurate simulations of a financial market currently available 
(Bouchard, Farmer, and Lillo, 2009). 
 
The process involved in the Mike-Farmer simulation is now described in more detail. 
Each time-step in the simulation corresponds to the generation of a new order. An initial 
order sign is generated from a fractional Gaussian process (e.g. Beran, 1994) that 
represents the long-run dependence found empirically in order signs for both limit and 
market orders; the sign of the resulting random numbers corresponds to either a buy (1) 
or a sell (-1). The signed order is then allocated a relative price, and, as described above, 
determined as a limit order and placed relative to the corresponding best price, or a 
market order and traded immediately at the opposite best price. This relative price is 
rounded to represent a tick integer price and recorded as either a new limit order or as a 
transaction (market order) with an associated price. 
 
During each time-step, multiple limit orders can be cancelled based on a function (see 
Mike and Farmer, p. 219, Equation 4) relating the number of orders in the book, the 
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imbalance between buy and sell limit orders, and the position of the order relative to the 
current opposite best price (updated every time-step). This feedback between order book 
variables and the cancellation of limit orders is fundamental for the model to create 
realistic market behaviour. As identified in Farmer et al. (2004), gaps between limit 
orders relate closely to the volatility of market prices, as transacted prices jump between 
available limit orders. This interplay between new limit orders and the cancellation of 
existing limit orders is central to how prices evolve and represented accurately in the 
model. 
 
Based on Mike and Farmer implementation, the volume of each order (limit and market 
orders) is held constant, this relates to the observation that the volume of orders does 
not materially impact on the order book dynamics (Bouchard, Farmer, and Lillo, 2009). 
Additionally, an ad hoc constraint is introduced: a minimum number of limit orders 
must be held in the order book before market orders or limit order cancellations can 
occur. This requirement ensures a relatively consistent price series, but, as 
acknowledged by Mike and Farmer, it highlights the failure of the model to capture all 
the dynamics involved in the order-flow – the model remains a highly simplified 
representation. Figure 4.2 provides a plot of a typical simulation over 100,000 time 
steps (or new order generations, that is, new market and limit orders) and Figure 4.3 
offers a snap shot of the limit order book at the end of this simulation. The parameters 
employed here are for the default Astra Zeneca model described in the original text (see 
Mike and Farmer, 2008, p. 220, Table 2). 
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Figure 4.2 Simulated Prices from Mike and Farmer (2008) 
 
Figure 4.3 Snap shot of Simulated Limit Order Book 
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4.7 Extending the Mike-Farmer Model 
 
Chapter 3 reviewed possible ways of improving the behavioural realism in financial 
market simulations and agent-based models. This included, crucially, agents that 
correspond more closely to empirical data on actual participants and their trading 
behaviour. To facilitate this, models can ensure measures of trading activity for different 
participants are produced, namely, changes in long and short positions over time. Based 
on these measures, group behaviour patterns can also be reproduced, such as those 
identified in chapter 2. Furthermore, the overall size of the market can be permitted to 
fluctuate over time to correspond to this ubiquitous characteristic of real-world markets. 
These additions can introduce new and important constraints on existing theories of 
financial markets and move newer models towards higher levels of validity.    
 
The Mike-Farmer model is extended here to accommodate these recommendations, 
incorporating different types of traders and their associated long and short positions 
over time. In the simplest version of the extended model, 2 groups of traders are 
included to correspond to commercials and speculators as reported in COT data and 
documented in chapter 2. An initial arbitrary long and short open interest of 1000 
contracts is allocated to each group. As with real-markets, the total long and short open 
interest must be equal at all times, representing the total open interest in the market 
(1000 contracts in this case). As described subsequently, the simulated measures of long 
and short positions also vary over time as the different types of traders buy and sell in 
the simulation. 
 
The extended model proceeds in the following way. As each new order is generated, it is 
randomly allocated to a type of trader with equal probability. As a transaction occurs, it 
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updates the groups corresponding long or short open interest. However, each new order 
of a particular sign may alter either the long or short open interest for the given group. 
For example, a new buy order made by speculators can increase long open interest (as 
speculators are buying more) or decrease short open interest (as speculators are buying 
back an existing short position). This allocation to either increase or decrease open 
interest is determined randomly with equal probability. Figure 4.4 provides a plot of 
simulated market prices and the corresponding changes in commercial and speculator 
long and short open interest, and total open-interest, over 100,000 time-steps. This plot 
is analogous to Figure 1.1 in chapter 2 depicting the same variables for the Oil market 
over the 1991 to 2008 period. 
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Figure 4.4 Simulated Positions for Commercials and Speculators, Open Interest, and 
Prices 
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This new, extended model can be used to test the hypothesis of group order-type 
preferences outlined above. Speculators are hypothesised to have a preference for more 
aggressive orders, including market orders, whereas commercial traders are 
hypothesised to typically use less aggressive limit orders. These preferences can be 
simulated by varying the Student distribution used to generate the relative price for a 
given order, as described above, for a particular group. Figure 4.5 demonstrates this 
approach. The default Student distribution used by Mike and Farmer is  incremented 
and decremented by a given value to represent different levels of order aggression, or a 
preference for market or limit orders. In Figure 4.5, speculators have a distribution 
skewed to the right, meaning new orders are more likely to be implemented as market 
orders or more aggressively-priced limit orders (for example, placed within the spread). 
In contrast, the commercial distribution skews to the left, meaning market orders are 
correspondingly less probable, and limit orders away from the current best price are 
more likely. 
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Figure 4.5 Representing Order Aggression with Different Student Distributions 
 
 
 
The econometric methodology outlined in chapter 2 involved estimating the relationship 
between group positions and changes in market price with a regression model, where 
the slope coefficient for each group position represents its contemporaneous relationship 
to changes in market prices. Table 4.1, taken from Table 2.10 in chapter 2, represents the 
relationship between group positions and market prices across all 31 markets analysed 
(as described in chapter 2, Equation 2.2, this is achieved with a categorical variable 
assigned to each market and includes significant lags of both prices and positions). 
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Table 4.1 demonstrates the clear pattern of trading behaviour described previously: 
commercial long positions and speculator short positions are negatively correlated with 
price changes whereas speculator long positions and commercial short positions are 
positively correlated. According to the hypothesis outlined above, a similar pattern 
should emerge in the simulated group positions from the extended version of Mike and 
Farmer's model once different levels of order aggression are introduced. 
 
Table 4.1 Real Market Data, Slope Coefficients for Change in Group Positions and 
Concurrent Change in Prices, Significance at p < 0.05 
 
 
The level of increment or decrement applied to the Student distribution represents the 
level of order aggression and is a central parameter in this new, extended version of the 
Mike-Farmer model. This order aggression value is referred to as oA henceforth and 
applied symmetrically to both groups in order to maintain the original shape of the 
Student distribution as closely as possible. This is negatively in the case of commercials 
(corresponding to lower levels of aggression) and positively in the case of speculators 
(corresponding to higher levels of aggression). 
 
In the following experiment to test the hypothesis of group order-type preferences 
outlined above, the oA parameter varies between 0 and 0.00217 at levels equal to the 
percentiles 50, 55, 60, 65, 70 and 75th of the default Student distribution. For each oA 
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level, the model is run across 1,000,000 time steps and a regression model fits the 
change in group positions to changes in market prices – the same methodology as 
applied to real data and described in chapter 2, Equation 2.1. The resulting slope 
coefficients for the simulated data are reported in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Simulated Market Data, Slope Coefficients for Change in Group Positions and 
Concurrent Change in Prices 
 
 
From the oA level of 0.00036 onwards, changes in commercial and speculator long and 
short positions follow the same qualitative pattern as identified empirically in historical 
COT data: changes in commercial short positions and speculator long positions have a 
positive sign; changes in commercial long positions and speculator short positions have 
a negative sign. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of group order-type 
preferences outlined above. Different levels of order-aggression, in the absence of more 
involved strategic or informational considerations, can account for the patterns of 
trading behaviour identified in historical COT data. 
 
It is interesting to note in Table 4.2 that only a relatively small level of group-preference 
is required for a clear pattern of behaviour to emerge; at the oA level of 0.00156 (the 
55
th
 percentile of the default distribution) speculators are only 10% more likely to use 
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market orders than commercials,  who are 10% more likely to use limit orders. As the 
level of oA increases, the size of the slope for each group inventory also generally 
increases. This suggests that inter-market differences may relate to different levels of 
group-preferences within a particular market. (Note, efforts have not been made to align 
the absolute value of the coefficients extracted from the simulated data to those found 
for the real markets; although, in principle, it would be possible to equalise the relative 
change in variables to achieve this level of realism – a point discussed in more detail in 
chapter 6.) 
 
This model can be extended further to include the third group of participants reported in 
COT data and analysed in chapter 2: non-reportable, or smaller, traders. Typically, these 
participants have a similar pattern of group behaviour as speculators, although less 
pronounced (chapter 2, Table 2.5), and implies a slight preference for more aggressive 
orders. This third group can be introduced into the model and provided with an oA value 
less extreme than speculators (whilst ensuring the oA values across all the groups nets to 
0 in order to match the original distribution as closely as possible). Example coefficients 
from a simulation involving three groups is provided in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3  Simulated Slope Coefficients with 3 Groups and Open Interest 
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4.8 Opportunities for Future Research 
 
Whilst inevitably increasing its complexity, the model can be extended in a variety of 
ways to explore a wider array of research questions. For example, currently, there is no 
direct feedback between group buying and selling and market prices; the group-level 
dynamics in the model operate in isolation from the order-flow dynamics. In the real-
world, inevitably, important relationships exist between group and order-flow 
behaviour. Exploring how these two levels interact, how group behaviour impacts price 
and order-flow, and vice-versa, is an interesting area for future research. 
 
For example, the analysis in chapter 2 demonstrates changes in open interest as being 
positively correlated with changes in market prices across a wide-range of markets (see 
chapter 2, Tables 2.5 to 2.8). However, as shown in Table 4.3, this relationship is not 
adequately represented in the current simulation. A positive relationship between open 
interest and market prices implies a feedback effect whereby increasing prices involve 
new transactions that increase long and short open-interest rather than decrease it. 
Currently in the model, this is determined via a random sampling with equal probability 
of a transaction increasing or decreasing open interest. Feedback effects could be 
specified by changing this probability to be a function of recent price movement, for 
example, as prices increase, the probability of new transactions expanding total open 
interest also increases. 
 
More accurate econometric descriptions of group trading behaviours could also be 
explored in the model. Chapter 2 documents significant autocorrelations in changes in 
long and short open interest of the different groups (see chapter 2, Table 2.4). These 
characteristics are not currently represented in the model; new orders are assigned to 
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each group based upon a uniform sampling with equal probability for each group. This 
allocation could occur differently, via, for example, a fractional Gaussian  process 
similar in mechanism to the generation of order-signs. The impact of long-run 
dependence in group behaviour on market price behaviour could then be explored more 
formally. This point is returned to in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
Another area for further research is the impact of different concentrations of trader 
types, or particular participant ecologies, on market price behaviour. Currently, the 
relative concentration of different groups of participants is equal in our simulated 
marketplace. However, the relative concentration of different participants could be 
varied and the impact on lower-level market behaviours, such as market liquidity, and 
higher-level market behaviours, such as price volatility, could be studied in a controlled 
environment. This new strand of research may be relevant for more practical issues. 
Chapter 3 documents an increase in the concentration of large speculators in most 
futures markets. The impact of these shifts in market composition could be explored 
more formally with versions of this model – this is a subject returned to in the following 
chapter. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
The agent-based model developed here to account for patterns of trading activity 
identified in historic COT data does so on the basis of order preferences amongst 
different groups of participants. Commercial traders are considered less aggressive and 
therefore tend towards limit orders, buying as prices decline and selling as prices 
increase; whereas speculators are considered more aggressive and therefore utilise more 
market orders and more aggressive limit orders, trading in the direction of prices 
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changes. These behavioural preferences, in the absence of deeper strategic 
considerations or a distinction between 'informed' or 'uninformed' decision-making, are 
sufficient to account for empirical regularities in trading behaviour reported in chapter 
2. 
 
Research reviewed in this chapter identifies that situational constraints often impact on 
economic behaviour broadly and in important ways. Existing literature focuses on how 
institutions, such as the continuous double auction process found in most financial 
markets, can restrict trading behaviour and result in consistent statistical characteristics 
in prices and order-flows in the absence of trader strategies or information processing 
(e.g. Farmer et al., 2005). This current research contributes to the existing literature by 
demonstrating how constraints imposed by different business institutions and their 
associated objectives may also have important effects on behaviour. Commercial traders 
may have less time-sensitive information and thus lower opportunity cost of non-
execution leading to a preference for non-aggressive orders. In contrast, large 
speculators may rely more on time-sensitive trading strategies and utilise relatively 
aggressive orders due to the high opportunity cost of non-execution. Relatively stable 
business objectives may therefore correspond to relatively stable patterns of trading 
behaviour as a natural consequence. 
 
This work can therefore be considered part of a broader, zero-intelligence approach to 
studying economic phenomena that places situational factors as the starting point for 
building more complex explanations of economic behaviour. Rather than invoking top-
down and theoretically driven notions of human behaviour at the on-set, as is typical of 
many traditional economic theories, this approach involves studying economics from a 
bottom-up, empirical perspective, assuming zero-intelligence and using computerised 
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simulations to test the contribution of different factors. A natural starting point in this 
process is the role of situational factors. For the study of financial markets, these 
include the behavioural constraints associated with the double auction process and, as 
introduced here, the business objectives associated with different groups of participants. 
 
The agent-based model presented in this chapter therefore permits a minimum of 
theoretical assumptions, being almost entirely empirically derived to capture a wide-
variety of features associated with the behaviour of financial markets. These include the 
properties of the spread, the distribution of returns, and trading patterns of different 
groups of market participants. Based on the uniquely empirical orientation of this 
model, it can also be calibrated to represent a particular market where two sources of 
data are available: higher-frequency, order-flow level data; and lower-frequency, COT 
data. The level of realism and calibration has been lacking in previous market 
simulations, and, whilst alternative approaches have been put forward (e.g. Darley and 
Outkin, 2007) they are typically proprietary and much more computationally expensive. 
 
The model introduced here therefore captures essential elements of market dynamics 
involved at two separate levels, the order-flow level, and at the level of group 
behaviour. In combination, this is a powerful tool to explore questions related to the 
interaction of different levels of market dynamics, for example, how changes in the 
relative concentration of different types of traders can impact on price behaviour. This 
topic is of relevance to regulators charged with maintaining the effective functioning of 
financial markets and is explored in more detail in the following chapter. 
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5. BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND MARKET REGULATION 
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Abstract: 
 
Recent debate on financial market regulation has included calls for the restriction of 
speculators' positions in order to limit market volatility. This chapter reviews related 
evidence with the use of the behavioural market model developed in the previous 
chapter and of the analysis of historic COT and price data. The results generate mixed 
conclusions, highlighting the need to extend the market model to include new 
relationships that link group behaviour and order-flows more closely, and more broadly, 
to re-direct regulatory debate towards the role of liquidity in causing market volatility. 
Overall, the research presented here suggests the net-effect of increased speculation is to 
provide more liquidity to a market, and therefore, to lower market volatility, even if 
speculators prefer more aggressive orders. A discussion considers the possibilities for 
new financial market regulation focused on orders preferences amongst traders, and, 
thus, on influencing the available liquidity in a market. 
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5.1 Introduction: the Regulation of Speculators 
 
The relationship between the activity of speculators and the volatility of financial 
market prices has long been an area of interest and concern to those involved in 
financial markets, including regulators, academics and practitioners. As far back as the 
1850s, there are records of farmers and various legislative representatives calling for 
speculators to be eliminated from futures exchanges to avoid excessively high or low 
prices (Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Discussion Paper, 2009). Tobin (1978, p. 
154) famously proposed that taxing speculators and their transactions would introduce 
―sand in the wheels‖ to reduce the level of noise in financial markets. With the recent 
credit crunch period being attributed, in part, to excessive speculation in derivative 
markets (Bernanke, 2010), the role of speculation in the healthy functioning of the 
economy continues to be an ongoing area of political debate, applied academic research, 
and focus for legal reform. This chapter extends the findings presented previously to 
explore the relationship between speculators and market behaviour.  
 
In July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted by the U.S. Government with a number 
of far-reaching reforms to the U.S. financial system to be phased in over the coming 
decade. These include a number of new regulatory bodies to impose severe limits on 
financial market speculation, or 'proprietary trading', by banking entities. There is to be 
a re-structuring of the Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivative markets (customised 
transactions between counter parties in the absence of an organised exchange) to enable 
the government directly to oversee operations.  Also heralded is a new Office for 
Financial Research empowered to collect vast amounts of data from financial firms, 
including long and short positions and the identity of counter parties – thereby 
effectively widening the scope to include international markets (Lester and Bovenzi, 
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2010). The new legislation gives regulators broader powers and mandates higher 
prudential standards, aiming to reduce the risk of financial crisis occurring in the future. 
 
One area of reform still under debate is the permitted size of positions held by 
speculators in particular markets. During the Great Depression, the U.S Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA) was enacted to impose position limits on net-long and net-short 
positions held by speculators in Grain futures markets for the purpose of protecting 
against the burdens of 'excessive speculation'. This notion of excessive speculation 
considers two separate types of risk. The first is the risk arising from market 
manipulation, where an individual or group of participants takes control of a large 
concentration of a market and sets prices in the absence of realistic supply / demand 
conditions.  The second is the risk associated with extreme volatility of market prices 
not reflective of underlying economic conditions. Position limits are considered to be 
relevant for both these types of risk and are therefore applied in a wide range of U.S 
exchange traded derivative markets. More recent regulatory debate has focused on 
whether position limits should increase in severity and apply more broadly (Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Discussion Paper, 2010). 
 
The distinction between these two separate types of excessive speculation is an 
important one. The first risk issue is relatively straightforward – market manipulation 
involves the accumulation of a commodity by a particular party that effectively 
monopolises supply and provides control over market prices. There is one notorious 
example of such 'cornering' of a market. The Hunt brothers were charged by the CFTC 
in 1985 with manipulating the silver market. At one stage, towards the end of the 1970s, 
the Hunt brothers allegedly controlled 77% of the total silver supply (Tuccille, 2004). 
This episode led to the bankruptcy of the Hunt brothers and the application of new 
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position limits by the CFTC to the metal markets. The second type of risk, as outlined 
above, relates to market volatility, and is more subtle and non-linear. The application of 
position limits to constrain market volatility raises questions of how different types of 
participants interact to generate emergent market characteristics, such as increased price 
volatility, and whether a particular market can suffer from too much speculation. It is 
research related to this second question that is the primary focus of this chapter. 
 
The standard theory for the impact of speculation on financial markets underlies the 
current regulation-by-type-of-trader (RTT) approach, where position-limits are applied 
to speculators. The standard theory proposes that a relationship between trading activity 
and market price volatility depends uniquely on the information that different types of 
traders possess (see sections 2.2 and 3.5). The theory argues that prices in financial 
markets change as new information emerges and participants revise their estimates of 
the fundamental value of a market. But, crucially, some subset of participants are 
considered less informed (Frankel and Froot, 1986; Shalen, 1993) and trade on the basis 
of more noisy measures of information (Black, 1986) or positive feedback strategies 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Shleifer, 2000). These traders possess a wider dispersion 
of expectations for future prices and their trading activities are therefore associated with 
higher levels of market volatility. This view is also related to the strong correlation 
between trading volume (or the number of market order transactions) and market 
volatility that has been known for a long-time (Tauchen and Pitts, 1983; Karpoff, 1987; 
Gerety and Mulherin, 1989; Stephan and Whaley, 1990; Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen, 
1992). This relationship has also been interpreted as causal, that is, volume is seen to 
drive volatility (Ane and Geman, 2000). It follows that speculators can cause prices to 
move excessively because of the wide dispersion of beliefs underlying their buying and 
selling, and, therefore, that their actions need to be restricted in order to reduce the 
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impact of noisy trading on market prices. 
 
An immediate issue with the standard theory and the associated RTT approach is the 
operational problem of measuring ‗information‘. Notions of information and informed / 
uninformed participants are highly abstract, and, as discussed in chapter 3, models 
derived from this viewpoint may not be falsifiable or offer empirical validity. However, 
this approach also neglects empirical research into the causes of market volatility. It is 
now well-established that volatility in financial market prices relates closely to available 
liquidity, rather than the total volume of transactions or their size (Farmer, Gillemot, 
Lillo, Mike and Sen, 2004; Weber and Rosenow, 2006; Joulin, Lefevre, Grunberg and 
Bouchaud, 2008). Mike and Farmer (2008) define liquidity as the difference between 
the current midprice (the price between the best bid and best ask) and the price where an 
order of a given size can be executed. However, it can be defined more broadly as the 
relative balance between market and limit orders; that is, if a market is considered 
‗liquid‘ it has a sufficient number of limit orders to offset new market orders without 
dramatic changes in price.  
 
Alongside an enhanced understanding of the underlying causes of market volatility, 
evidence of order-type preferences amongst groups of participants also offers a new 
perspective. If speculators rely on more aggressive order-types, their increased 
participation may naturally coincide with higher levels of volatility. Limit orders supply 
liquidity to the market whereas market orders remove limit orders, and thus, remove 
liquidity (Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, 2005). If speculators typically rely on more 
market orders their activity may naturally coincide with lowering levels of liquidity, and 
therefore, more volatile prices – as there are less resting limit orders at current prices to 
offset new market orders. Crucially, with this explanation, no abstract theory of 
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informed or uninformed trading is required to understand a positive relationship 
between the activity of speculators and increases in market volatility.  
 
This remainder of this chapter is outlined as follows. The next section reviews existing 
research on the impact of speculators on financial markets. This has tended to focus on 
specific markets and events and therefore overlaps with both areas of risk from 
increased speculation that are outlined above. This review is followed by a more 
focused analysis on the second area of risk – that of price volatility and its relationship 
to the activity of speculators. Predictions made by the market model introduced in the 
previous chapter are presented, and similar research questions are also addressed using 
historic COT and price data, as introduced in chapter 2. This analysis finds inconclusive 
results and highlights the need to extend the existing modelling framework with new 
relationships between the group and order-flow levels that are not currently specified. 
The chapter closes with a discussion on possibilities for a new perspective on market 
regulation that incorporates an empirical view on price volatility, an awareness of 
behavioural characteristics of different groups of traders, and the use of more 
sophisticated models of financial markets as pragmatic tools for research.  
 
5.2 Research on the Impact of Speculation in Futures Markets 
 
The CFTC has recently issued a proposal to introduce speculative position limits in a 
wider range of markets (CFTC, 2010). Numerous hearings on the issue of excessive 
speculation and the RTT approach in derivative markets have been held in the U.S 
House of Representatives and Senate. The debate is also ongoing in other developed 
economies. In the UK, a commentary on the issue of limiting speculation has been 
published (Financial Services Authority (FSA), 2009), although currently position limits 
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in U.K domestic markets are not considered by type of trader, but apply to all market 
participants. Research papers and commentaries on the subject have also been released 
by major exchanges (e.g. CME, 2009) and international regulatory bodies (Domanksi 
and Heath, 2007; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008a; Mayer, 2009; United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2009b; Irwin and Sanders, 
2010). As discussed in more detail below, academics have also increased their efforts to 
clarify the impact of speculation on financial market behaviour. 
 
This increased interest in the subject is largely a result of the extreme price volatility 
seen across a range of markets over the last decade. Although stock market bubbles and 
crashes are the crises most notorious in the public mind, extreme market moves have 
occurred in many other asset classes. During the period from January 2006 to June 
2008, the Commodity Research Bureau Index of a basket of commodity prices 
increased by a dramatic 71%. Oil futures reached a high of $147 in mid-2008, only to 
reverse direction dramatically over the following 6 months. This level of volatility is 
unprecedented in the Oil market and has been associated with an influx of new, 
speculative money into commodity markets. The following section reviews research 
related to this recent volatility in commodity prices and its relationship to the activities 
of speculators. This is a subject that has stimulated substantial academic research and 
the following literature review provides a broader context for appreciating concerns 
regarding excessive speculation. 
 
Irwin and Sanders (2010) clarifies that new money entering the commodity markets 
over the recent decade has come in a number of different forms, including: Index funds 
(where investors hold a basket, or 'Index', of different commodities), exchange traded 
funds (where investors can gain exposure to a basket or particular commodity by 
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holding a fund traded on a stock exchange), and over-the-counter (OTC) Swap 
agreements (where customised transactions between counter parties are hedged in 
exchange traded futures markets). These relatively new investment products can provide 
investors with long positions (that is, profits if prices rise) in a basket of different 
commodity markets, and the interest in these products has been substantial. According 
to a Barclays report (see Irwin and Sanders, 2010), during the period from 2006 to the 
end of 2007 Index fund investment increased from $90billion to $200billion. Current 
estimates suggest $320billion of retail and institutional money is now devoted to 
commodities (The Economist, 2010). Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin (2009) suggest the 
increase in speculative capital flowing into commodity markets is a result of influential 
studies demonstrating the value of commodities in investment portfolios and poor 
returns from more traditional investments, such as stock markets during the early 2000s. 
 
Many commentators claim new legislation in the year 2000 also had an important 
impact on speculation in derivative markets (e.g. Masters, 2008). The Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) was intended to maintain the competitive position 
of the U.S in OTC derivative markets, but has been criticised for allowing speculators to 
enter derivative markets en-masse. Specifically, the CFMA excludes OTC derivative 
transactions from regulation under the same government body as exchange traded 
derivatives, the CFTC. This legislation effectively reduces speculative position limits 
when positions are considered across both exchange and OTC venues; and provides a 
loop-hole for increased speculation in derivative markets via unregulated markets (an 
oversight that has largely been addressed in the more recent Dodd-Frank act). 
Furthermore, the CFMA treatment of Swap positions has also come under criticism. 
Swaps, often held by large financial institutions, do not represent an outright speculative 
position, but are considered commercial transactions and therefore not subject to 
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position limits. However, according to Masters (2008), these transactions are often 
placed by large brokers who are hedging OTC positions with speculators. Swaps may 
therefore correspond indirectly to speculative trades and can allow speculators to exceed 
their designated position-limits. New provisions on Swap dealers enacted under the 
Dodd-Frank act include the public reporting of trades to increase levels of transparency 
and accountability. 
 
The CFTC responded to increased interest in the new money flowing into commodity 
markets by issuing extended reports. The weekly Supplemental Commodity Index 
Traders (CIT) report, started in 2007, disaggregates positions of Index traders in 12 
agricultural markets. Complaints followed the release that the report was too narrow in 
scope.  As a result, the Disaggregated Commitment of Traders (DCOT) report began its 
weekly release at the end of 2009, including information for agricultural, energy and 
metal markets (excluding other asset classes, such as currencies, stocks and interest-
rates, as analysed in chapter 2). The DCOT classifies all reporting traders as either swap 
dealers, managed money, processors and merchants, and other reporting traders (rather 
than commercial, large speculators, and non-reportable traders). The report increases the 
transparency of dealings of particular groups of traders, but is limited by the low 
number of markets covered and the restricted historical data, extending only 3 years 
prior to first release. Despite limitations, the data has been used by researchers to 
investigation the impact of specific participants on commodity markets. 
 
Masters (2008) analyses CIT data and the sums of money tracking specific Commodity 
Indexes to infer the total dollars allocated to a given market based on the weight it holds 
in an Index. From these calculations, Masters infers precisely the new demand entering 
specific markets over time as a result of increased participation in Index funds. Masters 
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argues Index speculators have had a severe and negative impact on market liquidity. 
Whilst more traditional speculators will typically buy and sell futures and hold 
substantial long and short positions, Index funds are long-only, may never sell their 
positions, and thus offer little liquidity to the markets. Notably, Masters highlights 
international stock markets, traditionally the venue for large institutional investors, are 
approximately 240 times larger than traditional commodity markets (excluding 
financial-orientated derivatives). Masters claims a direct link between large investments 
from institutions into smaller commodity markets and the dramatic increase in food and 
energy prices seen over the period – and highlights the adverse consequences for the 
wider economy. 
 
A similar position is taken by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee (USS/PSI, 
2009). This U.S. Senate report labels the activities of Index funds in the Wheat futures 
market as constituting ‗excessive speculation‘ under the CEA and advocates a number 
of reforms. These include: 1) the replacement of position limit exemptions applied to 
certain Index funds; 2) the imposition of tighter position limits, such as 5000 contracts 
per trader, in the Wheat futures market; 3) an investigation into Index funds operating in 
other agricultural markets; and 4) higher levels of data collection on the levels of Index 
fund participation across all derivative markets. Debate continues as to the 
appropriateness of these recommendations. 
 
Aside from the appreciation of commodity prices associated with higher levels of 
speculation, other negative implications have been suggested by various studies. 
Historically, commodity prices have had a relatively low correlation with prices in other 
asset classes and a relatively high correlation with inflation (Gordon and Rouwenhorst, 
2004). However, as Index strategies involve linking a large number of different markets 
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into a single portfolio, researchers have found new inter-market relationships have 
emerged that do not necessarily reflect economic fundamentals. For example, Tang and 
Xiong (2010) identify that agricultural commodities have begun to trade more closely 
with energy commodities, and a United Nations discussion paper shows commodity 
futures becoming more closely correlated with the stock market (Mayer, 2009). 
Additionally, according to Medlock and Jaffe (2009), negative implications from higher 
Oil prices (associated with increased Index speculation) has contributed to the 
$331billion spent on Oil imports in the U.S  in 2008 (representing 47% of the trade 
deficit; compared to only 19% in 2002). This has strained the U.S. economy and 
weakened the value of the Dollar over the period. (Medlock et al. note that Oil and the 
Dollar had a negative correlation of 0.82 between 2001 and 2008, evidence of the 
importance of Oil prices to the economy). Domanski and Heath (2007) also provide 
evidence that the relationship between futures and the underlying commodity market 
prices has degraded in recent years, with negative implications for commercial traders 
using derivative markets to hedge their business dealings. 
 
Not all researchers agree with this viewpoint, however. Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin 
(2009) analyse DCOT data and note that, if Index funds are driving commodity prices 
higher, then markets without Index fund investments should not advance. But there is 
evidence that this is not the case. Markets without Index investments, such as fluid milk 
and rice futures, and those commodities without corresponding futures markets, such as 
apples and edible beans, have also shown large price increases along with various other 
agricultural and energy markets. Other evidence supports this viewpoint. The livestock 
market, which had the highest concentration of index fund positions during the first half 
of 2008, also experienced the smallest price increase relative to other commodities. This 
suggests that Index buying is not the primary causal influence on price increases and 
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indicates legitimate changes in the fundamental value of many commodities may be 
driving prices.  
 
Irwin and Sanders (2010) test the causal relationship between speculator activity and 
market price volatility more directly, via a series of econometric tests. Irwin and 
Sanders use DCOT and CIT data and apply Granger causality tests to determine whether 
past values of trader positions are useful in forecasting price volatility. Irwin and 
Sanders (2010) find no statistically significant relationship to indicate changes in Index 
fund and swap-trader positions increase market volatility over future periods. In 
contrast, they find evidence that increases in Index fund positions are associated with 
declining volatility in certain markets.  They advocate further research to understand 
this effect. However, for Frenk (2010), the Granger causality tests conducted by Irwin 
and Sanders are inappropriate for the given context. Research demonstrates Granger 
causality to be ineffective when applied to volatile financial time series (Pagan and 
Schwert, 1990; Phillis and Loretan, 1990) and therefore, researchers using this 
technique may reach inappropriate conclusions as to the role of speculation in 
commodity market volatility. 
 
A brief review of research into the impact of speculation in commodity futures markets 
paints a mixed picture, but demonstrates the level of interest and controversy 
surrounding the subject area. The recent Dodd-Frank act introduces important reforms 
to OTC derivative and Swap markets, with particular implications for Index funds and 
Swap dealers operating in commodity futures markets. These include higher levels of 
margin requirement and new transparency requirements for large positions. This new 
regulatory framework will contribute to new participant behaviours and market 
reactions and makes questions about the impact of specific participants on market 
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prices, such as how the Swap trader loophole contributes to price increases, difficult to 
study scientifically as research is limited by available data. The analysis of specific 
questions inevitably relies on data reflecting specific conditions. These constraints may 
limit the value of highly focused, condition-dependent research.  
 
However, as levels of speculation and overall trading volume continue to balloon in 
financial markets, broader questions as to the contribution of speculators and other core 
groups of participants to the behaviour of markets continue to be relevant to regulators. 
The pursuit of more general questions may offer longer-term value to regulatory debate, 
permitting more robust generalisations that are not limited to temporary conditions. 
Furthermore, analysis into broader questions may benefit from larger and less detailed 
datasets, such as the COT dataset introduced in chapter 2, due to the less focused scope 
of the research; additionally, benefits may arise from the use of alternative research 
techniques, such as experiments with computational models, as introduced in chapter 4, 
due to the relatively coarse dynamics represented.  
 
There is, of course, an underlying assumption to this line of research: that the behaviour 
of participants, and correspondingly, their impact on aggregate market behaviours, such 
as levels of market volatility, is relatively consistent and therefore meaningful to study. 
Chapter 2 provides evidence that certain behavioural characteristics in large groups of 
traders are markedly consistent in a majority of U.S. Futures markets over the last two 
decades, and therefore suggests the study of how group trading behaviour relates to 
market volatility is a valid area for further enquiry. Other researchers share this 
viewpoint and have carried out related research, as the following paragraphs review.  
 
Daigler and Wiley (1999) investigate the relationship between core groups of traders 
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and market volatility with the use of a dataset provided by the Chicago Board of Trade. 
The 'Liquidity Data Bank' provides historical trading volume (long and short trading 
volume) associated with 4 different types of traders.  They are market makers (also 
known as floor traders, who are also exchange members), exchange members trading on 
their own account, floor traders operating for other exchange members, and the general 
public (corresponding to speculators, managed funds and small hedgers). Daigler and 
Wiley analyse these data across 5 different futures markets between June 1986 and June 
1988 to study the impact of different groups on the volatility of returns across each 
market. They also find consistent results: the volume traded by the general public 
category (which includes speculators) is positively related to market volatility, that is, 
increases in activity by this category of participants co-occurs with increases the 
variance of prices; whereas, volume of exchange members and floor traders tends to be 
negatively associated with  market volatility. 
 
Daigler and Wiley interpret their finding of an asymmetric relationship between 
different categories of traders and market volatility in terms of the different quality and 
quantity of information possessed by these separate participants. The general public 
cannot adequately capture information related to changes in fundamentals, and 
therefore, trade more imprecisely with a greater dispersion of expectations; this leads to 
a positive relationship between their trading activity and market volatility. Alternatively, 
exchange members are considered better informed, and therefore, have lower dispersion 
of beliefs; thus, their activities are negatively associated with price volatility. 
 
A similar finding comes from Wang's (2002) analysis of weekly COT data on currency 
futures markets over a more substantial period of time, from January 1993 to March 
2000. Following a similar methodology as Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), market 
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data is decomposed into expected and unexpected components using ARIMA models 
(or 'Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average' models) – general purpose models fitted 
to predict future values of a time-series based on previous values of the same series (e.g. 
Mills, 1990). Bessembinder et al. identifies that market data, such as trading volumes 
and open-interest, is serially correlated and therefore highly predictable.  They 
demonstrate that unexpected activity (or the residual values from fitted ARIMA models) 
typically has more significant statistical relationships with other market variables than 
expected components (or predicted values). This approach is extended by Wang (2002) 
to study the relationship between group trading activity (which, as chapter 2 
demonstrated, is also found to have significantly autocorrelations) and market volatility. 
 
Wang separates net-positions (long minus short positions) of commercials and 
speculators into expected components and unexpected components. When controlling 
the effect of overall trading volume, open interest, and expected net-positions, he finds 
significant relationships between unexpected trading activity and market volatility that 
are not otherwise apparent. Unexpected activity by speculators is found to be positively 
associated to price volatility, and thus interpreted as having a destabilising impact on 
market prices. In contrast, unexpected activity by commercials is significantly and 
negatively associated with volatility, and therefore seen to stabilise market prices. As 
with the conclusions drawn by Daigler and Wiley, Wang supports a theory of 
uninformed and informed trading amongst speculators and commercial traders. Wang 
proposes that commercial traders possess private information and therefore buy and sell 
within a relatively small range of prices around the fundamental value.  They thus 
dampen volatility. Speculators, however, are likely to be uninformed with a wider 
dispersion of beliefs, and therefore destabilise the market. 
 
205 
 
Findings of a broad relationship between activities of particular types of traders and 
levels of market volatility can be interpreted from a different, behavioural perspective. 
As discussed previously, more recent research demonstrates that the volatility of market 
prices over a given period reflects the relationship between market and limit orders over 
the same period. If different groups of traders have consistent order preferences, it 
follows that there may be systematic relations between the activity of different groups 
and market volatility. This behavioural explanation may account for the findings of 
Daigler and Wiley, and Wang, and not require more abstract notions of informational 
differences between groups of traders. 
 
Daigler and Wiley acknowledge that ―floor traders tend to reduce volatility as they take 
the opposite position of other traders and provide short-term liquidity‖ (1999, p. 2310) 
but fail to recognise that this behaviour might correspond closely to the use of limit 
orders. A common market-making strategy employed by floor traders is to place bids 
and offers simultaneously in the market, in order to profit from the spread (Lukeman, 
2003). In line with findings from the previous chapter, this use of limit orders may 
account for a negative relationship between market makers' activity and market 
volatility. To paraphrase the above Daigler and Wiley quote, as more limit orders are 
placed in the order book, more liquidity is supplied, and price movements become more 
constrained or less volatile as a result. Equally, the general public, which Daigler and 
Wiley find to be positively associated with price volatility, may typically rely on market 
orders and thus be positively related with market volatility. These traders remove resting 
orders and reduce liquidity, thereby causing prices to become more volatile. 
 
The same interpretation can apply to the findings of Wang on the activity of speculators 
and commercials in currency futures markets. Unexpected speculator activity is 
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positively associated with price volatility due to the increased (or unexpected) use of 
market orders, whereas commercial activity is associated with decreased volatility due 
to an increased (or unexpected) use of limit orders. This interpretation of the studies' 
results is more concrete than invoking abstract notions of informed and uninformed 
trading to explain findings. The explanation can also be considered more parsimonious: 
the impact of different traders on market volatility relates to their order preferences.  
 
5.3 Relationship Between Groups with Order Preferences and Market Volatility 
 
This section considers the relationship between group trading activity and price 
volatility by focusing on two research topics. Firstly, as explored by Wang (2002), a 
study is carried out on the relationship between unexpected changes in group net-
positions and market volatility. Secondly, a study is carried out on the relationship 
between market composition, or the relative proportion of commercials and speculators 
in the market place, and market volatility. These research topics are addressed by 
generating predictions from the market model introduced in the previous chapter, and 
then comparing these predictions to an analysis of real-world market data. 
 
5.3.1 Defining Volatility 
  
There are various approaches to measuring price volatility, the most simple of which is 
taking the standard deviation of log returns (see, for example, Floros, 2009). An 
alternative, standardised technique is developed by Parkinson (1980) and applied here. 
It involves referencing the highest and lowest price in addition to the closing price for a 
given period. This volatility measure assumes an underlying geometric Brownian 
motion with no drift for prices (see Chan and Lien, 2003). Figure 5.1 shows the 
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volatility measure for the Oil market from 1991 to 2008, using the default rolling-
window of 10 periods to determine volatility (or 10 weeks as applied here). To apply 
this approach to the simulated COT data, in addition to the closing price for each period, 
the highest and lowest price is therefore also extracted from the simulated data. 
 
Figure 5.1 Oil Market Prices, Returns, and Parkinson's Volatility Measure 
 
 
5.3.2 Unexpected Changes in Group Net-Position 
 
The objective of Wang's (2002) methodology is to document the concurrent relationship 
between unexpected changes in net-positions and market volatility, controlling for other 
measures of trading activity. In the following analysis, the methodology is applied to a 
larger number of markets than used in Wang's original study; additionally, the 
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methodology is applied to simulated COT data, as generated by the market model 
introduced in the previous chapter. This analysis assesses how broadly Wang's original 
findings apply to markets outside of the currency futures he original tested; it, 
furthermore, enables the model's predictions to be scrutinised against real-world results 
and highlights discrepancies as areas for future development. 
 
The measures of trading activity used in Wang (2002) include weekly net-positions 
(long minus short open-interest) of commercials and speculators, open-interest, and 
trading volume. Following the original methodology, these variables are included in the 
current study and represented as period-on-period percentage change (weekly returns) 
to ensure stationarity (see section 2.5). Significant autocorrelations are also incorporated 
by referencing 6 period lags of each variable. In order to separate group net-positions 
into expected and unexpected components, group net-positions are regressed from the 
previous lags in order to derive a predicted (or expected) component and a residual (or 
unexpected) component. With the data prepared in this way, price volatility is 
regressed on concurrent and 6-period lags of volume and open interest , and the 
expected and unexpected components of group net-positions (the same 
variable naming conventions as in the original text). Equation 5.1 represents the 
regression model. 
 
Equation 5.1 Wang's (2002) Regression Model for Price Volatility 
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To apply this methodology directly to simulated COT data, extensions are required to 
the model. The simulated data needs to be made more realistic in terms of 1) the time-
windows between observations, which correspond to weekly periods in real-world COT 
data, and 2) the time-series characteristics of the simulated group trading activity (to 
permit expected and unexpected components to be derived). On the first issue, a weekly 
trading period is represented with a predetermined amount of trading volume (or 
number of market transactions). This is achieved in the following way in the simulation. 
Once a predetermined volume threshold has been exceeded, the high, low and closing 
prices, along with the long and short positions of each group, are recorded for that 
period (as is the case for COT data at the end of each week) and a new ‗week‘ begins. 
The volume thresholds used are sampled from a normal distribution with a mean of 
2000 and a standard deviation of 500. These values are arbitrarily chosen but enable the 
simulation to mimic variation in weekly volume as found in real markets. The model 
proceeds across 52 'weeks' recording market activity at the end of each period. 
 
In the second required extension, the simulated trading activity is made more realistic 
by extending the model to permit autocorrelation in the buying and selling activity of 
each group. This is different from the model extensions introduced in chapter 4, where 
each new order was allocated randomly with equal probability to either speculators or 
commercials. Chapter 4 described how, based on the allocation of a new order to a 
particular group, the order is then assigned a relative price level which may correspond 
to a more aggressive limit or market order if a speculator, or a less aggressive limit 
order if a commercial. In the extensions to the model introduced here, autocorrelation in 
trading activity is introduced at the level of trade allocation, where, instead of allocating 
to each group based on a random sampling with equal probability, the sampling is 
derived from a fractional Brownian motion with a corresponding Hurst exponent 
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(exactly the same technique originally applied by Mike and Farmer to determine trade 
signs – see section 4.6). This simple extension of the original methodology, when 
combined with the long-run dependence in trade signs already present in the Mike-
Farmer model, results in the trading activity of each group relating to its trading activity 
in previous periods. With these modifications to the model in place, it is now possible to 
apply the Wang (2002) methodology to simulated COT data and determine the model's 
predictions regarding the relationship between group activity and volatility. To keep 
things as simple as possible, the number of groups in the market simulation is kept to 
two, corresponding to commercial and speculators with their particular order-type 
preferences, rather than including a third group as was carried out for chapter 4. 
 
The Wang methodology is applied to different data sets of simulated market data, each 
derived from different model parameters in order to observe how the results vary under 
different conditions. The oA parameter introduced in the previous chapter represents 
different levels of order aggression amongst the groups of traders. The simulated COT 
data is generated for different levels of oA and additionally, for different levels of Hurst 
exponent (representing the long-run dependence in group trading activity). The 
regression model (see Equation 5.1) is applied to the simulated data and the  
Coefficients, representing the relationship between unexpected commercial net-
positions and market volatility, are presented in Table 5.1. The results for speculators 
(not shown) are the inverse of Table 5.1 based on the constraint of only two groups 
being present in the market. Note in Table 5.1, the higher the oA value, the less 
aggressive the commercial order preferences. 
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Table 5.1 Simulated Market Data: Coefficients for the Relationship Between 
Unexpected Commercial Net-Positions and Market Volatility Across Different Levels of 
oA (Group Order Aggression) and Hurst Exponent (Long-Memory in Group Positions) 
 
 
Wang (2002) finds unexpected changes in speculator net-positions to be associated 
positively with market volatility (that is, positively signed coefficients) and vice-versa 
for commercial traders (negatively signed coefficients). The results of the Wang 
methodology applied to the simulated COT data do not show a clear effect, as Table 5.1 
demonstrates. This inconclusive finding could relate to a number of factors, including 
the relative noise of the simulation, the two-group constraint, the limited sample size of 
the simulated COT data, or the particular methodology used to introduce auto-
correlation into the group positions. These are potential areas for future research and are 
discussed further towards the end of the chapter. 
 
Wang's approach is now applied to real-world data across the 31 markets analysed in 
chapter 2 with more conclusive results. Table 5.2 reports the coefficients for unexpected 
net-positions of both speculators and commercials (no longer symmetric as there are 
more than two groups). When accounting for open interest and trading volume, 
unexpected speculator net-positions co-vary positively with market volatility and 
unexpected commercial net-positions co-vary negatively. In many cases, a t-test shows 
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the results to be significant (at p < 0.05). This clear inverse pattern of results across the 
two groups is consistent with Wang's findings. The results also support a claim that the 
activities of speculators are associated with destabilising market prices. Further research 
is required in order to replicate Wang's results within the existing modelling framework 
– offering a clear avenue to improve behavioural realism still further. 
 
Table 5.2 Real Market Data: Coefficients for the Relationship Between Unexpected 
Speculator and Commercial Net-Positions and Market Volatility 
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Note: as discussed in chapter 4, the absolute values of slope coefficients cannot be 
compared meaningfully across markets as the relative size of changes in group positions 
differ. 
 
5.3.3 Concentration of Different Groups 
 
We turn now to the second research question: the relationship between the concentration 
of different groups in a market and the market's price volatility. Underlying the debate 
for the heightened regulation of speculators, as discussed in the introduction to this 
chapter, is the premise that increased speculation results in less-stable market prices 
(Masters, 2008). If speculators are considered as having more aggressive order 
preferences than commercial traders, these preferences may provide a causal link for a 
relationship between increases in speculation and increases in market volatility. This 
question is now explored by using the model to simulate market price volatility under 
different group-concentrations, and separately, by examining the relationship between 
group-concentrations and market volatility based on historic COT and price data. 
 
Experiments with the original Mike-Farmer model show more aggressive orders 
correspond to more volatile prices. In the model, the relative price of a particular order 
(and therefore its status as either a market or limit orders) is determined by sampling 
randomly from a t-distribution (see Figure 4.1). The degrees of freedom parametrises 
the t-distribution and is referred to as in the original paper. A default value of 1.31, 
taken from the original paper, has been used in all simulations thus far. Mike and 
Farmer use different values of to describe the characteristics of different markets. 
Table 5.3 is derived from simulations involving 100,000 transactions. (Note, to maintain 
a consistent sample size, transactions rather than new orders-generated are held 
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constant.) As decreases and the t-distribution becomes more peaked, more aggressive 
orders are placed (including relatively more market orders), and, more volatile prices 
result. Therefore, in terms of the model's predictions regarding the impact of 
speculators, to the extent that an increase in speculation shifts the overall value 
of lower, prices will become more volatile. 
 
Table 5.3 Simulated Market Price Volatility at Different Levels of  
 
 
In the extended version of the Mike-Farmer model, introduced in the previous chapter, 
the t-distribution is manipulated with the oA parameter. This is found to have a similar 
effect on price volatility as varying . The oA parameter systematically shifts the mean 
of the t-distribution to increase (as is the case for speculators) or decrease (as is the case 
for commercials) the relative aggression of orders with a resulting effect on market 
volatility (results not shown). This extended approach therefore also suggests a link 
between speculators and price volatility. 
 
However, a single t-distribution may not be the most effective way to represent the 
relative order placement of both commercials and speculators. As shown in chapter 4, 
by introducing a group-specific t-distribution (the oA parameter shifting the distribution 
differently for each group) we replicate more realistic patterns of group trading 
215 
 
behaviour. It may therefore be more realistic to allocate separate t-distributions to each 
group and sample their relative prices independently from each t-distribution. 
Experiments with the model employing this alternative approach demonstrate a more 
complex relationship between speculators and market price volatility than is found 
when using a single t-distribution to represent both groups. 
 
To demonstrate this, market volatility is again recorded across various simulations each 
involving 100,000 transactions. Separate t-distributions are allocated to commercials 
and speculators: speculators are granted more aggressive order preferences with a 
lower value; commercials have less aggressive orders with a higher value. In 
addition to using two separate t-distributions, the proportion of new orders allocated to 
each group is also varied across different simulations. This is achieved by changing the 
threshold where new orders are allocated to a particular group, which effectively 
changes the proportion of speculators to commercials in the simulation. The results, 
presented in Table 5.4, demonstrate the price volatility associated with different levels 
of for each group and different proportions of speculator to commercial trading. 
 
Table 5.4 Simulated Market Volatility at Different Levels of and Proportion of 
Speculators 
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As Table 5.4 demonstrates, although speculators tend to increase volatility, the impact 
depends on the proportion of speculators in the market, and additionally, on the 
extremity of order preferences amongst commercials and speculators. The model 
predicts more volatile markets are typically associated with a higher proportion of 
speculators and more extreme order preferences; but, additionally, that extreme order 
preferences can result in lower volatility if the proportion of speculators is also low. 
 
A separate experiment finds similar results by varying the extremity of order 
preferences amongst the two groups via the oA parameter (rather than using two t-
distributions with separate  values) whilst also varying the proportion of each group 
in the market. Results are in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5 Simulated Market Volatility at Different Levels of oA (Group Order 
Aggression) and Proportion of Speculators 
 
 
Overall then, the model predicts that higher levels of speculation should result in more 
volatile prices as a result of the heightened use of market orders and a proportionally 
lower number of aggressive limit orders. However, depending on the assumptions used 
to model the relative placement of orders amongst different groups, the relationship 
between the proportion of speculators and volatility may be affected by the existing 
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number of speculators in the market and the extremity of order preferences. As 
described in the following paragraphs, the relationship between speculators and market 
volatility may also relate to a significant third factor, not currently incorporated into the 
modelling framework; namely, overall levels of market liquidity. 
 
An analysis of historical market data identifies some broad trends in market behaviour 
across a majority of futures markets. These include a trend towards increased 
speculation over time (see Table 3.1), and, as Table 5.6 demonstrates, a trend towards 
increased trading activity (as measured by trading volume) and a trend towards 
decreased volatility (as measured by a standard deviation of returns over the relevant 
period). It is a reasonable assumption that increased speculation has also brought 
increased liquidity to most markets. As trading volume has increased, so has the size of 
limit order books, and, as a result, prices may have generally become less volatile (that 
is, more limit orders are available at current prices to offset new market orders). The 
predictions made by the model do not account for this important relationship. The 
model divides new orders between speculators and commercials, but does not increase 
the total volume of orders, and therefore, cannot simulate the increased liquidity that 
may accompany higher levels of speculation. 
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Table 5.6 Comparison of Volatility and Median Trading Volume During the First 12 
Months of Available Data (1991 for Most Markets) to the Last 12 Months (2007-8 for 
All Markets) 
 
 
The assumption that increased speculation has also brought increased liquidity to most 
markets is also supported indirectly by the empirical modelling of Mike and Farmer 
(2008). As Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 demonstrates, the t-distribution used by Mike and 
Farmer to model the relative placement of buy and sell orders is most dense at the 
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corresponding best price (the best bid for buy orders and best ask for sell orders). This 
means that for a given sampling of new orders (both market and limit orders) there will 
typically be a higher number of limit orders than market orders. This higher proportion 
of limit orders suggests that increased levels of overall market activity (or an increase in 
new orders) may typically correspond to deeper limit order books, and therefore, less 
volatile prices, as more limit orders are available to offset new market orders. 
 
A time-series analysis of historic market data also highlights this relationship between 
increased speculation and decreased volatility. A measure of the proportion of (long and 
short) commercial activity to (long and short) speculator activity in a given market over 
time, introduced in chapter 3, Figure 3.14 and Equation 3.3, provides a proxy for market 
composition. As described in Equation 5.2, a regression model relates this weekly 
measure of market composition to a market's volatility , whilst accounting for 
recent changes in trading volume and open interest in a manner similar to the 
Wang study outlined above. The resulting coefficients for market composition are 
reported in Table 5.7. 
 
Equation 5.2 Regression of Price Volatility on Group Composition, incorporating 
Trading Volume and Open Interest and Lags 
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In Table 5.7, although only a limited number of markets are found to have statistically 
significant relationships, the positively signed coefficients highlight a tendency for 
increased speculation to co-occur with decreasing volatility. The number of markets 
with positively signed coefficients is 25, and only 6 markets have negatively signed 
coefficients. Based on a Binomial test (e.g. Siegel, 1956), there are significantly more 
positive coefficients than would be expected under the null hypothesis that both positive 
and negative signs are equally likely to occur (p < 0.001, two-tailed). Although 
individual markets may not have statistically significant results, the overall trend across 
markets is significant. 
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Table 5.7 Coefficients for the Relationship between the Proportion of Commercial to 
Large Speculator Activity (Market Composition) and Market Volatility 
 
 
These broad trends in the data contradict the claim that increased speculation always 
destabilises market prices (Masters, 2008) and demonstrates that predictions made by 
the market model, as it is currently specified, are ineffective. The model predicts that, 
for a constant level of market activity, an increase in speculation will tend to increase 
price volatility. But increased speculation is also associated with increased liquidity 
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historically. This highlights that additional components need to be introduced to the 
model in order more accurately to represent the relationship between increased 
speculation and increased market liquidity, and therefore, between increased speculation 
and lower levels of volatility. The following section discusses possible extensions to the 
model in more detail. 
 
5.4 Recommendations for Further Extensions to the Mike-Farmer Model 
 
In Chapter 4, I proposed extending the existing market model by specifying new links 
between the group-level and the order-flow level. One area discussed, based on the 
analysis of the historic COT data in chapter 2, is a relationship between higher prices 
and increases in open interest. As Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 demonstrate, a significant 
and positive relationship exists between changes in open-interest and changes in prices 
across a majority of markets. Currently in the model, as described in chapter 4, whether 
a transaction increases or decreases open interest is determined randomly with equal 
probability. I suggested in chapter 4 that a more realistic relationship could be 
introduced by raising the probability of a new order increasing open interest when 
prices have also been increasing – this would correspond to a positive coefficient 
between changes in open interest and changes in prices. A similar positive feedback 
relationship could relate to the activities of speculators, stipulating that speculative 
transactions have a higher probability of increasing open-interest than transactions 
carried out by commercial or other traders. This relationship could therefore link the 
increasing activity of speculators to increasing open interest, as seen historically across 
most markets in the sample (Table 3.1 and Table 5.6). 
 
A further opportunity to extend the model is to specify that the size of the limit order 
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book (the total number of limit orders available) changes in line with the total open 
interest. Currently, in the model, changes in open interest have no direct impact on the 
total number of limit orders held in the order book, although there is a logical 
connection between these two measures of activity: more open interest means more 
contracts waiting to transact, and therefore, a larger limit order book. This could be 
specified in the model by varying the lower-bound of limit orders required for any 
transactions or limit order cancellation to take place. An ad-hoc parameter to this effect 
is already present in the Mike-Farmer model to maintain realistic order book sizes (as 
described in chapter 4), but could be made more meaningful by relating it to changes in 
the overall size of open interest. By introducing these new relationships between the 
group and order-flow level, an indirect relationship between increases in speculation 
and liquidity, and therefore decreases in volatility, would result. 
 
It is by disaggregating market behaviour into its different components that different 
dynamic relationships become apparent and can be incorporated more accurately into 
formal models. It is likely that new group to order-flow level relationships improve the 
model to generate more realistic predictions regarding group activity and market 
volatility. Additionally, they allow the model to be applied more meaningfully and 
generally to further areas of enquiry. This is a clear area for future research. As 
discussed in chapter 3, this incremental process of model development, empirical 
scrutiny of predictions and then refinement of theoretical components, is central to 
progressive science, and more specifically, well-suited to the use of agent-based 
modelling in understanding complex phenomena such as financial markets.  
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5.5 Regulating Order Preferences Rather than Speculators  
 
Rather than regulating particular types of traders, it is potentially much more effective 
to regulate or encourage the use of particular types of orders, or levels of order 
aggression, and by doing so, enforce minimum levels of market liquidity and, thus, 
useful caps on market volatility. This line of thinking would represent a major shift 
away from the traditional view on the impact of speculators in financial markets – 
focused on informational differences between types of traders and imposing limits on 
the amount of speculation in a market – and involve adopting a new paradigm. This 
viewpoint is already gained credence, as Farmer highlights, ―if it is considered socially 
desirable to lower volatility, this can be done by giving incentives for people who place 
limit orders, and charging the people who place market orders‖ (as quoted in Davis, 
2005). This could be done in graded way, for example, during heightened market 
volatility fees associated with market orders could gradually increase to encourage more 
patient trading. This is in stark contrast to threshold limits placed on speculation in a 
given market, as advocated by the RTT perspective.   
 
Whilst Farmer has suggested regulating trades not traders only speculatively, the 
research presented here can move this line of thinking forward more formally. Evidence 
presented in chapters 2 and 4 identifies that groups of traders in a large number of 
markets have relatively stable order-type preferences. Imposing fees on market orders 
and incentives on the use of limit orders will affect different groups of traders in 
profoundly different ways. Speculators, who tend to take liquidity from the market, 
would effectively be taxed by higher costs on market orders whilst commercials may 
not be affected as directly. There are other groups of participants to consider of course, 
for example, market makers who tend to use limit orders and trade over shorter time-
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horizons. It is crucial to have a deep understanding of the impact of regulatory change 
on different groups of market participants and anticipate both the local and emergent 
effects on market behaviour. This point was understood clearly by the NASDAQ Stock 
Exchange prior to the overhaul of its pricing structure and market tick-sizes, leading to a 
significant investment in agent-based technology to model the repercussions of their 
proposals prior to implementation (Darley and Outkin, 2007). Research conducted here 
on the behaviour of groups of traders, and the market model incorporating this 
knowledge, can move research forward with a more user-friendly and parsimonious 
representation of important group-level dynamics. Future versions of the model may 
offer regulators a cost-effective way to investigate the impact of regulatory changes. 
 
As Goldstone and Janssen (2005) argue, with more empirical modelling techniques, 
direct intervention on the part of regulators could be a thing of the past. In large-scale 
systems of interacting agents, such as financial markets, changing the structure of the 
environment even slightly to facilitate certain forms of behaviour could induce major 
changes to a systems‘ emergent behaviour, in part due to the positive feedback effects 
involved. A style of regulation that leaned heavily on computational modelling could 
explore the impact of gradual changes to market structures – such as graduated changes 
to order fees in response to changing levels of market volatility.  This would offer major 
gains to government bodies charged with controlling market crises and systemic risks. 
Indeed, controlling liquidity in the wider economy is a central part of government 
monetary policy. Interest rates are manipulated in the wider economy, often gradually 
over time, to influence consumers and businesses, to encourage savings with higher 
interest rates or spending with lower interest-rates. It may also be feasible to apply 
incentives in order to manipulate liquidity in more localised financial markets. 
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This approach to changing participant behaviour is not without precedent. Financial 
market trading platforms have started to employ pricing regimes to encourage liquidity 
or attract liquidity away from competing trading platforms by charging higher fees on 
market orders (taking liquidity) and rebates on limit orders (making liquidity). Table 5.8 
provides example fees charged and rebates offered for different order-types across 
different U.S equity trading platforms, so called Make / Take fees (taken from Traders 
Magazine, July 2008). Similarly, Exchanges often operate with ‗Designated Market 
Makers‘ who are obliged continuously to provide limit orders in return for a 
predetermined income from the Exchange. This process often occurs when a new 
product is launched, to guarantee liquidity, or some-other structural change takes place 
(see, for example CME, 2008). 
 
Table 5.8 Example Make Fees (or Rebates for Limit Orders) and Take Fees (charged for 
Market Orders) Across a Selection of U.S. Equity Trading Platforms (in Cents per 100 
Shares) 
 
 
Make / Take fees have caused controversy within the financial community (see Citadel, 
2008), pointing to the need for more detailed understanding of the effects of such 
regimes on different groups of market participants. The U.S Securities and Exchange 
Commission have acknowledged this controversy and recently imposed a cap of $0.003 
per share in Equity markets (Rule 610(c) of Regulation NMS), with calls for similar 
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caps on Options Exchanges. With these processes already in place commercially, it 
seems a logic area for regulators to consider in more detail as a means to influence 
participants and liquidity, and therefore, to control market volatility more effectively. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Regulators concerned with the economic impact of overly-volatile financial market 
prices have, in many cases, attributed blame to speculators and an increase in their 
activities (the so called regulation-by-type-of-trader, or RTT approach, as discussed in 
the introduction). This chapter has reviewed literature on the relationship between 
speculators and financial market behaviour and explored this relationship with the use 
of a market model and historical COT and price data. In line with the mixed conclusions 
drawn from the literature review, new research presented in this chapter also suggests 
the impact of speculators on market behaviour is not easily determined.  
 
On one side of the debate, speculators may trade more aggressively and therefore 
extract liquidity from markets and increase volatility; a positive relationship is found in 
historical COT data between unexpected changes in net-positions by speculators and 
market volatility; additionally, the market model (as it is currently specified) predicts, 
for a given level of market activity, that increased speculation legitimately relates to 
increased levels of market volatility due to a preference for more aggressive orders.  
 
On the other side of the debate, an alternative methodology applied to historic COT data 
demonstrates that increased speculation also accompanies higher levels of market 
activity, and therefore, higher liquidity. As a result, increased speculation is also 
associated with lower levels of market volatility in the real data. These conflicting 
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results point to a crucial observation about the nature of market volatility seemingly 
overlooked by the RTT advocates: it is the balance between liquidity taking (the use of 
market orders) and liquidity provision (the use of limit orders) that is central to 
understanding market volatility. Speculators may contribute to both these sides of the 
market, despite a preference for more aggressive orders when compared to other 
participants such as commercial traders. This awareness should inform market 
regulators and enforce a shift away from the RTT approach. 
 
For regulators, rather than focusing specifically on the role of speculators, an alternative 
framework that regulates types of trades rather than types of traders may be more 
effective. As discussed above, this new approach could influence market volatility via 
market liquidity – by incentivising the use of market or limit orders with variable fees 
and rebates. There is also precedence for such a regime, with the existence of Make / 
Take fees and Designated Market Makers already common on many exchanges. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Contents: 
 
 6.1 Introduction  
 6.2 Chapter Review: Successes, Limitations and Areas for Future Research  
 6.3 Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Market Morphology 
 
Abstract: 
 
This chapter reviews the objectives and preceding research in this thesis, offering 
criticisms and areas for improvement and future research. The chapter closes by placing 
this work within the broader context of future developments in the study of financial 
markets. A movement towards a theory of ‗market morphology‘ is proposed, that would 
encompass the mapping of different forms of emergent level price behaviour to the 
different participant ecologies operating in a market-place. Research in this thesis has 
assisted in the study of market morphology in three ways: by advocating a move beyond 
existing models of financial markets and their outdated representations of trader 
behaviour; by demonstrating empirical consistencies in trader-group behaviour that 
contribute to representations for more accurate market models; and by introducing a 
new market model achieving behavioural realism at multiple levels of analysis.  
 
“Our view is that the enormous quantities of data that are now available fundamentally 
change the approach one should take to building economic theories about financial 
markets.” 
Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo (2009, p. 63) 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The primary research objectives for this thesis are to increase understanding of the 
behaviour of groups of traders in financial markets, and to develop a market model that 
incorporates more realistic group behaviour as a foundation for more practical, future 
research into market dynamics. With these objectives in mind, this chapter reviews how 
effectively the research presented in this thesis achieved these goals. Each chapter is 
briefly reviewed and potential successes and limitations of each step in the research 
process are discussed, with areas for future research highlighted. The chapter closes by 
placing the overall findings within a wider context to determine their significance and 
relevance for future work.  
 
6.2 Chapter Review: Successes, Limitations and Areas for Future Research  
 
Chapter 1 briefly reviews findings of statistical characteristics associated with financial 
market prices. When changes in market prices are measured in a standardised way to 
allow meaningful comparisons across different markets, research identifies certain 
observable features to be remarkably similar across a wide range of markets, such as the 
long-tailed distribution of returns and the relationship between the size of returns and 
their frequency. Specific parameters describing these statistical characteristics are even 
found to be directly comparable (see Figure 1.3). At a conceptual level, these are 
important findings. They suggest other consistencies in market behaviour may exist, and 
may have been overlooked by existing research.  Additionally, these findings point 
intriguingly towards universal mechanisms underlying aspects of markets behaviour. 
These observations are the foundation for the research carried out in this thesis, which 
explores consistencies in financial markets at the level of group behaviour, rather than at 
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the level of price behaviour; and is motivated by the awareness that the behaviour of 
traders inevitably relates to the behaviour of market prices – and their associated 
characteristics.  
 
An empirical study into traders' behaviour with data spanning almost 2 decades across 
31 different futures markets is carried out in chapter 2. This chapter represents the bulk 
of the empirical work carried out in this thesis and is therefore reviewed and critiqued at 
some length in the following paragraphs. Although the COT dataset used here has been 
analysed elsewhere, this has been primarily in economic settings. A thorough 
investigation into the behaviour of traders as a direct focus of the research has been 
lacking in the literature, as reviewed in chapter 2. The empirical work identifies a 
pattern of behaviour in historic COT data: speculators typically buy into rising prices 
whereas commercial traders typically sell into rising prices; the opposite pattern occurs 
during falling prices. This systematic behaviour of different groups of traders is 
apparently robust and applies across the majority of markets sampled. The remainder of 
the thesis explores the implications of this trading pattern for existing models of 
financial markets, provides a behavioural account of the phenomena in terms of order-
type preferences and a market model incorporating these results, and investigates how 
these insights inform on the relationship between the activities of different groups and 
the volatility of market prices – with possible implications for market regulation.  
 
I employ two separate research methodologies for chapter 2. An econometric approach 
demonstrates consistencies in group trading behaviour via standard time-series models. 
A time series regression predicts the change in a group‘s positions on each time step as a 
function of the current market returns, and the returns and change in positions on 
previous time steps. The coefficients describing the relationship between change in 
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positions and returns have a significant and consistent pattern across markets: 
speculators‘ coefficients are positive whereas commercial traders‘ coefficients are 
negative (Table 2.5). This pattern is also shown to hold at longer-time-horizons and 
additional tests confirm that the coefficients associated with the groups are significantly 
different. I then explore this same pattern of behaviour using an alternative, more 
bespoke methodology. This approach employs a standardisation procedure to compare 
changes in traders' positions across different markets. (This is comparable to the 
approach adopted by other researchers to analyse statistical characteristics of market 
prices, as cited in chapter 1.) By comparing changes in positions associated with price 
changes of a standardised size and similar sign (positive or negative price changes), 
direct comparisons of behaviour under similar conditions are carried out across markets. 
This second approach produces results consistent with the econometric methodology, 
and also permits new studies of the phenomena. For example, a comparison of trading 
behaviour across markets demonstrates that relative changes in positions within groups 
– for a given relative price change – cannot be considered significantly different; that is, 
a high level of similarity may exist within groups and across markets (Tables 2.13 and 
2.14).  
 
The second research methodology is unorthodox and can be criticised for lacking direct 
parallels to previous research. It is my view, however, that, as a supplement to more 
standard econometrics, the methodology of standardising and categorising market 
behaviour is complementary, being both non-parametric (although non-parametric 
econometric techniques could certainly be explored for future research) and allowing 
for new research questions to be addressed. The primary contribution of the alternative 
methodology is to show that not only are commercial and speculators significantly 
different in their trading behaviour, but, additionally, behaviour within groups cannot be 
233 
 
considered significantly different in many cases. These results indicate that intra-group 
behaviour is similar across a majority of markets – a new research finding. Additionally, 
the second methodology allows for a comparison of scaling in trading behaviour, 
finding evidence that certain group behaviours can be considered proportional at 
different relative scales of price changes. These are novel research directions most 
effectively supported by a novel research approach.  
 
An additional critique of chapter 2 relates to the consistencies of the findings and the 
observation that interest-rate and stock index markets may show less consistent patterns 
of group behaviour than other markets, including currencies and more traditional 
agricultural, metal and industrial futures markets (see Tables 2.5 to 2.8). There are 
certainly important economic differences between the asset-classes that could underlie 
differences in results. Interest-rates and stock indexes are financial, rather than tangible, 
as is the case with a commodity, for example. It could be that the lack of a more tangible 
underlying product to these derivative markets results in different, or less pronounced 
patterns of behaviour. There has been no further study into these differences and 
additional statistical tests are required to assess whether they are meaningful.   
 
A further criticism of the empirical work in chapter 2 applies to the choice of markets. I 
select 31 different futures markets covering 6 different asset classes as a comprehensive 
and diverse sample of different products. However, these markets were chosen on a 
discretionary basis, as being sufficiently liquid, economically relevant, and diverse. The 
selection criteria could have been more systematic here; for example, markets could 
have been selected strictly on the basis of liquidity or trading volume. Furthermore, in 
addition to futures markets, option markets are also reported in COT data. Including 
option markets in the study could have provided a larger sample size.  
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A final criticism of the empirical work presented in chapter 2 relates to the scope of the 
research. My research focuses very deeply on a particular pattern of trading behaviour; I 
analyse the consistency of a pattern of behaviour across markets and within groups. I do 
not explore, more broadly, other possible patterns of trading behaviour that may exist 
and be identifiable via new research techniques or datasets. One possible research 
direction overlooked, but strongly suggested by the findings reported in chapter 2, is a 
causal relationship between changes in positions and market returns. This area of 
research was partly avoided due to the existence of a number of other studies 
investigating this same subject using various datasets from stock exchanges (Choe, Kho, 
and Stulz, 1999; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu, 2003). These 
findings generally suggest that market returns have some ability to forecast changes in 
traders‘ positions, but not the other way around. As reviewed in chapter 2, similar 
studies have also been conducted with the use of COT data (Buchanan, Hodges, and 
Theis, 2001; Wang, 2001). My intention in chapter 2 is to focus on concurrent 
relationships between market returns and group positions, and the surprising level of 
consistency found here – an area that has not been the subject of a comprehensive study 
using COT data. 
 
As possible further research, it may be of interest to explore how the causal relationship 
identified by other researchers between market returns and traders‘ positions relates to 
order-type preferences. (That is, the theory of different levels of trading aggression 
associated with different types of traders that is explored in the following chapters of the 
thesis.) More broadly, future research could involve the study of alternative datasets and 
proceed with clearer hypotheses that extend from my own work. A recent paper by 
Lillo, Moro, Vaglica and Mantegna (2008) analyses the synchronous relationship 
between market returns and changes in the trading positions of firms in the Spanish 
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stock market. The results of this study are very similar with my own, but span an 
entirely different set of markets and participant groups. Focusing on the four most 
highly capitalised stocks and approximately 70 of the most active trading companies in 
the Spanish stock market, Lillo et al. classify participants into three well-defined 
groups. Firms are characterised by changes in their positions as being either positively 
correlated with stock returns (similar to my findings on large speculators), negatively 
correlated (similar to my findings on commercial traders), or uncorrelated (with 
similarities to non-reportable traders). Lillo et al. (2008, p. 12) suggest these trading 
firms ―self-organise in groups to the extent that in most cases it is possible to 
characterise a firm with a specific resulting strategy‖. Furthermore, Lillo et al. identify 
that firms typically stay in the same group over the 4 year sample period, indicating a 
long term specialisation. These findings are analogous to those in chapter 2, suggesting 
high levels of consistency in trading behaviour. Lillo et al. also argue their results offer 
an empirical basis for agent-based models of financial markets, as I have done 
throughout this thesis, but fail to explore possible links between patterns of trading 
behaviour and order-type preferences.  
 
Moving on to Chapter 3, which reviews literature on computational and agent-based 
modelling in the social sciences, and more specifically, the application of this relatively 
new approach to modelling financial markets. The literature review in this chapter 
highlights that many existing models of financial markets incorporate unrealistic 
representations of groups of traders, relying on theoretical convenience rather than 
empirical evidence. For this chapter, I implement the Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005) 
market model that generates realistic statistical characteristics of market prices and use 
the model to demonstrate weak group representations. The simulated group behaviour 
from this market model is unrealistic, yet a central theoretical component. This analysis 
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leads to a number of suggestions on how to improve behavioural realism in future 
market models.  
 
Whilst informative, the analysis of Alfarano et al. in chapter 3 can be criticised as being 
inappropriate given the model‘s intentions. The developers set out to replicate key price 
characteristics and develop a model that can be calibrated to represent a particular 
financial market‘s behaviour. To do so, they use highly stylized components that 
extended logically from previous literature, including the typical groups of fundamental 
and noise traders (see discussion in sections 2.2 and 3.5). These representations of 
groups of participants have a long heritage in academia and it is difficult to criticise 
Alfarano et al. for using these established components to develop a model that is 
broadly successful within the context of their objectives. However, as a relatively recent 
publication and representative of many other models in this area, the approach of 
Alfarano et al. demonstrates a misalignment between the research objectives and the 
established components used to derive the results. If an objective of such research is to 
calibrate a model to represent real financial markets more closely, other sources of 
empirical data, in addition to those on market prices, are equally valid measures of a 
model‘s success, and, should therefore be referenced as a tool for progressive research. 
The comparison of simulated to real-world group behaviour carried out in chapter 2 
helps to demonstrate that the group representations upheld as the status-quo in modern 
market models do not adequately extend from empirical sources. With new objectives of 
moving towards higher levels of realism and market-specific calibration, the status-quo 
is in need of updating. My analysis here is intended to highlight this point as it applies 
to Alfarano et al. and, with equal merit, the broader research paradigm.  
 
An alternative ‗zero-intelligence‘ approach to modelling economic phenomena, 
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including financial markets, is reviewed in chapter 4. It is named ‗zero-intelligence‘ 
because of the focus on situational constraints in economic situations, rather than 
agents‘ intelligence. The approach also advocates a bottom-up stance to model building 
that relies on using empirical data to develop models rather than theoretical 
assumptions. The market model developed by Mike and Farmer (2008) is implemented 
for chapter 4 and accurately calibrates its core components on real-world market data. 
The model, in the context of empirically derived components, demonstrates that the 
continuous double-auction – the standard trading institution of almost all financial 
markets – has a powerful constraining influence on traders‘ behaviour. Via the accurate 
simulation of the placement and cancellation of market and limit orders, and, in the 
absence of any rational decision-making or conditional behaviour on behalf of agents, a 
number of statistical characteristics associated with financial market behaviour naturally 
emerge in the model. Deeper theoretical assumptions, including a division between 
fundamental and noise traders, are not required for the model to be effective.  
 
Chapter 4 extends the Mike-Farmer model to include groups of traders with different 
levels of order-aggression as an account of the patterns of behaviour identified in 
chapter 2. Speculators are considered typically to rely on market orders whereas 
commercial traders typically rely on limit orders. These different levels of order 
aggression, when introduced into the Mike-Farmer model along with measures of 
trading behaviour amongst different groups (referred to as ‗simulated COT data‘), give 
rise to the behaviour documented in historic COT data. This new layer of realism in the 
model is consistent with the original Mike and Farmer approach – it is derived from 
empirical data and indirectly captures global characteristics in the market place (in this 
case, the aggregate behaviour of different types of traders).  
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Introducing order-type preferences as an explanation for the behaviour documented in 
chapter 2 is an assumption, of course, and does not imply that such preferences actually 
produce the phenomena in real-world financial markets. This assumption can be 
adequately defended on two counts, however. Firstly, and most crucially, the approach is 
strongly supported by existing evidence of order-type preferences amongst market 
participants with different business objectives (see studies discussed in section 4.4 and 
4.5); secondly, the theoretical assumption of group order-type preferences is introduced 
into the model at a low-level, applying to groups of traders that make up the market 
system, and is not crucial to the model‘s overall performance (the Mike-Farmer 
approach proceeds to simulate price behaviour accurately in the absence of order-type 
preferences). This is in contrast to focusing assumptions at the highest-level, and 
abstracting over the entire behaviour of the system, as typical of alternative modelling 
approaches (e.g. Alfarano et al. 2005; Miller and Page; 2007).  
 
There are alternative explanations for the patterns of group behaviour and these are 
discussed in chapter 4. A more typical economic account would propose consistencies in 
trading behavior arise via strategic or informational differences, or via noise and 
positive feedback trading (e.g. Black, 1986; Shleifer and Summers, 1990), or herding 
behavior (Irwin and Yoshimaru, 1999). Whilst there may be merit in these theories, and, 
indeed, none are mutually exclusive from my own, the question posed in chapter 4 is: 
which account offers the most evidence-driven, parsimonious explanation? I consider a 
theory of order-type preferences to be the most powerful account, linking most naturally 
to differences in business objectives amongst market participants, and supported by 
evidence of varying levels of order aggression amongst different types of traders. As 
such, the extended Mike-Farmer model can be considered a constructive ‗proof‘ of the 
proposition that order-type preferences contribute to patterns of group trading behavior 
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across a broad range of markets. 
 
The extended Mike-Farmer market simulation is unique in that it is empirically 
consistent at two separate levels of analysis: at the order-flow level, based on the 
modelling and empirical calibration conducted by Mike and Farmer, and at the group-
level, based on my own research. Whilst other approaches have sought-out similar 
levels of realism (Darley and Outkin, 2007), the model presented here is relatively 
simple and easy to replicate. Indeed, it would be possible to take forward the 
simulations I have done analytically, and relate them more closely to previous 
mathematical models. For example, Parlour (1998) shows that the probabilities involved 
in the trade-off between the choice of market and limit order relates fundamentally to 
the number of limit orders currently held; Foucault (1999) suggests higher volatility 
increases the probability of limit orders becoming executed at an unfavourable price; 
Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) demonstrate that participants who rely on shorter-
term information have an associated higher opportunity cost of non-execution and 
therefore make use of more aggressive orders. All these models have some relevance to 
my own approach and offer potential frameworks for extension. As Miller and Page 
(2007) highlight, it is the norm in economics to derive mathematical models from first 
principles and, whilst the approach can yield valuable insights, it can also be limiting, 
applying most appropriately to homogeneous and equilibrating ‗worlds‘, rather than 
complex and dynamic ones such as financial markets. I choose to extend the Mike-
Farmer computational model due to its flexibility and its uniquely empirical focus that 
aligns with the objectives of this thesis. Additionally, this model is very recent and 
represents the current trend in the literature away from purely theoretical models. I 
consider the market model developed here to accommodate a number of realistic 
characteristics of market behaviour on a minimal number of theoretical components.  It 
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is sufficiently powerful to offer a strong foundation for future research. As Miller and 
Page (2007, p. 20) highlight, good models are often ―designed to be just sufficient to tell 
a story that could be understood easily yet have enough substance to provide some 
insights into broader issues‖. Some broader issues are explored in the next chapter of 
the thesis. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the relationship between the activities of particular types of traders, 
in particular speculators, and market volatility – a topical subject of relevance to 
financial market regulators. An analysis is conducted with historic COT and price data, 
and with the market model developed previously. Computational models are unique in 
that they provide a laboratory for research, an environment in which to test and develop 
key hypotheses for understanding emergent behaviour more accurately. In chapter 5, 
parameter values in the market model are varied to explore how the concentration of 
different groups may impact on market volatility. The model clearly predicts that 
increased use of aggressive orders from speculators leads to more volatile prices, but 
also demonstrates how important non-linearity can be introduced from changes in the 
relative concentration of different groups of traders (and their associated order-
preferences).  
 
The empirical research in chapter 5 finds conflicting results, however: over the sample 
period, the activity of speculators is often associated with reduced volatility (at least 
when using stark statistical tests – see section 5.3.2 on Wang‘s methodology). Increased 
speculation may introduce more liquidity to markets and therefore be associated with 
reduced volatility. The empirical analysis in chapter 5 leads to a number of suggestions 
for future improvements to the market model, which include linking the size of the limit 
order book more closely to the total amount of open interest in the simulated market. 
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Additionally, the analysis leads to a discussion on new possibilities for market 
regulation: regulating types of trades rather than types of traders. By regulating market 
liquidity (the supply of limit orders relative to market orders) it is possible to regulate 
market volatility. I suggest this approach has not been adequately explored by market 
regulators.  
 
A worthy criticism of the empirical research in this chapter applies to the sample period 
for the data analysed here, which extends until 2008 only. Although in most cases the 
data covers the preceding 17 years and is therefore substantial, for many markets, the 
period from 2008 onwards has been marked by periods of unusually extreme volatility. 
For example, the stock market effectively crashed in September-October 2008 with the 
bankruptcy and government bail-outs of a number of international companies. 
Economists may consider this time as characteristic of a ‗regime shift‘ in market activity 
– and therefore unrepresentative of more typical market behaviour. Further research 
could compare and contrast findings on group behaviour from the period preceding the 
recent volatility and use subsequent data as an out-of-sample test of the findings.  
 
One of the most interesting areas for future research is to continue to develop the Mike-
Farmer model. In particular, it may be interesting to provide a clearer framework for 
emergence in the market model, whereby well-formulated aggregate behaviour can arise 
from localised, individual behaviour. To develop models that move beyond our initial 
understanding, flexible frameworks are required for new and unanticipated features to 
arise (Miller and Page, 2007). The current specification of the market model provides a 
framework for realistic group behaviour to arise from lower-level probabilistic 
specifications of order preferences, but more research in this direction is certainly 
possible. For example, it would be possible to demonstrate how different constraints 
242 
 
associated with business objectives lead inevitably to participant behaviours. As Epstein 
(2007, p. 8) highlights, the motto of a new form of ‗generative‘ social science is: ―if you 
didn‘t grow it, you didn‘t explain its emergence‖. Within the context of this modelling 
research, market agents could be provided with a range of position-sizes associated with 
their trading (which can be considered as related to their business objectives; for 
example, pension funds have much larger position sizes then market makers), whilst the 
time-horizons for investments and the associated order-aggression are optimisable 
parameters in the model and determined on the basis of agents‘ performance. Agents 
could then evolve over time towards optimal behaviour given their unique business 
constraints, whilst other agent decisions (such as whether to buy or sell) are determined 
randomly so that the influence of business objectives on behaviour is isolated. Such a 
modelling specification may lead naturally to the emergence of the pattern of group 
behaviour identified in chapter 2.  
 
6.3 Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Market Morphology 
 
Given the above chapter review, I consider that the objectives of this thesis - to increase 
understanding of group behaviour in financial markets and to develop a market model 
incorporating more realistic behaviour - to have been broadly achieved. There is clear 
scope for improvements and future research and a number of options in this direction 
have been outlined in this chapter and elsewhere. This concluding section now briefly 
considers the broader significance and contribution of this work to new developments in 
the study of financial markets.  
 
I consider this research to be increasingly important in connecting the behaviour of 
participants in financial markets, or what can be considered local level market 
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dynamics, with higher level behaviour associated with financial market prices, or what 
can be considered the emergent level. By offering new evidence on the behaviour of 
groups of traders, this thesis contributes to more realistic models of market dynamics, 
and therefore assists in the process of mapping emergent level behaviours more 
accurately to local level components. This mapping process could be termed a theory of 
‗market morphology‘: connecting the form of market behaviour (or emergent 
behaviour) to its component parts (or local level behaviour, including relative 
concentrations of different types of participants). The goal of this area of research would 
be to understand broad similarities and idiosyncratic differences between financial 
markets, in liquidity, volatility, or more abstract notions of power-law scaling (as 
discussed in chapter 1), in terms of differences in local level components – such as 
unique participants and participant ecologies.  
 
There are analogies for a theory of market morphology from other areas of science. 
Morphological diagrams are standard measurement tools in the study of bacterial 
colonies (Ball, 2004). Shapes form in agar gel, for example, as it develops depending 
uniquely on the amount of nutrients and the hardness of the gel during development. 
The resulting form of the bacteria is reliably related to its inputs so that maps of this 
relationship have been constructed. A more well-known example is the relationship 
between air temperature, humidity and the shape of snowflakes. For example, 
hexagonal columns of ice grow below -25c, whilst, between -5c and -22c, snowflakes 
form as flat plates in relatively dry air, and as more typical star shapes if air humidity is 
higher. For snowflakes, temperature and humidity can be considered control parameters 
that construct a ‗morphological space‘. Growth patterns for both bacteria and 
snowflakes can be divided into discrete classes based on the relationship between core 
control parameters, and the subsequent form of growth is repeatable, even if precise 
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details differ. 
 
In a similar way, local level quantities in financial markets, such as the relative quantity 
of participants with particular business objectives and trading characteristics such as 
order-aggression, may generate a morphological space for particular types of market 
behaviour to emerge. As Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009, p. 145) highlight, ―it 
would be extremely valuable to have a comprehensive empirical study that connects the 
heterogeneity of market participants with their strategy and with the properties of price 
dynamics‖. It is not suggested that this theory could offer a complete explanation of 
market behaviour, but it could forge new, broad insights into how the interactions of 
different types of participants influence the behavior of markets.  
 
Whilst my research does not focus on exploring a theory of market morphological 
directly, it does provide insight into components that are required for such research. 
Chapter 2 provides empirical evidence demonstrating a clear pattern of behaviour 
amongst two very different types of market participants in large U.S future markets: 
speculators typically use more market orders, whereas commercial traders typically use 
more limit orders. These order-preferences may relate closely to fundamental types of 
market participants. As Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo (2009) argue, there may be two 
broad classes of agents in financial markets: liquidity takers and liquidity providers. The 
impact these different types of participants have on a market system may relate to the 
positive and negative feedback effects they introduce via liquidity changes. This broad 
distinction between liquidity takers and providers could also be extended to encompass 
other market participants not documented in COT data, such as market makers, who are 
traditionally viewed as liquidity providers, although recent debate on the high frequency 
trading and automated market making has suggested otherwise (e.g. Grant, 2010). Lillo 
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et al. (2008, p. 14) agree that there is ―an interplay of at least two classes of traders, 
different with respect to their size heterogeneity and responding to price changes in 
different ways‖. In moving towards a theory of market morphology, Lillo et al. (2008, 
p.14) support the possibility that ―the fluctuation of price returns, i.e. the market 
volatility, is significantly affected by the fluctuations in the relative trading intensity of 
the two groups.‖ 
 
Accurately calibrated market models and clear hypotheses from empirical research offer 
strong foundations for a theory of market morphology. But this area of research also 
faces numerous challenges. Empirical datasets are limited and markets are highly 
dynamic environments: models must be able to distinguish what is contingent from 
what is robust, via rigorous testing against empirical sources. Models must also 
successful locate a middle ground between excessively crude caricatures of a financial 
market and excessively complex ones. Within these important constraints, a theory of 
market morphology must also have realistic and pragmatic aims: to deliver much 
needed insight into differences between markets that can benefit those charged with 
regulating them. It is widely accepted that the severe economic downturn that began in 
2008 was partly caused by the extreme behaviour of certain financial markets; a 
research agenda that increases our understanding of how market behaviour changes and 
evolves over time is of clear relevance at this time.  
 
To continue the comparison with the natural world, there is an intriguing analogy for the 
potential in this new area of research found in the study of natural systems, suggestive 
of the important role of participant heterogeneity in understanding and effectively 
regulating financial markets. Honey bees have a dependence on the internal temperature 
of their hive, which must fall within a specific and narrow range in order for bees to 
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reproduce and grow effectively (Fischer, 2004). To regulate this temperature, bees 
collectively vary their behaviour: to increase the heat, bees huddle together and rapidly 
flap their wings; to reduce the temperature, bees spread out and fan their wings. The 
temperature threshold that stimulates this behaviour is linked to a genetic trait. Hives 
with bees that lack genetic diversity are prone to extreme fluctuations in internal 
temperature. As bees react at similar temperature levels, extreme fluctuations in 
temperature and limited hive-productivity result. In contrast, hives with higher levels of 
genetic diversity amongst bees have more stable temperatures. The collective response 
of the bees to changes in temperature is more gradual, being graded at different 
thresholds to offer a more consistent hive environment. In a similar respect, the 
collective response of market participants creates aggregate fluctuations in market 
liquidity, volatility and prices. Sufficient diversity amongst traders and financial 
institutions – specifically, their order preferences, levels of trading aggression, or prices 
at which they are willing to buy and sell - may promote more stable economic 
environments. By developing a thorough understanding of the behaviours associated 
with participants, and an accurate mapping of how these behaviours interact and 
aggregate in market environments, it may be possible to mitigate related risks more 
effectively.  
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